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INTRODUCTION

Class actions incite both delight and disgust.
Several
complementary themes in popular culture embrace the class action,
including sympathy for underdog litigants challenging powerful
malefactors, fascination with massive redistributions of wealth from
corporations to individuals, and reluctance to permit large and
influential wrongdoers to escape justice merely because of their size
and clout. Class actions have thus become an appealing procedural
counterweight to the burdens that modern society imposes on
consumers and citizens, giving many little Davids a fighting chance
for protection from or retribution against political and economic
Goliaths. But class actions also expose and rile competing visions of
the judicial system: suspicion of large-scale judicial proceedings,
wariness of high-paid plaintiffs' lawyers, and a sense that society may
subsidize the jackpot payouts that often result from group litigation
and settlement. These crosscurrents of attraction and repulsion have
propelled class actions to a level of political and academic prominence
far exceeding the attention devoted to any other aspect of civil
procedure.
Despite the critical attention focused on class actions, the
debate over how best to reform them has not identified a conceptual
flaw at the core of their design. Academic scrutiny of class actions
over the past sixty years has usually built upon three overlapping
themes: the potential utility and fairness (or disutility and unfairness)
of aggregating individual claims as a solution to collective action
problems that inhibit enforcement of substantive rights, the extent
and significance of agency costs and diminished individual autonomy
in representative litigation, and the relative roles that courts,
legislators, and administrative agencies should play in redressing
widespread injuries. These themes at an abstract level frame the
debate over whether class actions are desirable as a matter of public
policy, and at a technical level frame arguments for or against the
myriad procedural reforms that scholars and legislators have proposed
to expand, curtail, or manage class litigation.1 However, analysis of
1.
A vast and growing literature analyzes the structure, role, and utility of class actions
(as well as other aggregative devices) and proposes an equally vast array of regulatory, remedial,
and procedural reforms to federal and state laws governing the prevention and remediation of
injuries affecting large groups. Among the many excellent contributions to the field are:
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE

GAIN (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000) [hereinafter Coffee, Accountability];
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1343 (1995) [hereinafter Coffee, Class Wars]; John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs'
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whether and how to reform class actions often overlooks a critical
theoretical concept that has little direct connection to either the
collective action, agency cost, or institutional role strands of class
action scholarship. This Article seeks to correct that theoretical
oversight, to explore some of its practical implications, and to
demonstrate how rethinking the principles that animate class actions
reveals a novel avenue of class action reform.
The pivotal issue in most proposed class actions seeking
damages is whether class members' factual and legal circumstances
are sufficiently alike to permit resolution of contested claims and
defenses collectively rather than through traditional case-by-case
adjudication. This issue of "alikeness" arises because the factual
circumstances of multiple plaintiffs seeking to join in a single
proceeding are seldom precisely the same. Factual distinctions at
various levels of subtlety and materiality usually permeate the legal
claims of putative class members, such that their collective claims
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Private Enforcement];
Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, & Conflict of Interest, 4 J.
LEG. STUD. 47 (1975); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, &
Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEG. F. 475 (2003); Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class
Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21 (1996); Samuel Issacharoff, Governanceand Legitimacy in the
Law of Class Actions, 1999 SuP. CT. REV. 337; Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1941); Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375-400 (1967); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Plaintiffs'Attorney'sRole in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991); Francis E. McGovern, Class Actions
and Social Issue Torts in the Gulf South, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1655 (2000); Arthur R. Miller, Of
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "ClassAction Problem," 92
HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979); Geoffrey P. Miller, ClassActions in the Gulf States: EmpiricalAnalysis
of a Cultural Stereotype, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1681 (2000); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence
Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003) [hereinafter
Nagareda, Preexistence]; Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass
Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002); George L. Priest, ProceduralVersus Substantive
Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 521 (1997); Martin H. Redish, Class
Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and
Public Roles, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71; Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate:
Relationships, Representation& Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1996); Judith Resnik, From "Cases"
to "Litigation,"54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5-46 (1991); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in
Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class
Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) [hereinafter
Rosenberg, Mandatory Litigation]; David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "PublicLaw" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Beyond the Class Action Rule: An Inventory of Statutory Possibilitiesto Improve the Federal
Class Action, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186 (1996); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party
and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998); Charles Silver, 'We're Scared to Death": Class
Certification & Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003); Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut,
You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465
(1998).
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raise both "common" and "individual" 2 questions relevant to proving
liability and damages. The answer to common questions (such as
whether a product was defectively designed or whether an
advertisement was misleading) are identical for every class member,
and can often be determined accurately and efficiently in a single
proceeding before a single finder of fact. However, the answer to
individual questions (such as whether a design defect was the
proximate cause of an injury or whether a consumer relied on a
misleading representation) can vary from plaintiff to plaintiff and may
require time-consuming and costly proceedings to assess the merit and
3
monetary value of each class member's claim.
Common and individual questions pull in opposite directions on
the issue of whether a court should certify claims for class action
treatment. The prevalence of important common questions suggests
that consolidating otherwise disparate claims into a class action would
efficiently deploy scarce judicial resources while providing plaintiffs
2.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Elsewhere in this Article, I use the words "similar" and
"dissimilar" in lieu of "common" and "individual" to illustrate the problems that arise when
courts attempt to resolve questions that do not yield identical answers for each class member.
3.
The nature and significance of individual issues is a function of the substantive liability
and damage rules applicable to asserted claims and defenses. I assume in this Article that most
common law and statutory sources of rights that create private remedies will continue to include
elements-such as proximate causation-that may require varying proofs depending on
particular class members' circumstances. The design of procedural rules should accommodate
the individualized elements of substantive laws that the procedures help to enforce. See infra
Part III.B. However, to the extent that the content of substantive law creates undesirable
obstacles to the development of fair and efficient procedures, policymakers can amend
substantive rules through appropriate judicial or legislative avenues to better exploit the
advantages of available procedures. For example, developments in consumer protection law that
permit plaintiffs to prove reliance based on general evidence without offering direct testimony
arguably illustrate the evolutionary adaptation of substantive law to a procedural environment
that favors common elements over individual elements. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing
Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1654 (2000) (reviewing
developments in the law of reliance and arguing that "[iun the case of reliance, the certification
battles are best understood as ongoing uncertainty over the true state of substantive law").
Similarly, the growing literature considering whether the basic structure of tort law can tolerate
relaxation of causation and injury requirements to treat the imposition of risk as an actionable
harm is highly relevant to the debate over class actions (although it is usually not framed in
those terms) because risk-based claims are easier for large numbers of claimants to prove by
common evidence than are claims premised on palpable individual injuries. The question of how
the structure of tort constrains the definition of required elements thus has ramifications for
which procedural remedies will be available to enforce substantive rights, which in turn
determines how effective liability rules are likely to be in vindicating the compensation,
deterrence, and insurance objectives of tort law. For a general discussion of risk-based liability
theories, see generally Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death & Harm: The Normative Foundationsof
Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1436-42 (2003); Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating
General Causation:Notes Toward a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2117 (1997); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625
(2002); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for IncreasingRisk, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 439 (1990).
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with an opportunity to leverage their own resources against the
defendant's inherent economy of scale. 4 In contrast, the presence of
salient individual questions suggests that adjudicating a class action
would either require numerous hearings on individualized questions
of law or fact, or would induce courts to adopt substantive, procedural,
or evidentiary shortcuts around such hearings. 5 Extensive hearings
may become impractical, while shortcuts around them may become
unfair. Courts considering whether to certify proposed class actions
thus face a recurring dilemma about how to resolve the tension
between common and individual questions that arises when class
members present factual circumstances that are similar, but not
exactly alike.
The theoretical and practical dimensions of the tension
strikingly
are
questions
common and individual
between
underexplored beyond the literature addressing agency costs. The
consequences of diversity among class members have been carefully
analyzed in the context of decisions about the propriety of allowing a

4.
Class actions potentially promote social welfare by overcoming collective action
problems inherent in the regulation of conduct affecting disorganized groups. Injurers can derive
large benefits from imposing comparatively small costs on each member of a risk-bearing
population. The injurer's ability to derive a concentrated benefit from imposing diffused costs
creates a significant asymmetry of resources and incentives between injurers and victims. The
injurer has a strong incentive to continue its conduct and has the resources to defend itself, while
no individual victim has a comparably strong incentive or sufficient resources to compel the
injurer to stop. When the conduct is complete, the injurer's size and potential exposure provide
it with the resources and incentives to avoid being held accountable, while the victims
individually often lack the incentives or resources to sustain the effort of investigating potential
claims and obtaining a remedy for losses. The traditional single plaintiff versus single defendant
model of private dispute resolution thus does not provide a viable means for compensating
victims or deterring injurers because victims are unlikely to sue, and if they do sue, injurers are
likely to have an advantage in the litigation's war of attrition. The theory underlying the class
action is that aggregating victims into a single fictional unit - "the class" - places incentives and
resources into a more equitable balance and neutralizes the defendant's otherwise overwhelming
tactical advantage. See, e.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, supranote 1, at 686:
Modern society seems increasingly to expose men to such group injuries for which
individually they are in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do
not know enough or because such redress is disproportionately expensive. If each is
left to assert his rights alone if and when he can, there will at best be a random and
fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all.
See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE

THEORY OF GROUPS 48 (2d ed. 1971) (analyzing obstacles to the optimal creation of collective
goods inherent in the costs of organizing groups and in the variance between marginal costs and
marginal benefits to individual group members); Steven Shavell, The FundamentalDivergence
Between The Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 575 (1997)
(noting that victims of wrongs do not fully internalize the benefits of litigation and thus may
have insufficient incentives to file socially desirable suits).
5.
See infra Part II.
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single agent to represent diverse principles. 6
In contrast, the
consequences of diversity for the valuation of aggregated claims - and
thus for the effectiveness of aggregative procedures as a tool for
implementing substantive rules and remedies - has received
comparatively little explicit attention.
Politicians, courts, and
commentators have focused on controlling when, where, and by whom
class actions are filed, managing class actions after they are certified,
and policing how they are settled, but have given only minimal
scrutiny to the logically antecedent question of how to decide whether
a class action is a procedurally viable means of resolving the similar
and dissimilar aspects of contested claims and defenses. In particular,
rules for assessing the significance of common and individual
questions within putative class actions - notably Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) 7 - have not evolved since their creation in 1966,
have received virtually no helpful clarification from the Supreme
Court, have bewildered lower courts, and have not attracted
substantial scholarly scrutiny.
The lack of critical attention to rules for assessing the
similarity of putative class members' claims outside the agency
context has allowed a conventional wisdom to evolve that misstates
the nature and overlooks the seriousness of the problems that a lack of
similarity creates.
The consensus view among courts and
commentators is that the critical determination in deciding whether to
certify claims for class action treatment is whether the factual and
legal questions that unite class members are relatively more
significant than the questions that divide them."
The formal
embodiment of this approach is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3), which asks judges contemplating whether to certify a class
action to decide whether "questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members."9
The problem with this "predominance"
6.
See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation:An Inquiry
into the Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEG. F. 581; Rhode, supra note 1. This Article does
not address issues relating to the construction of principal-agent relationships. Instead, the
Article assumes the existence of a representative who can advocate on behalf of the class
consistent with due process, and asks when the effect of diversity among putative class members'
factual and legal circumstances on the valuation of claims at trial or in a settlement should
provide an independent basis for refusing to certify a class action.
7.
For a discussion of Rule 23(b)(3)'s text, purpose, and shortcomings, see infra Part IV.
8. See infra notes 128-138, 164 and accompanying text.
9.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added). For example, in a proposed class action by
ratepayers against an electric utility challenging rates exceeding a statutory tariff, the legality of
the rate would be a common question, while the amount of any overcharge could vary for each
person in the class. Likewise, in a proposed class action by consumers suing a credit card issuer
for fraudulent oral misrepresentations, the truthfulness of the issuer's statements in a sales
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approach is that the extent of dissimilarity among class members'
circumstances turns out to be a much more important indicator of
whether claims are suitable for class action treatment than the extent
of any similarity. Accordingly, the certification inquiry should not ask
whether class members' circumstances are more similar than
different, but rather whether their circumstances are sufficiently
different to preclude resolving their claims in a single proceeding.
Unfortunately, the debate over class action reform does not recognize
serious flaws in current certification criteria for assessing the
similarity and dissimilarity among class members' circumstances, and
thus these criteria remain relatively immune from proposed reforms
even though they are the source of many of the problems that
reformers are trying to solve. Accordingly, this Article seeks to
highlight the importance of certification rules that have largely
escaped critical scrutiny, to illustrate how these rules hinge on
conceptually incoherent criteria and inspire equally confused doctrine,
and to explain how reliance on these criteria both inflates and reduces
the expected litigation and settlement value of claims processed
through class actions. The Article then identifies principles from
which replacement certification criteria can be drawn, and proposes a
new rule for courts to use when deciding if a class action would be an
appropriate procedural vehicle for adjudicating the common and
individualized elements of contested claims and defenses. 10
script could be common to the class, but proof of whether a class member heard and relied on the
representations in a particular script would depend on each member's individual circumstances.
Rule 23(b)(3) would require a court considering a motion to certify a class in these hypothetical
cases to decide whether the common questions of rate legality or truthfulness of a telemarketing
script "predominate" over the individual questions of damages or reliance.
10. My examination of class action principles, rules, and doctrine focuses on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23"), which governs class certification in federal courts and is the
model for most state class action rules. See infra notes 119-121 (reviewing state class action
rules and noting that predominance is a certification factor in 45 of the 48 states with rules or
statutes permitting class actions). I focus on Rule 23(b)(3), which permits class actions seeking
primarily monetary damages, and which has become the most litigated and controversial of the
three categories of class actions that Rule 23(b) creates. See THOMAS WILLGING ET AL.,
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 118 (1996). The (b)(3) category has also been the focus of
most recent debate over class action reform proposals. See Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy)
Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923, 928 (1998). The other two categories of class
actions - codified in Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) - are generally available when plaintiffs seek
primarily injunctive relief or when payment of individual damage claims would risk depleting a
common fund and prejudicing litigants whose claims would not be addressed until after the
defendant loses the ability to pay them. Neither of these categories relies on the concept of
predominance as a criterion for certification. Instead, rules tailored to the unique institutional
and policy concerns raised by injunctions (often to enforce civil rights statutes) and common fund
distributions have evolved to manage the cases that fall into the (b)(1) and (b)(2) categories.
Although this Article's analysis tracks the current tripartite structure of Rule 23(b), it would
apply even if the rule were rewritten to create a single trans-substantive certification standard
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The Article's analysis proceeds in four parts.
Part II
establishes the practical importance of dissimilarity among class
members' circumstances by explaining how dissimilarity creates
subtle distortions in the presentation and assessment of claims and
defenses that either inflate or dilute the perceived value of the overall
class claim and are a significant source of inaccuracy in class
adjudication and settlement." I define and explore three examples of
these distortions: "cherry-picking" (the tendency of aggregate
proceedings to generalize from examples that do not fully represent
the diversity of individual claims), "claim fusion" (the process by which
claims in the aggregate merge to assume characteristics that no
individual claim possesses), and "ad hoc lawmaking" (the
manipulation of substantive rules to assist in resolving or preventing
practical difficulties that arise in the course of adjudicating dissimilar
questions of fact and law). In addition, Part II explains why the fact
that most class actions settle - which is often cited as a reason not to
care too deeply about flaws in certification criteria - is actually a
reason to reconsider such criteria due to their effect on the outcome of
negotiated agreements.
Part II concludes in light of these
observations that there is a pressing need to analyze the theoretical
and practical coherence of criteria for assessing similarity and
12
dissimilarity among claims in proposed class actions.
Part III develops three general principles of civil procedure and
class actions - "finality," "fidelity," and "feasibility" 13 - that should
because the tension between common and individualized issues that I discuss would affect any
effort to parse monetary claims that are suitable for aggregate treatment from those that are
unsuitable.
ii.
Accuracy is of course not the only value that procedure should promote - others include
efficiency, distributive justice, an opportunity to be heard and participate, and the avoidance of
invidious bias - but is a useful concept to consider when evaluating the wisdom of a procedural
rule. See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication:An Economic Analysis,
23 J. LEG. STUD. 307 (1994).
12. The certification inquiry (both before the trial court and on interlocutory appeal) on
which the Article focuses is generally the judiciary's sole opportunity to assess whether
particular claims are suitable for class action treatment. Cases that are not certified are usually
dropped or settle, and cases that are certified usually settle before trial, such that there is rarely
non-interlocutory appellate review of the certification decision (aside from the relatively
unrigorous review of certification criteria that occurs in the context of approving settlements
under FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)). Cf. infra note 96. The certification decision is therefore the pivotal
moment in the life of a putative class action, with the judge acting as a gatekeeper to the
procedural benefits of Rule 23. Similarity among claims and defenses is a key that unlocks the
gates to class action status, while dissimilarity is a force that slams the gates shut.
13. For a detailed explanation of each principle, see infra text accompanying notes 44-98.
Briefly, the "finality" principle captures the need for class actions to vindicate the dispute
resolution and behavior modification goals of civil procedure by eventually resulting in a
judgment reflecting the rights and obligations of the parties. The timing and preclusive effect of
this judgment may vary from case to case, but at a minimum class actions seeking damages
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shape the judicial test for assessing similarity and dissimilarity
among class member's claims. My goal is to anchor the assessment of
individual and common questions more securely in broader principles
that animate civil procedure generally and class actions in particular.
The finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles collectively establish
guideposts for evaluating how the similar and dissimilar elements of
group claims should affect a court's decision about whether to certify a
class. The need for a judgment (finality), the need to ensure that each
beneficiary of that judgment is entitled to it (fidelity), and the need to
resolve individual issues within resource constraints (feasibility)
suggest that courts should certify classes featuring some dissimilarity
among members' circumstances only if there is a feasible plan for
resolving factual and legal disputes regarding each element and
defense applicable to each class member's claim and for eventually
entering judgment for or against class members for a specified sum of
money. The court should either provide an opportunity for the parties
to litigate individual claims or defenses, should have a reason to
believe that such an opportunity is not necessary under the applicable
substantive law, or should have a reason to believe that a settlement
can fairly account for dissimilarity without any need for adjudication.
The principles leave room for imaginative judicial solutions to complex
management problems while providing a check on the permissible
scope of experimentation.
Part IV applies the lessons learned from Part III to Rule 23's
predominance test, concluding that the concept of predominance and
the doctrine that it has spawned are inconsistent with the principles
that should guide certification criteria. To prove this point, the Article
discusses the historical origins of the predominance test, the failure of
its drafters to provide any interpretative guidance, the ineffective
efforts of the Supreme Court and lower courts to divine its meaning,
its inherent conceptual flaws, and the dubious doctrine that courts
have developed to apply the predominance rule to recurring fact
patterns involving individualized defenses, individualized damages,
and choice of law in cases with multistate contacts.
should culminate in a judgment that determines who owes or does not owe what to whom. The
"fidelity" principle addresses the connection between procedural and substantive rules,
establishing a constraint on the ability of courts to permit class action procedures to alter
analysis of substantive claims and defenses. Certifying classes may have the desirable effect of
removing practical obstacles to the fair and efficient determination of the merits of claims and
defenses, but certification is not a license for courts to tweak the merits by modifying the content
of applicable substantive law. The "feasibility" principle reflects the tension between aspirations
and capacity in the management of complex litigation. Courts often want to accomplish more
than they are able to achieve in class actions given constraints of time, talent, and resources, and
must therefore think carefully about the feasibility of potentially costly and improvident
procedural remedies before embracing them.
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The basic problem with the predominance test is that it
requires elaborate efforts to answer a question that is not worth
asking. The answer to the question "which issues predominate" is
neither interesting nor useful, and is not grounded in any relevant
principle. The predominance inquiry fixates on the notion that class
actions are viable when class members share similar factual
circumstances and raise similar legal questions. However, similarity
among claims is an unhelpful concept when one thinks about the
practical consequences of certifying a class and the procedural
principles (such as finality, fidelity, and feasibility) to which class
adjudication should conform. A more relevant concept is dissimilarity.
The existence of some similarity within the class is what makes class
actions potentially efficient and appealing, but it is the lack of
substantial dissimilarity that makes class actions a fair and
procedurally viable means of rendering judgment for or against the
class and its members. The predominance concept conflates the
similarity and dissimilarity inquiries into a single balancing test, thus
obscuring the practical and theoretical importance of dissimilarity
standing alone.
The predominance balancing test is an exercise in futility
because it relies on a subjective comparison of inherently
incomparable factors that is not grounded in a principled assessment
of their independent significance. The ensuing weighing process is
analogous to asking a starving person to balance the nutritional value
of vitamins in his only potential food source against the negative
effects of poison in the same food. Any sort of balancing would be
pointless. A huge nutritional value would be irrelevant if the poison is
fatal, and if the poison is not fatal then any amount of nutrition would
justify consumption absent a superior alternative food source. The
same analysis applies when deciding whether to certify a class
because dissimilarity among class members' claims at a sufficient dose
is a fatal poison to class adjudication. When individual questions of
law or fact unique to particular class members raise insurmountable
obstacles to class adjudication, then the number and importance of
common questions is irrelevant. On the other hand, if the proposed
class action would be "superior 14 to possible alternative forms of
litigation even accounting for the efforts needed to cope with difficult yet manageable - individualized issues, then denying certification
based on an arbitrary notion of whether common questions
"predominate" would be gratuitous. Individualized questions of law or
fact viewed in isolation thus either should or should not preclude
14.

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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certification in any particular case; their relative "predominance" with
respect to common questions should neither salvage an otherwise
uncertifiable class nor derail a class that should otherwise be certified.
Certification rules relying on the "predominance" test thus enshrine a
pointless concept that obscures the need to evaluate individual
questions of law and fact directly rather than in comparison to
common questions.
Having rejected the predominance test, I propose in Part V a
"resolvability" test that would reconcile the practical demands of class
litigation with theoretical constraints. The new test would permit
certification only when the court has a feasible plan to answer all
disputed questions of law and fact that must be resolved before
entering judgment for or against class members under the law
governing each class member's claim and applicable defenses. The
test also suggests a framework for considering the propriety of
settlements of otherwise uncertifiable classes, although defining the
precise limits on such settlements requires developing a normative
theory of consent that is beyond the scope of this Article. 15 The new
resolvability approach to dissimilarity would channel the inherent
subjectivity of certification decisions along more clearly defined paths
and would realign certification analysis with principled constraints
from which the predominance test has drifted. Rules should ideally
facilitate the implementation of guiding principles, but the
predominance test does the opposite, interposing a meaningless and
distracting wedge between principle and practice.
Part V also notes some of the broader implications of my
proposal linked to unraveling the dynamic connection between
substantive and procedural constraints on the regulation of behavior
that affects large groups. Class actions have become a crutch on
which policymakers lean to provide a procedural boost to the efficacy
of substantive rules regulating behavior. Replacing the predominance
test with a resolvability test would likely make that procedural boost
more difficult to obtain, which suggests that policymakers and
commentators concerned about deterring corporate wrongdoing and
compensating victims should refocus the debate about class actions to
consider new approaches to substantive regulation for which class
adjudication might be a more suitable enforcement mechanism. In
addition, rather than making questionable use of the class action to
optimize the remedial power of substantive liability and damage rules,
there may be a need to tailor substantive rules to operate more
effectively under existing individualized procedures for resolving
15.

See infra text accompanying notes 196-199.
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disputes, or to develop new and more effective aggregative procedures.
While procedures must evolve in response to substantive preferences,
policymakers must also reconsider substantive preferences in light of
limitations on procedure.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DISSIMILARITY FOR THE LITIGATED AND
NEGOTIATED VALUATION OF CLASS MEMBERS' CLAIMS

This Part contends that dissimilarity among class members
distorts the outcome of class actions through three phenomena cherry-picking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking - that current
class action scholarship either overlooks or underweights. When class
actions are adjudicated to trial, effective advocates can harness these
phenomena to exploit dissimilarity among putative class members and
thereby alter the probability of a liability finding and the calculation
of aggregate damages. Even when parties settle class actions before
trial, bargaining occurs in the shadow of the expected trial procedure,
and thus a settlement will likely replicate any distortions that
dissimilarity would create during formal adjudication.
A. A Thought Experiment Confirming the DistortingEffect of
Dissimilarity
A simple thought experiment confirms the importance of
dissimilarity to analysis of certification criteria. Imagine that class
actions were available only in cases where the claims of all class
members were exactly alike in every detail and subject to proof
through identical evidence, and where individuals could prove their
membership in the class by purely objective submissions, such as the
defendant's business records naming the people with whom the
defendant interacted.
In these hypothetical circumstances, it is difficult to imagine
that class actions would generate substantial controversy or occupy
their current position high on political agendas.
Class actions
featuring such ultra-commonality would present only minor
coordination problems, would be only marginally less manageable
than any constituent claim standing alone, would be unlikely to
confuse juries any more than non-class cases, would have outcomes
approximately as predictable as outcomes in ordinary non-class
litigation, and would not involve substantial conflicts among class
members' interests. The expected outcome of a trial for any one
plaintiff picked at random from the homogenous class should not
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differ from the expected outcome for any other class member. The
case presumably would settle after no more than a few sample trials of
randomly selected class members' claims that would establish a range
of outcomes to serve as the template for a classwide settlement. The
ability to pinpoint a reasonably accurate average claim value would in
turn minimize agency costs because the court could monitor
settlements with an eye toward the divergence of settlement values
from expected litigation outcomes. Settlements would vindicate both
the compensation and deterrence objectives of applicable substantive
laws because defendants would pay roughly what the merits of claims
suggest is warranted, and plaintiffs would receive roughly what they
would be entitled to receive (assuming that jury verdicts in sample
trials would be roughly accurate).
Because all claims would be
identical and all class members identifiable, the averaging of sample
trial verdicts would not have any distributive consequences beyond
the unobjectionable smoothing over of lucky or unlucky high-end or
low-end jury awards. 16 Trying a few claims would thus be functionally
17
equivalent to trying them all.
16. Cf.Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of
Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 569-70 (1993) ("[W]hen factual issues are identical
throughout the class, the class action functions as a trivial form of sampling. The court in effect
relies on a sample of one case, that of the representative plaintiffs, to adjudicate liability for the
entire class.").
17. Plaintiffs might object that class proceedings would deprive them of their autonomy, but
that objection would wilt if we assume that the economic value of plaintiffs' claims is small
relative to the defendant's aggregate stakes in the litigation, such that plaintiffs would likely be
unable to litigate at all - let alone autonomously - outside of a class action. In any event, the
critique of class actions premised on a plaintiffs right to autonomous control over litigation is
questionable given the lack of substantial autonomy that exists even in nominally individualized
suits and the costs that an autonomy norm would impose on third parties competing for scarce
judicial resources or hoping to benefit from the deterrent effects of collective litigation. See
Bruce L. Hay, ProceduralJustice - Ex Ante v. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1838 (1997)
(observing that individuals behind a veil of ignorance might rationally prefer to sacrifice
autonomy in favor of efficient and accurate aggregative procedures); Deborah R. Hensler,
Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 92-97 (discussing the
obstacles to meaningful participation that plaintiffs face even in traditional non-class suits); Eric
D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through Group Justice, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 800
(1997) (noting that adjudicative resources are scarce, such that providing autonomy to each
litigant has distributional consequences); Rosenberg, Mandatory Litigation,supra note 1, at 84143 (noting that litigation autonomy fosters opportunistic personal wealth-maximizing behavior
by litigants that undermines the deterrence and insurance objectives of tort law). But see Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357, 364 (1978) (defining
"participation" of litigants through the presentation of reasoned argument as a feature
distinguishing adjudication from other mechanisms of "social ordering", such as elections and
contracts); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 779, 822 (1985) ("[G]iven the traditional respect afforded an individual tort litigant's right
to control the prosecution of a substantial personal injury or wrongful death claim, and that the
plaintiff loses much of this individual control when the court certifies a class action, courts
should avoid using this joinder device to try these cases."); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the
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The difference between the thought experiment above and the
highly controversial modern class action is that the circumstances of
plaintiffs who claim to fit a proposed class definition are rarely exactly
alike. Distinctions among class members could include, for example,
the degree to which their contact with the defendant was direct or
attenuated, the precise nature of the defendant's behavior toward
them, the collateral circumstances of their interaction with the
defendant, their mental state during their dealings with the
defendant, the type and severity of their injuries, the ranking of their
remedial preferences, and the nature and strength of the defenses to
which they may be subject. If these differences are material - i.e., if
the substantive law imposed by the institution with legitimate
political authority to create rights and regulate behavior deems the
differences potentially outcome-determinative - than procedure
should have a mechanism to tailor adjudicated outcomes to the
varying circumstances of individual plaintiffs.' 8
Once one moves from an imagined world of complete similarity
to the real world of partial dissimilarity, opportunities exist to
manipulate the presentation of evidence and legal argument in a
manner that highlights favorable or unfavorable aspects of unique
individual claims. Judges and jurors trying to assess the merit and
value of these distinct claims must then engage in the difficult
cognitive task of aggregating their analysis while tracking material
variables that differ from claimant to claimant.
As the next
subsection explains, there is little reason to believe that courts and
jurors adjudicating classwide liability and damages questions can
accurately account for the full effects of dissimilarity.
B. Trial Distortions:Cherry-Picking,Claim Fusion, and Ad hoc
Lawmaking
The practical problems with certifying class actions despite
dissimilarity among claims arise from the natural human instinct to
simplify the inherently complex and to create order out of what
appears chaotic. These instincts manifest in class actions in the form
of procedural shortcuts to squeeze heterogeneous claims into a
homogenous mold and thereby avoid the procedural difficulties that
dissimilarity would create. The effect is akin to mixing different colors
Adequacy of Adequate Representation,75 TEX. L. REV. 571, 572 (1997) (arguing that due process
principles require providing plaintiffs with a right to be heard directly rather than through a
representative).
18. For further development of the normative foundations for the need to integrate
substance and procedure, see infra Part III.B.
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of paint into a large vat: the vibrant reds, greens, and blues will blur
into gray. This blurring of constituent parts into an undifferentiated
whole may be unobjectionable if one does not care about the color of
the final product, but would be a serious problem if one were
interested in preserving the palette of original ingredients in the mix.
Likewise, aggregating distinct individual claims into a class obscures
differences among class members in ways that engender substantive
consequences.
The hypothesis that certification of dissimilar claims tends to
distort assessment of their merits is grounded in three recurring
phenomena of class litigation, which I call "cherry-picking," "claim
fusion," and "ad hoc lawmaking." Each of these concepts describes a
means by which certification can inflate - and sometimes deflate - the
aggregate value of class claims beyond the sum of the values of
individual claims.
"Cherry-picking" refers to the fact that plaintiffs' counsel often
controls the presentation of plaintiffs' case and can hand-pick the most
persuasive individual examples of a defendant's alleged wrongdoing to
stand as representatives for the alleged classwide problem.' 9 The
"true" persuasiveness of class members' dissimilar liability claims may
lay on a spectrum, but the class can present examples from only the
top of the spectrum and thus skew the jury's assessment of the merits.
For example, in a class action against a credit card issuer for making
misleading representations about interest rates, class members may
have had varying levels of financial sophistication, may have seen
various disclosures that were more or less misleading than others, and
may have relied on the misrepresentations to different extents. Yet a
smart class counsel will not make his case through testimony of, say, a
doctor who read a relatively benign disclosure on which he did not
rely; instead, the star witness is likely to be a very sympathetic and
unsophisticated victim of the most egregious example of the
defendants' misconduct. The defendant can try to counter the effect of
this testimony by spotlighting cases from the bottom of the spectrum,
but realistically this is not likely to happen; most defendants want to
deny liability, not highlight the fact that sometimes their behavior
was less culpable than at other times. The consequence is that
plaintiffs' ability to cherry-pick the best examples from among a pool
19. The extent of plaintiffs' control over witness selection at trial will vary depending on the
role that the court plays in managing the presentation of evidence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)
(vesting broad management powers in district courts presiding over class actions). A defendant
contemplating settlement at an early stage of a class action often will not be able to predict the
extent of plaintiffs' power to cherry-pick, and must factor that uncertainty into its settlement
calculus.
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of diverse claims skews the defendants' potential exposure above what
a case-by-case merits review would suggest is the appropriate
damages figure. Class members with weak claims in essence ride the
coattails of class members with stronger claims and benefit from the
jury's perception that the defendant's conduct in the aggregate was
worse than it may actually have been.
The upward skewing of claim values can apply in reverse if the
class representative turns out to be a lemon rather than a cherry. The
class in these circumstances would be attempting to prove its claim
based on an example drawn from the bottom of the diverse spectrum,
which would artificially deflate the jury's assessment of liability and
calculation of aggregate damages. The lemon-picking phenomenon
thus helps to explain plaintiff-protecting critiques of class actions
premised on agency costs by illustrating the potentially adverse effect
of dissimilarity among claimants on the selection of a representative.
"Claim fusion" describes the phenomenon that occurs when the
claims of the class morph to assume aspects of disparate individual
claims, such that the class has a claim that is stronger than the claim
of any particular member. The class claim in effect becomes a
composite fusing the best components of its dissimilar constituent
claims. Building off the example above, suppose that a credit card
issuer mails three types of solicitations that are each misleading, but
for different reasons. Each class member receives one of these
solicitations, but none receive all three. The claims of the class will
of the three
effect
gain strength from the cumulative
misrepresentations, which in the jury's mind will likely fuse into one
massive misrepresentation despite the fact that no class member
received all three solicitations. 20 Even if claimants were divided into
three subclasses, each subclass would benefit from the jury's
awareness of the defendant's misconduct toward the other subclasses.
Moreover, even assuming that only one rather than three types of
misrepresentation are at issue, the claim fusion problem could occur
with respect to collateral facts surrounding plaintiffs' claims. For
example, suppose that one class member called the credit card issuer
to complain about unexpectedly high interest rates and testifies as to
her perception that she was treated rudely, that another testifies that
she was particularly aggrieved because of her low income, and that a
third testifies that she suffered substantial stress as a result of her
dealings with the defendant. The alleged indifference of the defendant
20. Most courts have not recognized the problem of claim fusion, although the Fourth
Circuit has noted the practical difficulties that arise when the aggregation of dissimilar claims
creates a "fictional composite" claim that is stronger than its individual components. Broussard
v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 345 (4th Cir. 1998).
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and the alleged stress and poverty of the plaintiffs will infuse the class
claim even though most individual class members would not have any
basis for alleging any of the grievances of the three testifying
plaintiffs. Allowing the jury to know the myriad manifestations of a
defendants' misconduct may not seem undesirable, but from the
perspective of ensuring accurate judgments the fusion of dissimilar
circumstances into a more compelling whole likely skews litigation
outcomes above what the merits warrant by making liability findings
21
more probable and inflating damages assessments.
The claim fusion problem also applies in reverse as defense
fusion. If the defendant has varying defenses to some individual class
members' claims, the defenses may fuse to form an artificially strong
classwide defense that skews the value of class members' claims
downward. For example, if one of the class representatives in the
above credit card hypothetical lied on her application, and another
had an independent source of knowledge correcting the omissions in
the misleading solicitations, a jury might allow those defenses to blur
together and to color their perception of absent class members'
22
claims.
"Ad hoc lawmaking" occurs in class actions when courts
attempt to devise substantive and evidentiary shortcuts around
management problems that dissimilarity imposes on the resolution of
otherwise similar claims.
For example, courts will create

21. Experiments by psychologists studying juror behavior have not directly addressed the
hypothesis that claim fusion and cherry picking exploit cognitive biases and therefore skew claim
valuations.
However, more general experiments establish that jurors have difficulty
compartmentalizing information in complex cases and that the size of a plaintiff population and
distinctions among plaintiffs' circumstances can sway assessment of aggregate liability and
damages depending on the process by which jurors receive information. See, e.g., Irwin A.
Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The Effects of Number of
Plaintiffs on Jurors' Liability Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive Processing of Evidence,
85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 916 (2000); Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of
Outlier Presence, PlaintiffPopulation Size, & Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury
Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 209, 211-13, 225-26 (1988); Dennis J. Devine, et al., Jury
Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on DeliberatingGroups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY
& L. 622, 671-72, 699 (2001). Further empirical study would be helpful in assessing the cognitive
foundation for the claim fusion and cherry picking phenomena in consolidated litigation.
22. Although this Article focuses on claim fusion as a problem affecting the design of class
certification standards, another way to conceptualize the problem would consider the standards
that should govern the admissibility of evidence in class actions. For example, one area meriting
further consideration is whether courts adjudicating class actions should strictly interpret the
relevance requirement in FED. R. EVID. 402 to preclude any testimony or evidence at the liability
phase of a case that is not relevant to the claims of the entire class. In this manner, courts could
prevent parties from introducing evidence about the unique circumstances of particular class
members, which in turn would prevent juries from making unwarranted extrapolations that
inflate or dilute aggregate claim values.
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irrebuttable 23 evidentiary presumptions to avoid having to consider
24
individualized questions of fact on legal elements such as reliance,
invent new theories of liability to avoid having to consider the
circumstances of individual class members, 25 bend the rules of
evidence and alter burdens of proof so that contested facts can be
resolved on a common rather than individualized basis, 26 manipulate
choice of law analysis to minimize the diversity of applicable rules,27
and try to disentangle claims and defenses so that juries consider
aggregate classwide liability before they consider whether defendants
have defenses to individual claims that might reduce the size of their
aggregate exposure. 28 Nothing inherent in the class action device

23. The inferences must be irrebuttable because if they were rebuttable the individual
issues would remain in the case (subject to a flipped burden of proof) and would still present
obstacles to adjudicating class actions.
24. For example, plaintiffs often propose that when liability is premised on a consumer not
knowing a certain fact, or relying on a given representation, the court should presume that all
class members who acted in a specified manner must have had a certain level of a knowledge or
been relying on a misleading statement. See, e.g., Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 752 A.2d
807, 817 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (citing cases). Under these proposals, objective
evidence (such as the defendant's business records) of how the class member acted, which is
generally easy to present in a class action, would substitute for subjective proof of knowledge or
reliance, which is generally difficult to present in a class action. See, e.g., Sandwich Chef v.
Reliance Nat'l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 220 (5th Cir. 2003) ("A class cannot be certified
when evidence of individual reliance will be necessary."). Many proposed presumptions depend
on analogies to federal securities law, which permits a presumption of reliance in
misrepresentation and omission cases based on the specific wording of the applicable statute and
the assumption that false or misleading disclosures affect all participants in an efficient market.
See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-49 (1988); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972). A problem with this analogy is that most consumer
markets do not feature the fast and broad transmission of information characteristic of an
efficient securities trading regime, so there is no factual basis for presuming that a particular
piece of false or misleading information had any effect on any particular consumer. See Sikes v.
Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (11th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing securities and RICO
contexts for purposes of applying statutory reliance element).
25. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting that in attempting to "streamlin[e]" management of a class action, the district court had
merged distinct state law liability standards into an "Esperanto instruction"); Epstein, supra
note 1, at 489-514 (discussing substantive legal developments arising from class actions in the
employment, antitrust, and securities fields).
26. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 343 (4th Cir.
1998) (finding that admission of speculative evidence related to "average" class member damages
impermissibly relieved plaintiffs of their burden of proving actual damages with reasonable
precision).
27. For an overview and critique of how courts attempt to sidestep the inconvenient
implications of rigorous choice of law analysis in complex litigation with multistate contacts, see
Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1996).
28. See, e.g., Garner v. Healy, 184 F.R.D. 598, 602 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (proposing to decide the
common question of whether defendants were liable to the class before deciding individualized
questions of whether any class member could prove proximate causation); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Lopez, 93 S.W.3d 548, 560-61 (Tex. App. 2002) (noting that trial plan had scheduled
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distorts substantive or evidentiary rules in this manner, but
certification has that practical effect when judges try to manage the
dissimilar aspects of class members' claims. 29 These innovations by
courts trying to cope with dissimilarity may or may not be legitimate
in particular cases, but they collectively help to explain the perception
that class actions often produce outcomes that are not consistent with
30
applicable substantive law.
The combined effect of cherry- and lemon-picking, claim and
defense fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking is that class actions exploit or
obscure dissimilarity rather than resolving it. Plaintiffs' counsel find
creative ways to infuse the class claim with the best of its dissimilar
aspects, and judges find innovative ways to make any vestiges of
dissimilarity disappear from the case. Defendants in turn try to
counter these efforts by tarring the class with the least desirable traits
of members with the weakest claims. The result of these efforts is
that class litigation is a process of forced homogenization; the more
heterogeneous claims are to begin with, the greater the effects of
1
homogenizing them. 3
C. The DistortingEffects of Dissimilarityon Valuation of Class Action
Settlements
The problems with dissimilarity discussed in this Part arise
because of the practical difficulties that individualized questions of
calculation of classwide damages prior to presentation of the defendant's individualized defenses
to liability).
29. Some commentators have noted the general practice of courts using the class action as a
procedural opportunity to modify substantive rules, but these observations are usually not linked
to the problems of dissimilarity that I argue are a primary cause of such substantive
modifications. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via
Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 873 (1995) (noting attempts by courts to "fit[] the substantive
law into the class action mold").
30. Ad hoc shortcuts can prejudice both plaintiffs and defendants, although defendants are
more likely to suffer prejudice because most shortcuts are designed to facilitate the plaintiffs'
preferred manner of proof. Plaintiffs' counsel usually requests the shortcuts, and generally do
not do so for the defendant's benefit. However, plaintiffs are not immune from prejudice because
their counsel's zeal to ensure certification may lead to shortcuts that circumvent substantive or
evidentiary rules that favor some members of the diverse class.
31. Even apart from the cherry-picking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking phenomena,
problems associated with dissimilarity among claims manifest themselves in other
undercurrents of the class action reform debate. For example, debate about conflicts among class
members' remedial preferences is usually framed as relating to agency costs inherent within the
class action device, but can be reconceptualized as reflecting a concern about how to balance
similarity and dissimilarity among class members' preferences and circumstances when deciding
whether to certify a class. Likewise, debate over whether class actions create unnecessary
burdens for courts can be framed as a disagreement about how courts at the certification stage
should balance the similar, easy to manage aspects of proposed class claims against the more
difficult to manage dissimilar aspects.
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law or fact create when a court attempts to litigate a class action. Yet
most certified class actions settle, 32 so the practical problems
associated with litigating individualized questions rarely arise, or are
resolved through the parties' voluntary adoption of expedited claims
processing procedures to distribute the proceeds of an agreed
settlement. The fact that most class actions settle may suggest that
difficulties in managing them should not bar their certification. For
example, if a defendant does not plan on litigating the question of
liability, then the difficulty that plaintiffs would have in proving
liability on a classwide basis arguably should not bar them from an
opportunity to negotiate a fair and efficient settlement of claims that
might otherwise go uncompensated.3 3 Likewise, the fact that damages
would be difficult to prove in jury trials that no party intends to
initiate should not be a reason to preclude plaintiffs from proving
damages through an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that
all parties are willing to accept. However, this Section will show that
the distortions that dissimilarity causes in trial outcomes also plague
settlement outcomes, such that the near-ubiquity of settlement
replicates rather than resolves the problems that the remaining parts
of this Article seek to correct.
Dissimilarity distorts settlement outcomes in two principal
respects. First, dissimilarity among claims prevents judges from
effectively monitoring agency slack during settlement, which creates
maneuvering room for agents to negotiate low-ball settlements that
reward the agents without fully compensating their clients. Second,
settlement bargaining involves an attempt to predict trial outcomes,
and thus the value of a negotiated agreement will reflect trial
distortions that the parties believe might arise from material
dissimilarity among class members.
1. Ineffective Monitoring
A standard critique of class actions is that lawyers who act as
agents for the class have financial incentives to negotiate settlements
that prioritize their own interests at the expense of class members'
interests. 34 One reason that class counsel are able to get away with
32. See Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 151 ("[C]lass actions today serve as the
procedural vehicle not ultimately for adversarial litigation but for dealmaking on a mass basis.").
33. See Green, supra note 17, at 795 ("Everyone knows the case is not going to be tried,
but ... appraise the case under the Rule 23 criteria as if it were. That seems to me an Orwellian
approach ....").
34. For example, class counsel may: (1) fear competition for fees from lawyers pursuing
rival class actions and therefore engage in reverse auctions with defendants in which they trade
diminished client compensation for the certainty of their own reward, see, e.g., Coffee, Class
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settling claims for less than their true value is that even wellintentioned potential monitors (such as courts) lack the ability to
second-guess settlements because the information needed to
determine the expected litigation value of claims is difficult to
obtain. 35 Yet one reason why expected values are so difficult to
calculate is that class members are often differently situated, which
increases the number of variables in any calculation of aggregate
expected damages.
For example, assume that L equals the probability that an
average jury would find the defendant liable to a plaintiff, and that D
is the amount of damages that an average jury would award. Now
imagine two classes: one class contains 1000 members identical in all
respects to representative V, while a second class contains 250
members with circumstances identical to V, 250 with circumstances
identical to W, 250 with circumstances identical to Y, and 250 with
circumstances identical to Z. The expected aggregate litigation
outcome for the more uniform class is 1000 x L, x Dv. But the
expected aggregate litigation outcome for the more fragmented class is
(250 x Lv x D) + (250 x Lw x D.) + (250 x Ly x Dy) + (250 x L x D).
The first calculation is obviously much simpler than the second
because it requires the court to estimate the value of fewer contested
variables. Judicial monitoring of settlements thus becomes more
viable when there is relatively little outcome-determinative
dissimilarity among class members. The enhanced ability of courts to
monitor settlements in homogenous cases should in turn act as at
least a partial check on agency costs, assuming that courts are willing
36
to expend the effort necessary to fulfill their monitoring role.
Accordingly, there is an often unnoticed - albeit indeterminate correlation between the extent of dissimilarity among class members'
Wars, supra note 1, at 1370; (2) perceive that the effort necessary to produce a marginal dollar of
compensation for clients is not worth the fraction of that dollar that they will see in fees, see, e.g.,
Coffee, Private Enforcement, supra note 1, at 690; (3) conclude that the risk of holding out for a
better deal for their clients is not worth putting the certainty of their own fee in jeopardy, such
that they lose interest in zealously pursuing the case once their fee reaches a satisfactory level,
see Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 ("[A] juicy bird in the hand is worth more than
the vision of a much larger one in the bush."); and (4) collude with defendants by accepting a
large fee in exchange for agreeing to a settlement that allows the defendant to purchase
litigation peace at a low overall cost, see, e.g., Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 1, at 1367-68.
35. See, e.g., Coffee, Accountability, supra note 1, at 376 (noting that a "distinctive" feature
of class actions relative to other contexts in which principals do not directly appoint their
representatives is that there is no effective third-party monitoring to minimize agency costs);
Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that settlement hearings ostensibly designed to give
courts the information necessary to perform their monitoring function are usually "pep rallies
jointly orchestrated by plaintiffs' counsel and defense counsel").
36. For a discussion of why courts lack incentives to monitor class action settlements
closely, especially in negative value cases, see Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 1, at 1369-70.
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circumstances and a court's ability to monitor and remediate the
possible effect of agency costs on settlement values.
2. Tainted Bargaining
Settlements generally cannot produce accurate valuations of
dissimilar claims within a class action proceeding because of the
distortions that dissimilarity creates in anticipated litigation
outcomes. Prevailing models of settlement establish that parties will
seek to avoid a prolonged and expensive trial by attempting to
anticipate the outcome of litigation and agreeing to accept or pay an
amount that approximates the expected net gain or loss. 37 Each party
will calculate the expected value of claims (which is the probability of
success multiplied by the potential reward), adjust for expenses and
risk aversion, discount to present value, and thus establish
parameters for a potential settlement. The case will then settle if the
parties' settlement ranges overlap and if strategic behavior (such as
low-ball offers or unrealistically high demands) do not derail
negotiations. The settlement value should roughly reflect the relative
merit of each side's position, but only if the litigation process whose
outcome the parties are trying to predict is an accurate means of
resolving disputed claims. For example, a settlement negotiated by
experienced lawyers in a typical single-plaintiff versus singledefendant slip-and-fall negligence case in a fair judicial forum will
probably closely correlate with the merits of the claim because
litigation is presumably a reasonably accurate means of resolving such
recurring negligence disputes and the lawyers can draw from prior
experience when attempting to predict the suit's outcome. In contrast,
if the same two lawyers were told that their clients' dispute would be
resolved by a game of chess, the settlement value would bear no
relationship to the merit of the claim and would instead reflect the
odds associated with the chess game.
For the same reasons that the settlement value of a claim
subjected to resolution by chess instead of litigation would not
correlate with its merits, the settlement value of a claim that would be
resolved through a class action despite distortions - such as cherrypicking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking - created by dissimilarity
would also not reflect the merits of the parties' positions. Calculation
37. For a critique of expected value models, see Joseph Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The
Unexpected Value of Litigation (Stanford Law School / Olin Law & Economics Working Paper
No. 292) (arguing that claims may settle for more or less than their expected value based on the
parties' perception of how each will gather and exploit new information about contested facts and
legal theories during multiple stages of litigation).
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of expected values would be a function of each party's prediction of
who would suffer greater prejudice from the distorted class action trial
procedure.
The parties would not be attempting to predict the
outcome of any rational or known process because no such process
exists for the types of claims being discussed, and thus the odds that
litigation would produce an accurate outcome that the parties could
predict are extremely low. The settlement value of any class action
where claims are substantially dissimilar thus relates more to
perceptions about which party will suffer greater prejudice from a
trial conducted in violation of the principles discussed in Part III than
to perceptions about which party has the more meritorious case. An
example illustrates the point.
Suppose that a class of insurance policyholders who received
lower-than-requested payments for property damage to their homes
sue the insurer for systematically underpaying claims. Plaintiffs
propose to present as evidence internal corporate memoranda
discussing the insurer's claims adjustment techniques, which
plaintiffs characterize as a "common classwide scheme" to defraud
policyholders by providing a level of coverage that is in practice less
than what policyholders had expected or paid for. The insurer
believes that the challenged general claims practices were used in
adjusting half of the one million property damage claims that were
resolved during the proposed class period for less than the demanded
amount, and that the practices reduced the value of affected claims by
an average of $500, for a total classwide loss of $250 million (i.e.,
500,000 claims x $500 loss). Moreover, the insurer believes that if a
court reviewed each of the 500,000 affected claims, there is a 60
percent chance in each case that the court would conclude that the
challenged claims practices were legal under the circumstances. The
insurer thus has three individualized "defenses" to each class
members' claim: (1) that the class member was not one of the insureds
whose claim was affected by the challenged claims practices; (2) that
the claims practices were legal under the circumstances of the class
member's case; and (3) that the class member is entitled to lower
damages than his complaint demands. In the vernacular of plaintiffs'
"common scheme" allegation, the defendant would be using individual
counterexamples to refute the existence of the scheme, denying
whether the scheme affected any particular person, denying that the
scheme was illegal in any particular case, and disputing the extent of
damages that the alleged scheme may have caused.
Now imagine the settlement value of the case under each of
two proposed procedural mechanisms for litigating it, assuming that
the insurer succeeds in convincing the plaintiffs that its calculations
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discussed above are accurate. For each proposal, assume that the
parties are represented by well-financed and competent counsel.
Under one proposal, the court would (assuming infinite time and
resources) individually examine all one million claims files and assess
liability on a file-by-file basis, entering a judgment for or against each
The expected value of a judgment in these
class member.
circumstances would be $100 million (the plaintiffs' 40 percent
probability of success multiplied by the $250 million potential
exposure). The settlement value of the case would therefore begin at
$100 million and move higher or lower depending on the parties' risk
aversion and anticipated litigation costs.
Now suppose that the court decides to permit plaintiffs to
litigate as a class action the "common" question of whether the
insurer's claims practices were in general illegal without permitting
the insurer to present defenses to individual class members' claims
until after the jury rules on the common question, and even then only
in a quasi-administrative claims proceeding. The expected value of a
judgment would probably change in two ways.
First, the parties may conclude that a trial limited to the
abstract question of whether the insurer's general practices were
illegal would be more likely than a file-by-file review to result in a
finding of liability because the jury would not have a context for
assessing the reasonableness of claims decisions in concrete situations
and would be influenced by cherry-picking and claims fusion.
Moreover, the parties would probably believe that convincing a jury
that a large corporate defendant had a propensity to behave poorly is
much easier than proving that the defendant behaved poorly in any
particular case, especially when the evidence of such a propensity
consists of internal corporate documents not linked to a specific
context. The prospect of a classwide liability finding (rather than fileby-file liability assessments) may therefore raise the insurer's
aggregate expected probability of a loss from 40 percent to, say, 60
percent.
Second, the parties would realize that if the insurer loses on
the common question of whether its claims practices were in general
illegal, then the claims resolution process would be likely to conclude,
based on inertia and the truncated scope of alternative dispute
resolution procedures, that the previously established illegal claims
practice tainted a particular claims file. The parties might therefore
conclude that, say, 60 percent rather than 50 percent of files would be
found to have been tainted, and that the average estimate of damages
Settlement values would thus
would be $600 rather than $500.
change dramatically. The defendant would face a 40 percent chance of
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complete victory (assuming that courts in other jurisdictions grant
preclusive effect to the judgment), but a 60 percent chance of a $360
million exposure (600,000 files x $600 file). The expected value of a
judgment would more than double from $100 million to $216 million
(60 percent probability of loss x $360 million exposure). The starting
point for settlement talks would therefore be $216 million, and the
insurer would likely be more risk averse due to its higher total
38
exposure.
The likely settlement value of the common issues class action
would thus be substantially higher than the settlement value of the
hypothetical case where a court devoted time and energy to assessing
the merits of each individual claim without relying on' generalizations
based on "common" evidence and inferences. The settlement value of
the class action would not reflect the merits of the case so much as the
parties' assessment of how a distorted litigation process would
prejudice the defendant by inflating the defendant's probability of
losing on common issues, diminishing the defendant's probability of
prevailing on defenses, and increasing the defendant's total exposure.
Alternatively, one can imagine a scenario in which the
settlement value of the class action would be lower for plaintiffs than
if cases were litigated individually. Suppose in the example above
that the plaintiffs' "common" evidence of illegal claims practices is
weak, but that a file-by-file review creates a much stronger inference
of wrongdoing in the insurer's adjustment of claims. Even assuming
that the plaintiffs could present a statistical analysis of selected
claims files to support their allegation of classwide wrongdoing, the
parties might conclude that the "common" claim would be so
complicated that the jury might reject it even though a significant
38. The supposition that defendants will be risk-averse when threatened with a large
damages award may seem counterintuitive in light of conventional models of settlement
behavior, which assume that defendants are loss-averse and therefore favor the risk of trial over
settlement in the hope of avoiding all liability. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses & the
Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 123 (1996). However, the cognitive psychology
experiments on which these settlement models are founded were not designed to address risk
aversion in the context of the large potential losses that are possible in class actions, see Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251,
S258 (1986) (noting that experimental evidence about risk perceptions "may not apply to ruinous
losses"), and to the extent relevant predict that decisionmakers focus on the magnitude of
potential losses while underweighting the low probability of their occurrence, see Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, The Framingof Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science 453,
455 (1981).
Existing scholarship about risk preferences is therefore consistent with the
hypothesis that a corporate defendant faced with a massive potential class action judgment is
more likely to avoid risk than to seek it. Cf. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No:
A Study of Settlement Negotiations & the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 383
(1991) (concluding that the extent of a defendant's risk-aversion may partly depend on the
difference between its net worth and its exposure).
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percentage of individual claims are meritorious. The expected value of
a class action judgment would therefore be lower than the value of a
judgment in the hypothetical case where the court reviewed and
rendered judgment on each file separately.
Of course, the hypothetical option of adjudicating all one
million claims for the small sum of $500 does not exist in the real
world, so the settlement value of the insurance cases above absent
certification of a class is probably $0 or nuisance value. The ostensibly
neutral point that settlements are problematic when the litigation
procedure that motivates them would not accurately value claims is
thus in many circumstances a veiled (but no less troubling) way of
saying that defendants should escape liability entirely unless
somebody invents a more accurate mechanism to hold them
accountable for injuries imposed on a large group of somewhat
similarly and somewhat dissimilarly situated victims. One could
avoid this implication by making the fair and accurate resolution of
group claims less difficult by, for example, amending substantive law
to jettison hard-to-prove individualized elements, developing
streamlined dispute resolution procedures geared toward quickly and
accurately resolving large numbers of somewhat similar claims, or
rethinking the extent to which society should care if a settlement
correlates with the merits of claims. 39 However, as explained in Part
III, such innovations should be debated and discussed through
legitimate democratic channels, and should not be achieved covertly,
as they often are now, as an ad hoc incident to judicial attempts to
squeeze a square peg of dissimilar claims through the round hole of
class certification criteria.
I am not arguing here that class action settlements are
appropriate only in cases that could be manageably litigated. In some
circumstances, the parties might be able to predict how a court would
resolve claims if the court had sufficient resources to do the job
properly. For example, if the obstacle to certification is that holding a
hearing for each of one million similarly situated class members would
be impossible, a class action settlement might be appropriate if the
parties could accurately predict the likely outcome of those hearings,
perhaps based on statistical analysis of a random sample (assuming
that the applicable substantive law permits such sampling).4 ° A
39. See infra Part V.B.
40. For discussions of the benefits and limitations of statistical sampling techniques, see
Bone, supra note 16, at 568 (noting that a "critical question" when considering sampling "is how
to distribute fairly a limited number of process opportunities among persons with equal
participation rights"); Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law,
78 VA. L. REV. 1481, 1490 (1992) (suggesting "the use of statistical claim profiles, or models, to
set baseline appraisals of the value of individual claims"); Rosenberg, Mandatory Litigation,
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settlement in these circumstances could embody a fair and accurate
assessment of expected values roughly linked to the merits of class
members' claims in the aggregate even if a class action trial would not
be practicable, although there would still be unresolved questions
about how much of an award to distribute to differently situated
individual class members. 41 However, where the unwieldy nature of a
class action would distort its likely outcome, as in the insurance
coverage example above, then its settlement value is likely to
incorporate that distortion and unlikely to reflect a socially desirable
level of compensation and deterrence.
Certification criteria for
settlement classes must therefore permit courts to distinguish
between class actions that would be manageable but for a lack of
resources and class actions where manageability problems would
cause the resolution of common questions to distort the valuation of
42
dissimilar individual claims.
Accordingly, underemphasizing dissimilarity among claims on
the assumption that class actions will eventually settle without
considering whether the action could in theory be fairly litigated
injects the unfairness of potential litigation into the terms of
supra note 1, at 853 n.47 (advocating "averaging' in the "sense of disregarding differences in
litigation value among claims in order to redistribute claim-related wealth in a manner
consistent with tort deterrence and insurance objectives"); Laurens Walker & John Monahan,
Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1998) (proposing expanded use of established survey
methodologies to assess damages).
41. The existence of classwide settlements in uncertifiable cases may seem counter-intuitive
because the lack of manageability would render the plaintiffs' threat of obtaining certification
hollow and defendants would have little to fear from refusing to settle. However, defendants
may perceive a class action settlement as a favorable alternative to defending against numerous
individual claims, and may therefore seek to buy peace on a classwide basis even though a class
action would otherwise be uncertifiable. For an example of such a settlement in the context of
asbestos claims, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
42. The Supreme Court has partially recognized the need to consider similarity among
claims at the certification stage of a proposed settlement class, albeit in a disjointed manner. On
the one hand, the Court has held that "[c]onfronted with a request for settlement-only class
certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present
intractable management problems ... for the proposal is that there be no trial." Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). Yet on the other hand, the Court has held that
"permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation" is generally not appropriate
because the fair settlement value of the case cannot always be determined without reference to a
credible threat of litigation. Id. at 621. The gist of the court's seemingly inconsistent reasoning
seems to be that manageability is not important if no trial is contemplated, but that the
underlying factors that would render the case unmanageable may defeat certification for other
reasons. For example, the "divers[ity]" among claims and defenses that would defeat
predominance and inhibit a classwide trial under Rule 23(b)(3)(D) may likewise render any
classwide representation in settlement negotiations inadequate under Rule 23(a)(4). Id. at 622
n.17. Understood in this manner, the Court's opinion in Amchem is consistent with my analysis
above suggesting that the propriety of class action settlements is not a function of whether
claims could actually be litigated, but rather whether the settlement terms could be tested
against the expected outcomes of a predictable and fair adjudicative process.
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settlements. The settlement value of such cases would reflect a
reaction to perceived quirks in how an unwieldy class action would be
4
resolved rather than a rational assessment of the case's merits. 3
Assuring that settlements bear a relationship to the merits of claims
therefore requires devising certification criteria that account for the
potential distorting effect of dissimilarity among class members.

In sum, diversity among the circumstances of individual class
members and judicial reactions to that diversity are an often
overlooked source of controversial shortcomings in the class action
device. Class actions are not inherently incapable of resolving cases
accurately, but in practice collectively litigating or settling dissimilar
issues can distort the valuation of individual and aggregate claims.
Accordingly, a central question for observers concerned about tension
between the substantive aspirations of regulation and the procedural
reality of adjudication should be whether courts have coherent criteria
to assess how dissimilarity affects the propriety of certifying a
putative class. Part III seeks to create a principled foundation for
such criteria.
III. PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD SHAPE RULES GOVERNING THE EFFECT
OF INDIVIDUALIZED ISSUES ON CLASS CERTIFICATION DECISIONS

The previous Part demonstrated that dissimilarity among
putative class members' circumstances can distort the valuation of
claims, raising the question of how certification rules should measure
and assess dissimilarity within putative classes. The next three Parts
of the Article seek to answer that question. This Part identifies and
analyzes three broad principles from which to extract more specific
criteria for assessing the significance of individualized issues. Part IV
then tests the "predominance" rule against these criteria and finds the
rule conceptually flawed, and Part V proposes a replacement.
The significance of individualized questions in proposed class
actions is a matter of degree rather than of absolutes. Different class
members often act with different degrees of reasonableness, intent,
and knowledge, are injured to different extents, value their losses
differently, and have differing goals for the outcome of litigation, but
43. Such settlements might raise additional problems if the dissimilarity among differently
situated claimants leads lawyers representing one group to negotiate a settlement that does not
adequately address the needs of other groups. This concern about adequacy of representation
has been the primary focus of the Supreme Court's decisions reviewing class action settlements.
See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-27.
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these differences are not necessarily relevant or material in every
case. For example, the fact that different purchasers of a computer
intended to use it for different purposes would be irrelevant in an
antitrust class action against the seller for price-fixing, but would be
highly relevant in an implied warranty class action against the seller
claiming that the computers were unfit for a particular purpose.
Designers of class certification rules must therefore develop criteria
capable not only of recognizing the existence of diversity within
proposed classes, but also of assessing whether that diversity could
materially affect resolution of class members' claims.
Testing whether current rules governing class certification
adequately assess and account for diversity among putative class
members' circumstances requires identifying a broader set of
principles to which such rules should conform. Drawing from general
themes of civil procedure, it would be possible to identify at various
levels of abstraction hundreds of principles that certification rules
would need to reflect on any number of topics and subtopics from the
initial filing of class actions to the final enforcement of classwide
judgments. However, my goal is not to reinvent the class action from
scratch. For present purposes, I identify three principles and that set
minimum parameters for rules guiding judicial discretion in assessing
the similarity and dissimilarity of individual claims in a putative class
action. From each principle we can derive preliminary conclusions
about how to draft certification rules. We can then combine the three
principles to derive more concrete drafting criteria, and then test
those criteria against current rules governing class certification.
The three principles, explained in greater detail below, are
that: (1) a certified class action for money damages must eventually
result in an enforceable judgment resolving the claims of all class
members (the "finality" principle); (2) a class member may not receive
a judgment in his or her favor unless he or she proves the substantive
elements for the applicable cause of action and survives any applicable
defenses (the "fidelity" principle); and (3) attempts to adjudicate class
actions in conformity with principles 1 and 2 must occur within
resource and management constraints (the "feasibility" principle).
Class certification is thus proper only if the court has a plan for
eventually reaching an adjudicated or negotiated judgment that
reflects the parties' rights under controlling law.
These three
principles may not seem controversial when phrased at this level of
abstraction, but we will see in Part IV that current class action rules
and doctrine often overlook or contradict these ideals. Alternatively,
some of the principles may seem counterintuitive based on
conventional wisdom about class actions, but we will see that
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conventional wisdom has slipped from its theoretical moorings.
A. The FinalityPrinciple:A Certified Class Action Seeking Damages
Should Eventually Result in a Judgment Resolving the Claims of All
Class Members
A hallmark of American judicial procedure is that absent a
voluntary act by the parties (such as settlement) or dismissal by the
court, civil litigation eventually culminates in a final judgment
establishing the rights of the litigants with respect to the subject of
the suit. If a plaintiff prevails, the judgment requires the defendant to
take some action with respect to the plaintiff, such as paying a
specified amount of money or refraining from a course of conduct. If a
defendant prevails, the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion and the
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause generally terminate the
plaintiffs ability to litigate against the defendant again about the
subject addressed in the judgment. 44 Judgments do not always come
quickly, but the judicial system aspires to eventual closure.
The normative foundations of the need for a judgment reflect at
least three distinct concerns about civil process - cost, scarcity, and
efficiency. First, adjudication is costly to provide and should therefore
produce at least some benefit. The principal potential benefits of
adjudication in the context of suits for damages are the peaceful
resolution of disputes, official determination of culpability (or lack
thereof), amelioration of uncertainty about contested rights, payment
of compensation (or termination of contingent liabilities), and the
modification (or ratification) of contested behavior. 45 These benefits do
not fully accrue in cases where the court would be unable to enter a
judgment resolving the dispute or ruling on the propriety and
consequences of the contested conduct. Indeed, even if the purpose of
adjudication is understood in non-instrumental terms - for example,
as promoting human dignity by providing a mechanism for the redress
of grievances - it is difficult to see how leaving litigants twisting in
44. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Loopholes in the doctrine of claim preclusion permit
plaintiffs in some circumstances to file multiple suits challenging different aspects of the same
offensive conduct, but finality is still a goal within each separate proceeding with respect to the
issues being contested. See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 875-81 (1984) (holding
that a judgment rejecting class action claims alleging that the defendant engaged in a
discriminatory employment practice did not preclude class members from pursuing individual
discrimination claims that did not depend on "pattern or practice" allegations).
45. Cf. Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1975)
(reviewing the "conflict resolution" and "behavior modification" models of civil procedure).
Adjudication may also serve additional purposes when employed as a vehicle for reforming social
and political institutions. See Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976)
("Adjudication is the social process by which judges give meaning to our public values.").
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the wind without an enforceable judgment would promote any
plausible value or norm. Second, adjudication is a scarce resource for
which demand exceeds supply. A sensible threshold sorting criteria
for allocating this resource is to give it only to people who have a
chance of becoming better off after adjudication than they were
before. 46 A judgment is the embodiment of such potential relief. If
there is no realistic possibility that a judgment can be entered for a
particular claimant, distributive concerns suggest that the scarce
resource of litigation should be given to another claimant who might
be able to derive some benefit from it. Finally, from an efficiency
perspective, adjudication diverts the parties from more socially
productive pursuits, so there is value in eventually terminating
litigation in a manner that justifies its existence and that returns the
47
parties to more productive endeavors.
Class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) are no different from
ordinary civil suits in their need to result in a judgment. Each class
member claims entitlement to a sum of money, and each seeks to walk
away from the judicial proceeding enriched by that sum. 48 Defendants
have countervailing interests in terminating the case in their favor
without paying damages, and in not being sued again by members of
the same class raising the same claims. 49 Both sets of parties
46. This sorting criteria is evident in federal standing doctrine, which limits the availability
of judicial dispute resolution to cases and controversies in which a judgment could redress a
plaintiffs injury. See infra note 61.
47. See Priest, supra note 1, at 543-44 (defining "finality," along with "efficiency" and
"equity," as a principal goal of tort law because "there is a value.., to allow[ing] both plaintiffs
and defendants to return to increasing social productivity").
48. In reality, most plaintiffs have no idea of the existence of class actions in which they are
potential beneficiaries, and therefore in a formal sense do not seek or expect damages. However,
the lawyers who file class actions derive their compensation from the damages awards that they
obtain for the class and thus, as proxies for their clients, seek judgments specifying the nature
and size of financial entitlements.
49. The bar against so-called "one-way intervention" in class actions is a manifestation of
defendants' interests in assuring eventual peace: plaintiffs cannot chose to stay on the sidelines
of class litigation until the likely outcome is clear, and then intervene only if the result is
favorable while avoiding the binding effect of an unfavorable judgment. See Am. Pipe & Constr.
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974):
A recurrent source of abuse under the former Rule lay in the potential that members
of the claimed class could in some situations await developments in the trial or even
final judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation would be
favorable to their interests ... The 1966 amendments were designed, in part,
specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to assure that
members of the class would be identified before trial on the merits and would be
bound by all subsequent orders and judgments.
But cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (endorsing the doctrine of
offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel, which is in effect a form of one-way intervention).
Potential class members must instead decide whether to participate in the class action before the
court resolves the merits so that the defendant is able to bind the entire class to an unfavorable
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therefore want the arbiter of their dispute - a civil court - to
definitively state who owes or does not owe what to whom. Rule 23
recognizes the parties' mutual interest in finality by requiring class
actions to culminate in some form of judgment covering all parties to
the case, 50 and there is no indication in the Rule - with the exception
of a provision for "issue classes" discussed below 51 that class actions
warrant a departure from the general principle that civil litigation
culminates in final judgments specifying the rights and obligations of
52
the parties.
The need for a final judgment specifying the rights of the
parties has important implications for how courts should evaluate the
significance of similarity and dissimilarity among claims when
deciding whether to certify a proposed class action. Similarity among
claims facilitates crafting a judgment that specifies the rights of all
class members, while dissimilarity may necessitate fact-intensive
case-by-case inquiries into the propriety of judgment that would make
class litigation difficult, if not impossible. 53 Certification criteria must
therefore assist the court in determining which proposed class actions
judgment. Without the bar against one-way intervention, defendants would never be certain
that even a string of victories in high-stakes class action litigation would prevent an
opportunistic plaintiff from eventually getting lucky and subjecting the defendant to the risk of a
large classwide damages award. A defendant faced with the prospect of being unable to achieve
peace even by winning multiple trials might therefore be willing to settle cases for far more than
their merit warrants simply to limit its potential exposure to windfall verdicts.
50. See FED. R. CiV. P. 23(c)(2)(B) & 23(c)(3); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 n.8 (1975):
The certification of a suit as a class action has important consequences for the
unnamed members of the class. If the suit proceeds to judgment on the merits, it is
contemplated that the decision will bind all persons who have been found at the time
of certification to be members of the class.
The judgment requirement is buried within Rule 23(c)'s provisions governing class action notice
rather than in Rule 23(b)'s criteria for certifying classes, and therefore does not factor into
certification decisions as frequently as it should (as discussed infra in Part IV).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 58-64.
52. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 68 (governing entry of judgment in federal civil litigation).
For an example of a similar context where the Supreme Court has held that class actions do not
alter generally applicable procedural principles absent express indication in a statute or rule, see
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470 (1978):
There are special rules relating to class actions and, to that extent, they are a special
kind of litigation. Those rules do not, however, contain any unique provisions
governing appeals. The appealability of any order entered in a class action is
determined by the same standards that govern appealability in other types of
litigation.
53. Courts could elect to achieve finality without case-by-case inquiries into the varying
circumstances of each individual class member if they decide that the outcome of such inquiries
would not be relevant under the applicable substantive liability and damage rules. The
temptation to reach such a conclusion can be strong in cases where class certification appears to
be the only way to achieve rough justice for groups that lack access to alternative remedies,
which explains the ad hoc lawmaking phenomenon described above and illustrates the need for
the fidelity principle described below.
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can be litigated to judgment and which cannot, and which can be
settled fairly based on the expected value of a final judgment and
54
which cannot.
Three hypothetical examples illustrate how different proposed
class actions might be more or less suitable for certification depending
on how common and individual questions influence the difficulty of
crafting a judgment to resolve all class members' claims. In each
example, a significant aspect of the defendant's potential liability to
class members is a common question, but aspects of liability and proof
of damages vary for each class member.
In the first example,
resolution of the common question advances class members' quest for
a judgment very far, but in the second and third examples resolution
of the common question would still leave difficult individual questions
for the court to resolve before it could enter a judgment.
Example 1. Suppose that thousands of customers of a local
telephone company allege that a surcharge of a few cents for calls to
411 violates a statute setting permissible telephone service rates and
seek recovery of the overcharges. Classwide resolution of the common
question of whether the charges were legal would clearly move each
class member significantly closer to a final judgment. Further inquiry
into each individual case would be necessary to confirm that each
class member in fact incurred the alleged overcharge in a particular
amount, but merely introducing copies of phone bills should suffice to
prove each individual claim to the satisfaction of a fact-finder. The
individual issues that remain after resolution of common questions in
this example are thus a relatively inconsequential obstacle to
rendering a final judgment for each class member. 55
54. Whether a judgment will be preclusive is a separate question from whether it must be
final. The drafters of Rule 23 have been hesitant to codify the preclusive effect of class action
judgments for fear of violating the Rules Enabling Act by specifying the substantive rights that
flow from a procedural rule. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 393; James Wm. Moore & Marcus
Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555, 556
(1938). The absence of a uniform rule governing preclusion has led to substantial uncertainty in
assessing the preclusive effect of class action judgments. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., An
HistoricalAnalysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849 (1998) (analyzing
the evolving and often inconsistent treatment of preclusion in equity practice and early class
action litigation). Preclusion issues have also proven particularly tricky in class actions because
unlike traditional suits in which plaintiffs join all transactionally related claims against a
defendant into a single action, class actions usually focus on a relatively narrow subset of
contestable issues, potentially freeing class members to file additional suits against the
defendant on related issues without fear of preclusion. See supra note 44. It is not necessary
here to flesh out the extent to which class action judgments must be preclusive. At a minimum,
the parties must have a final judgment before they can try to enforce it, attack it, or avoid it.
Thus, at a minimum, class certification rules should link the question of certification to the goal
of eventually entering a judgment.
55. Some individual claims might present problems if, for example, the defendant contends
that a phone bill submitted into evidence is forged, or that a plaintiff was in arrears on her bill
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Example 2. Suppose that thousands of consumers receive an
identical written solicitation from a financial planner promising to
provide a valuable introductory financial consultation if the consumer
makes a "free" call to a specified ten-digit phone number. The
solicitation fails to advise consumers that the specified area code is in
the Cayman Islands (which is an international toll call for most U.S.
residents despite the absence of an international dialing prefix), and
that callers will incur whatever long-distance charges their telephone
company normally imposes for such calls. Thousands of consumers
have lengthy and helpful conversations with the planning service, but
are shocked to receive long-distance telephone charges for the "free"
calls and sue the planner for fraud. Resolution of the common
question of whether the solicitation was misleading because it omitted
disclosures about long-distance charges or represented the calls as
"free" would help class members to prove liability. However, because
a consumer's knowledge of the truth - or failure to exercise reasonable
diligence in learning the truth - is usually a defense to a common law
or statutory fraud claim, 56 and given the general understanding
among most telephone users that dialing strange area codes might
result in high telephone bills, the defendant would want an
opportunity to explore in each case whether the caller knew that the
area code being dialed would incur long-distance charges or took any
steps to determine how the call would be billed. Assuming that there
is a plausible reason to believe that some class members may have
incurred long distance charges voluntarily or negligently, resolution of
common liability questions would still leave substantial obstacles to
entering a final judgment entitling particular class members to
57
reimbursement of phone charges.

and thus never paid an overcharge. However, a court should presumably be able to cope with
these isolated defenses (which would likely depend on the defendant's business records) while
still moving the remainder of claims along to a final judgment.
56. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Bell Atl., 177 F.R.D. 279, 293-94 (D.N.J. 1997) (refusing to
certify statutory fraud class in part because of individual issues of whether plaintiffs "already
knew" allegedly omitted information); Zekman v. Direct Am. Marketers, 695 N.E.2d 853, 861 (111.
1998) (rejecting statutory fraud claim because plaintiffs knowledge that dialing a "900" number
would incur charges precluded him from challenging warnings about such charges); Agnew v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 502 S.E.2d 735, 737 (Ga. App. 1998) (Georgia's fraud statute bars
claim by plaintiff who already knew information allegedly concealed from him).
57. Holding the defendant liable for fraud regardless of any idiosyncrasies in what class
members knew about the possibility of long distance charges and how diligent they might have
been in anticipating such charges may be socially desirable. However, the optimal scope of fraud
doctrine and the availability of individualized defenses are questions distinct from whether class
certification would be appropriate under existing fraud doctrine. For additional discussion of the
relationship between substantive causes of action and procedural mechanisms for obtaining
remedies, see infra notes 62, 70, 95, and Part V.B.

1030

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:4:995

Example 3. Suppose that thousands of purchasers of an
automobile contend that the parking brake was defectively designed,
causing it to fail when they engaged it, such that the car incurred
damage by rolling out of a parking space and striking a blunt object.
Answering the common question of whether the brake was defectively
designed would be helpful in resolving each individual class member's
claim, sparing them the costly burden of proving a complex scientific
point in each of thousands of cases. However, resolving a common
question about brake design would still leave class members a long
way from establishing entitlement to damages. Each plaintiff would
still need to prove that the design defect was the proximate cause of
the roll-away (rather than, for example, their failure to properly
engage or maintain the brake) and that the damage to the car did not
pre-date the accident. Assuming that the defendant elects to put
plaintiffs to their proof, resolution of individual claims could require
testimony from each of thousands of plaintiffs and examination of
each of thousands of brakes. The effort and expense needed to move
from resolution of classwide common issues to a final judgment for
each class member would thus be substantially greater in Example 3
than in Example 1.
The foregoing examples illustrate that the practical
significance of any individual issues remaining as an obstacle to entry
of final judgment after resolution of common questions varies from
case to case, even when cases appear to involve similar subject matter
(such as the dispute over telephone charges in Examples 1 and 2). My
point is not to show that certification should always be granted in
cases similar to Example 1 and always denied in cases similar to
Examples 2 and 3 - more information would be necessary to make
that determination. Instead, my point is that a court must be able to
understand why the foregoing examples are differently suited to class
action status if it is to have any hope of making an appropriate
certification decision.
The limitations that the finality principle imposes in damages
cases need not entirely frustrate efforts to squeeze specific issues
arising in such cases into the class action mold. In theory, courts may
be able to fragment damage claims into components, confine
certification to only some of these components, and then render a final
class action judgment limited to the certified components rather than
the ultimate question of who owes or does not owe what to whom. For
example, in proposed products liability or securities fraud damages
class actions, a court might render a "judgment" that "product X is
capable of causing disease Y' or "proxy statement Z is misleading."
Class members who claim to have been aggrieved by X or Z could then
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attempt to use the judgment offensively in subsequent individualized
proceedings against the defendant, either in the same forum or
elsewhere. This approach could be useful in cases where rendering a
classwide judgment on all contested damages questions would be
impractical, such that the only alternative to a limited classwide
judgment would be no classwide judgment at all (and probably no
judgment of any kind given the collective action problems that inhibit
redress of injuries to large groups).
Rendering such a limited
judgment could be an efficient use of scarce and costly judicial
resources - and therefore consistent with the spirit of the finality
principle - if it resolved uncertainty about contested questions and
thereby facilitated settlement, or if it materially aided class members
in their subsequent individual suits.
Although fragmenting putative class claims may present a
safety valve to the demands of the finality principle, the utility of such
"issue classes" in damages cases is questionable - assuming that
certification rules even permit them. 58 First, issue classes should be
understand as injunction classes rather than as damages classes, and
therefore do not directly implicate the concerns addressed in this
Article. A plea for a court to rule on a discrete factual or legal
question is essentially a request for a declaratory judgment rather
than a request to adjudicate a claim for damages - the damages
component of the case is relevant only to post-class action proceedings
rather than to the class action itself. A plaintiffs request to fragment
what would otherwise be a 23(b)(3) damages class action into an
issues class thus, for practical purposes, seems to transfer the
certification inquiry's focus from the 23(b)(3) factors addressed in this
Article to the 23(b)(2) factors. 59 Second, federal courts may conclude
that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue issue classes, either because of
prudential constraints on the use of declaratory judgment actions 60 or
because the possibility that plaintiffs will be unable to exploit an
58. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4)(A) provides that "when appropriate," "an action
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues." For competing
views about the permissible scope of "issues" classes, compare Laura J. Hines, Challenging the
Issue ClassAction End Run, 52 EMoRY L.J. 709 (2003) (endorsing a relatively narrow view), with
Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certificationof Particular
Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249 (endorsing a relatively broad view).
59. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (expressly encompassing requests for injunctive and
declaratory relie).
60. Compare Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998) (holding that Article III
precludes adjudication of declaratory judgment actions seeking resolution of "a collateral legal
issue governing certain aspects of [class members'] pending or future suits"), with Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (holding that Article III permits an insurer to seek a
declaratory judgment about the validity of an insurance policy in anticipation of future
litigation).
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issue-class judgment in subsequent proceedings attenuates the
judgment's ability to resolve a concrete case or controversy. 61 Third,
issue class actions regarding common liability questions divorced from
individualized claims for damages will likely be rare because few
lawyers will have an incentive to file them. The lucrative potential
payday for class action lawyers arises from securing a damages award,
not from obtaining a declaratory judgment that individual class
members may - or may not - eventually parlay into damages in future
individualized proceedings that the class lawyer would not necessarily
control. Fourth, even if a lawyer could obtain a quasi-declaratory
ruling on a subset of contested issues, the shift from a class-versusdefendant to an individuals-versus-defendant procedural posture
would vitiate the lawyer's settlement leverage and permit defendants
to regress to their standard tactic of stonewalling individual cases to
deflate settlement values. Indeed, from the defense perspective, such
stonewalling would have the added benefit of deterring other
plaintiffs' lawyers from attempting similar bifurcated class actions in
the future. 62 Fifth, the utility of limiting a class action judgment to

61. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,
517 U.S. 544, 558 (1996) (noting that if class actions and other forms of representative litigation
"failed to resolve the claims of the individuals ultimately interested, their disservice to the core
Article III requirements would be no secret"); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992) (the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of Article III standing analysis is that a
favorable resolution of the plaintiffs claim will 'likely" "redress" a concrete injury) (citations
omitted); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) ('The 'personal
stake' aspect of mootness doctrine also serves primarily the purpose of assuring that federal
courts are presented with disputes they are capable of resolving."); Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) ("Even when a case falls within [Article III's] constitutional
boundaries, a plaintiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the
judiciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights
would be vindicated.").
62. There is nothing inherent in the process of allocating damage awards that renders class
action litigation impracticable, and thus there is no principled reason why a bifurcated
proceeding could not resolve classwide liability issues and then distribute damages among class
members. For example, if the only remedy available under the applicable substantive law is a
$100 per person penalty award, then distributing damages to class members would not create
any significant procedural challenges after resolution of liability questions (assuming that the
identities of class members can be determined objectively). However, most current forms of
substantive regulation follow a corrective justice model of remedies in which the court must
award damages based on individual class members' proof of entitlement to compensation, which
can be time-consuming and costly to establish. I assume for purposes of this Article that the
entitlement/compensation model of remedies is valid in spite of the constraints that it imposes on
the design of efficient adjudication procedures. For an argument that damage allocation criteria
should implement principles other than compensation that are easier to prove within the
framework of a bifurcated class action trial, see David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and
Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002)
(arguing that distribution of damage awards should follow principles of insurance); see also Gary
T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75
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common issues is questionable because the rendering court would
probably be unable to dictate the preclusive effect of its order in other
jurisdictions, creating uncertainty about the order's enforceability and
potential inequality of treatment in different fora. 63 In sum, if
certification rules permit issue classes, and if plaintiffs have standing
and incentive to file them, and if they prevail, there is still a
substantial possibility that plaintiffs would face insurmountable
practical obstacles to translating their issue-judgment into damagesjudgments for all or many class members, which calls into question
whether adjudicating the issue-class action would be worth the
effort. 64 In any event, for present purposes it is sufficient to observe
that the finality principle comes into play whenever a plaintiff seeks
to a certify a (b)(3) damages class rather than an issue class, and so it
is useful to assess the rules that courts should apply to such requests.

The foregoing discussion suggests a preliminary conclusion
that, in combination with conclusions from the sections below, could
assist in drafting rules governing certification of classes: courts should
certify class actions seeking damages only when the individual
questions of law and fact that remain after resolution of common
questions can be definitively resolved in a final judgment establishing
the rights and responsibilities of the plaintiffs and defendants. This
principle leaves room for courts to develop creative adjudication or
negotiation mechanisms for resolving individual claims in preparation
for a final judgment. There is no single "correct" way for a court to
winnow the scope of a case and to reach conclusions about contested
TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (noting overlooked areas of commonality between deterrence and
corrective justice approaches to regulation).
63. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 396 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A court conducting an action cannot predetermine
the res judicata effect of the judgment; that effect can be tested only in a subsequent action.");
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 737 F. Supp. 1289, 1307-08 ("[A] declaration concerning issue
preclusion by a court certifying a class action, for intended use in future litigation in another
court, is not procedurally viable."), amended by 838 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Kauhane v.
Acutron Co., 795 P.2d 276, 278 n.3 (Haw. 1990) (noting "the fundamental tenet of the doctrine of
res judicata that the court issuing the initial judgment lacks the authority to determine the
preclusive effect of that judgment"). But cf. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action
Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (2005) (contending that courts have substantial authority to
control the preclusive effect of class action judgments).
64. An interesting question for further study is how much of an anticipated benefit should
be required to justify the transaction costs of an issue class. Presumably, only a fraction - large
or small - of all class members who prevail in an issue class action would be able to parlay that
success into a satisfying victory or settlement in subsequent damage proceedings.
The
anticipated size of this fraction relative to transaction costs may be relevant to deciding if
adjudicating the issue class action is worth the court's time and effort.
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evidence in individual disputes. To the contrary, the large body of
scholarship assessing procedural devices for resolving complex factual
disputes attests to the variety of paths that courts can take. However,
class litigation under Rule 23(b)(3) should eventually culminate in a
final judgment informing the plaintiffs and defendants who owes what
to whom. If adjudication cannot produce such a judgment, and if a
settlement cannot do so fairly 65 (or if the parties are not willing to
settle) then the class should either not be certified or should be
decertified when the problem becomes apparent. As we will see in
Part IV, current certification rules and doctrine often overlook this
principle, resulting in the certification of class actions in
circumstances where the court does not have the faintest idea of how
the case could be resolved if the parties do not agree to a settlement
and insist on litigating the merits.
B. The Fidelity Principle:A Class Member Should Not Receive a
FavorableJudgment Unless He or She Can Prove the Substantive
Elements for a Cause of Action and Survive Any Applicable Defenses
This Section builds on the previous discussion of finality by
exploring how, if at all, class actions alter the manner in which a
plaintiff can establish entitlement to a judgment in his or her favor.
An underlying assumption of this Section is that substantive laws that
regulate behavior and create enforceable entitlements have definable
elements and defenses that should constrain how courts resolve
contested questions. 66 The section concludes that the procedural
65. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
66. Some conceptions of the nature of substantive law would be skeptical of this
assumption. For example, instrumentalist (sometimes called realist or reductionist) approaches
to tort law often postulate that the compensation and deterrence goals of tort determine the
meaning of tort elements in particular cases, such that the content of a rule is partly a function
of the context in which it is applied. These visions of tort law suggest that the distinction I draw
between procedural fidelity to substantive law and ad hoc lawmaking is illusory because the
content of substantive law is in some sense inherently ad hoc. A logical extension of such
arguments would be that if class actions can improve the deterrent and compensatory force of
tort, then judges in class actions can define "elements" of torts - such as breach of duty,
causation, and injury - to maximize deterrence and compensation without any preconceived
notion of how these elements would apply in other procedural contexts. Debating such
instrumentalist visions of malleable tort elements is beyond the scope of this Article (suffice to
say that it is questionable even on instrumentalist terms whether an amorphously defined tort
standard provides adequate warning to potential wrongdoers about the likely consequences of
their actions, such that actors faced with uncertainty may over- or under-invest in safety). For
present purposes, I assume that substantive rules have at least some content capable of
transcending procedural context, although this content is flexible and should evolve over time to
cope with new regulatory dilemmas. See infra Part V.B. For a helpful taxonomy and discussion
of competing conceptualizations of tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort
Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003).
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context in which a claim is adjudicated should not alter the content of
these elements and defenses or the outcome of their application. Class
actions should thus feature procedural fidelity to substantive law,
meaning that the merit of claims presented in a class action should be
assessed using the same substantive rules that would apply if
67
plaintiffs litigated their claims separately.
There are several prerequisites to entry of judgment in
ordinary civil litigation where a single plaintiff sues a single
defendant. The plaintiff must identify a legally recognized right
creating a private remedy, present sufficient evidence to show that the
defendant infringed the right, rebut objections that the defendant
raises to the significance of that evidence, prove damages, and defeat
any affirmative defenses. A plaintiff who cannot carry her burden of
68
proof or overcome defenses cannot obtain a judgment in her favor.
Class actions do not alter the basic proof-and-defense structure
of adjudication. A class action merely changes the manner in which
class members and defendants present the evidence and argument
needed to prove or refute each of their claims or defenses. Instead of
each class member presenting her own evidence, a representative
plaintiff attempts to prove the claims of all absent class members
using evidence common to each of them. Likewise, instead of refuting
each class member's claim, the defendant attempts to prevail over the
entire class by defeating the claim of the representative plaintiff and
attacking the sufficiency of any "common" evidence of classwide
liability. After resolution of common issues, each party's focus shifts
to whatever individualized issues remain. Class actions do not - or
should not - change the substantive elements of a claim, relieve class
members of their burden of proof, or deprive defendants of their right
to raise applicable defenses. 69 Policymakers are, of course, free to
mold the content of substantive regulations to best exploit the
67. Part IV.D. will discuss how current class action doctrine often overlooks or violates the
fidelity principle.
68. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted"); FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (allowing judgment against a party when "there
is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party"); FED. R. CIV.
P. 56 (allowing summary judgment when the moving party establishes that there is "no genuine
issue as to any material fact" affecting its entitlement to judgment).
69. The leading early proponents of class actions did not perceive their proposed procedural
innovations as altering the substantive law applicable to claims and defenses. See, e.g., Kalven
& Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 694 n.33 ("When the case is conducted as a class suit, regardless of
the variety of individual differences, the defendant is never deprived in any way of his right and
opportunity to present any defenses arising from any of these individual variations.").
Unfortunately, however, these early commentators did not explain how a court should decide
when individual variations among claims should preclude certification, and assumed the problem
out of existence by speculating that individual variations among class members' claims would
likely be "trivial or irrelevant" and not unduly "inconvenient." Id.
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procedural benefits of class actions, but nothing within the class
action device itself alters the elements and burdens of proof associated
70
with the parties' claims and defenses.
There are several reasons why class actions should not modify
the nature of claims and defenses. First, the statutes authorizing
courts to promulgate procedural rules governing class actions do not
ordinarily allow procedures to modify substantive rights. In the
federal system, the Rules Enabling Act forbids the Supreme Court
from drafting rules of civil procedure that "abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right," 71 which prevents Rule 23 from altering the
nature of the parties' claims or defenses. 72 Many states have their
own rules enabling statutes that similarly limit the scope of
73
procedural rules.
70. To the extent that some commentators see class actions as a useful tool for permitting
novel extensions of substantive law - such as various proposals to impose liability for risk and
for altering proof of causation and damages in mass tort cases - the innovation is best
understood as an evolution of tort law rather than class action jurisprudence. The practical
dispute resolution possibilities that class actions create may provide the inspiration for
substantive legal innovation, but the class action device itself ultimately follows where the
substantive law leads. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980) ("Mhe
right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of
substantive claims."); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 423 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("A motion for class certification, like a motion to join additional parties
or to try a case before a jury instead of a judge, seeks only to present a substantive claim in a
particular context."). Cf. Arthur R. Miller, supra note 1, at 674-76 (arguing that the surge of
class action litigation in the 1960s and 70s was a reaction to "larger social forces" that adopted
the class action as a convenient vehicle for implementing, rather than creating, newly recognized
substantive rights); Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 158 (distinguishing between the
structure of procedural mechanisms and their "external policy goals").
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2004). The Rules of Decision Act further constrains the ability of
federal courts to modify substantive rules in situations where courts must apply state rather
than federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2004). Federal courts therefore lack authority to create
a substantive common law for use as an adjunct to Rule 23 when resolving state law claims. See
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
72. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999) ("The Rules Enabling Act
underscores the need for caution" in interpreting the scope of Rule 23); Amchem Prods. Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) ("Rule 23's requirements must be interpreted in keeping
with.., the Rules Enabling Act."); Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The
Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements
Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 462 (1997) (arguing that under the
Rules Enabling Act, procedural rules "aim to cause dispositions on the merits, not to redefine
those merits").
73. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-2-7(4) (2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-109(A) (2003); ARK. CONST.
amend. 80 § 3; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-2-108 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14(a) (1991); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 602-11 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 1-213 (2004); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 8 (2004);
MINN. STAT. § 480.051 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 477.010 (2005); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 3-2-701
(2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 2.120(2) (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1(A) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §
27-02-10 (2004); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.735(1) (2004); PA. CONST.
art. 5, § 10(c); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 16-3-403 (2004); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.004(a) (2005); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-115(b) (2004) ("[procedural rules] shall
neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any person"). Class actions in some
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Second, even if the Rules Enabling Act did not constrain the
permissible scope of procedural rules, there is no indication that rules
creating class actions were intended to modify substantive rights or to
invalidate otherwise applicable defenses to class members' individual
claims. No such intent is evident in the text of Rule 23, in the official
notes of its drafters, or in contemporaneous commentaries discussing
its origins. Congress or a state legislature could in theory enact a
statute allowing certification of a class to alter otherwise applicable
substantive laws, but apparently such legislation has not been
adopted.
Third, allowing class actions to modify substantive laws as an
ad hoc incident to the convenient resolution of a particular case is not
consistent with the customary detachment between rule-formulation
and rule-application in a democracy, at least with respect to statutory
rights and to a lesser extent with respect to common law rights.
Substantive conduct-regulating rules and compensation-awarding
remedies are usually the product of democratic institutions such as
legislatures, administrative agencies subject to democratic oversight,
or an established process of common-law rulemaking by courts whose
decisions are open to review and debate by political institutions.
Regardless of their origin, substantive rules reflect (in theory) a
reasoned balancing of their relative social costs and benefits across a
range of foreseeable contexts through a process that has some political
If the content of substantive law is altered to
legitimacy.
accommodate complexities raised by the procedural device that the
plaintiff chooses to use in filing her claim - for example, by creatively
interpreting a statute or regulation to apply differently in class actions
than one might expect based on its application in non-class cases then courts in effect would be rebalancing the social costs and benefits
of a particular rule on an ad hoc basis. This rebalancing would occur
without the oversight and political legitimacy that normally
accompanies a decision about the nature of a substantive rule and
without the detachment that one would expect to see between the
formulation of a rule and its application to a particular
74
circumstance.
states are creations of statute rather than administratively promulgated rules and therefore
could, in theory, alter substantive rights, although none of the state class action statutes indicate
such an intent. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-23 (2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-801 et seq.
(2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223 (2005); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 591 et seq. (West 2005);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-623 et seq. (2003); WIS. STAT. § 803.08 (2004).
74. Ad hoc lawmaking of this type could in theory have democratic legitimacy if Congress
authorized it by delegating substantive rulemaking power to the judiciary as an incident to
judicial authority to craft procedural rules, but the Rules Enabling Act expressly disclaims any
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The ad hoc lawmaking problem is less acute, although still
serious, when a court accommodates the complexities of a class action
by modifying a common law rule rather than a statute or regulation.
Unlike legislative statutes or executive regulations, common law rules
are judicial creations and therefore prone to judicially-imposed
changes that adapt rules to new demands. There is no reason why a
class action cannot be a catalyst for the reform of the common law any
more or less than the myriad other facts that have transformed
common law rules over the centuries. 75 Nevertheless, there is
something discomforting about changing common law liability or
damage rules as an afterthought to a procedural dilemma in a
particular case, rather than with full consideration of the costs and
benefits of modifying the rule in all of the procedural contexts in
which the rule might be litigated. 76 The discomfort grows when one
considers that many successful class actions can have unintended
consequences on matters that involve a delicate balance between
competing policy interests. For example, a large damage award based
on the side effects of a drug or vaccine might prematurely pull the
product off the market to the disadvantage of people who need it.
Likewise, a successful classwide challenge to insurance claims
adjustment practices can have the effect of raising premiums and
pricing consumers out of the insurance market. Facilitating claims
against drug manufacturers and insurance companies for the massive
levels of damages that class actions can deliver is thus not as clearly
desirable as it might seem when viewed in the narrow context of a
particular class action filed by aggrieved victims, rather than in a
more self-consciously detached lawmaking context designed to weigh
competing social interests in the abstract without regard for the facts
of particular cases or the emotional pressure of dealing with a large

such delegation. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. The constitutionality of such a
delegation of legislative power to the judicial branch would be hotly contested. See generally Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1621
(2002) (assessing the debate over the nondelegation doctrine's constitutional origins). For a
discussion of the practical consequences of legislative delegation of rulemaking power to courts,
see Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099 (2002).
75. Cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 824 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (observing that state courts had "developed general common-law
principles to accommodate the novel facts of this litigation").
76. The concern over democratic legitimacy would be even greater if there were reason to
suspect that the interests of diverse class members were not fully represented in the litigation
process. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312
(1997) (developing a model of democratic legitimacy for judicial outcomes premised on interest
representation).
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class of injured claimants. 77 Allowing courts to bend substantive rules
to the procedural needs of particular cases is thus inconsistent with
the normal process of rulemaking and prone to prioritize the welfare
of litigants over broader social welfare with undesirable distributive
78
consequences.
Fourth, a corollary to the previous argument is that allowing
courts to depart from substantive rules to facilitate the resolution of
particular claims raises questions about democratic transparency and
Lawmakers - whether elected or subject to the
accountability.
oversight of elected officials - should be accountable for the rules that
they create. If the content of these rules varies depending on the
procedural context of particular cases, then the public will have
greater difficulty assessing the rules that their representatives have
created or supervised because the content of rules would be fluid;
sometimes the rules would mean one thing, and sometimes they would
Class actions thus create a troubling
mean something else. 79
opportunity for lawmakers and courts to dodge accountability by
permitting the implementation of substantive rules in a manner
distinct from their apparent and advertised meaning.8 0
Finally, allowing certification of a class to alter the substantive
law applicable to claims and defenses arguably raises due process
77. The tension between private and public perspectives on risk management is particularly
acute in an emerging category of class actions known as "social issue" or "social policy" suits, in
which plaintiffs seek remedies against actors whose profits arise from activities that cause
negative social externalities, such as tobacco companies, gun manufacturers, and health
maintenance organizations (HMOs). For a general discussion of this trend, see Deborah R.
Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale
Litigation, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & IN'L L. 179, 206-12 (2001); McGovern, supra note 1, at 1656 n.1.
78. Cf. Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 204 (arguing that the "central planning'
inherent in reform of broadly applicable substantive laws should occur through political
institutions rather than self-appointed class representatives).
79. Accountability and transparency problems arising from ad hoc lawmaking affect the
judicial branch as well as the legislative branch because procrustean distortion of substantive
rules to accommodate novel procedural circumstances enables judges to cloak substantive
innovations with a procedural gloss. The significance of a judicial opinion endorsing a particular
substantive theory thus will often not be apparent to readers who lack a detailed familiarity with
the facts of the case and the applicable law. This lack of transparency reduces the extent to
which the court can be held accountable for its decision. For a general discussion of the
importance of transparency in judicial opinions, see David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial
Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent, 2003 Sup.
CT. REV. 231, 255-56.
80. This Article approaches the problem of democratic accountability within aggregative
litigation as a function of the ad hoc nature of substantive rulemaking when conducted as an
incident to facilitating application of a particular procedural device to particular facts. An
alternative approach would be to conceptualize the accountability problem as arising from the
displacement of traditional compensatory models of litigation with a bounty hunter model that
alters the remedial focus of substantive laws. For an argument developing this latter view, see
Redish, supra note 1, at 107-29.
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concerns by inhibiting defendants' ability to raise defenses that would
be valid if plaintiffs pursued their claims individually rather than as a
class. There is nothing inherently wrong with denying a defendant
the defenses of its choice.
For example, defendants in federal
securities fraud cases would prefer to argue that particular purchasers
of an overpriced security did not rely on the defendant's
misrepresentations and thus have no claim for damages, but the
81
fraud-on-the-market rule makes the question of reliance irrelevant.
Likewise, defendants in employment discrimination cases would
prefer to avoid being held liable for violating Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act 2 if they did not intend to discriminate, but their lack of
intent can be irrelevant if their actions have a disparate impact on a
protected minority group.8 3 Neither the fraud-on-the-market theory
nor the disparate impact doctrine violate procedural due process even though they deprive defendants of their preferred means of
defending themselves from allegations of wrongdoing - because
defendants must adjust to generally applicable laws and tailor their
defenses to the elements of claims. However, suppose that the fraudon-the-market and disparate impact theories did not generally exist,
but were invented by courts solely to facilitate the efficient resolution
of class actions. An individual securities purchaser who wished to sue
an issuer for misrepresentation would have to prove reliance, but a
member of a class of purchasers would not. Likewise, an individual
job applicant protesting hiring criteria would have to prove a
discriminatory intent, but a member of a class of job applicants would
not. Due process concerns in these circumstances would appear much
more significant. The defendant would have a statutory right under
the applicable substantive law to raise a defense to individual claims,
but would lose that right depending on the procedural mechanism
chosen by plaintiffs for adjudication. A defendant might find itself
unable to conform its conduct to rules that vary with the procedural
context of a claim, thus rendering it liable to groups for conduct that is
not illegal with respect to any individual member of the group. The
caselaw and scholarship in this area are undeveloped, but there is a
plausible reason to believe that using the class action device to deny a
defendant its otherwise applicable right to raise defenses to individual
claims, or to relieve class members of their obligation to prove
otherwise required elements of their individual claims, would violate

81. See supra note 24.
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq (2005).
83. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422-23 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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the defendant's rights to procedural due process.8 4 At a minimum, the
scope of defendants' procedural due process rights in the class action
context warrants additional scholarship.
In short, class certification should not transform an individual
class member's losing claim into a winning claim, except in the sense
that it may level the procedural playing field by giving class members
access to better counsel and more resources with which to develop and
pursue their claims.8 5 The merit of each class member's claim - and
the applicable elements and defenses - should remain the same
whether or not the claim is certified for class treatment. A class
member who would deservedly lose his case in a traditional suit
against the defendant for want of sufficient proof or ability to
overcome defenses - even if represented by adequate counsel with
adequate resources - should also lose in a class action. The same
principle applies in reverse. A defendant who would be unable to
overcome a suit by any one class member should not be able to
manipulate the class action device into a victory (or a low-ball
settlement) over all class members. Rules governing class actions
thus must provide some mechanism for ensuring that the beneficiaries
of a judgment are in fact entitled to that benefit, and likewise that the
persons whose rights a judgment prejudices deserve to suffer such
prejudice.
A concrete example illustrates the foregoing abstract point by
positing four claims that remain constant despite changes in the
procedural mechanism through which they are brought. The change
in procedural context cannot alter the merit of the claims and should
not alter the outcome of the suit. If the outcomes nevertheless differ
from one context to another - despite equivalent juries, judges,
lawyers, and available resources - then procedural rules are not being
properly formulated or applied.
Assume that four consumers - W, X, Y, and Z - each purchase
the same model of Acme waffle iron from the same authorized retailer
84. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) ("Due process requires that there be
an opportunity to present every available defense."); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (vacating certification in part because "defendants
have the right to raise individual defenses against each class member"); Western Elec. Co. v.
Stern, 544 F.2d 1196, 1199 (3d Cir. 1976) (denying defendants a right to "present a full defense
on the issues would violate due process"); Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 437
(Tex. 2000) (noting in the context of class action litigation that "basic to the right to a fair trial indeed, basic to the very essence of the adversarial process - is that each party have the
opportunity to adequately and vigorously present any material claims and defenses").
85. Certification may arguably have a more transformative effect on claims for injunctions
against public actors by creating a class that is an entity with rights and characteristics distinct
from its individual members. For a theory of how group rights in institutional reform litigation
may differ from the sum of constituent individual rights, see Fiss, supra note 45, at 19.
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on the same day. Each plugs the waffle iron into an electrical outlet,
precipitating an immediate explosion. Evidence suggests that a
manufacturing defect that randomly effects some, but not all, Acme
waffle irons could cause such an explosion. W, X, Y, and Z each file
separate suits against Acme for property damage caused by the
allegedly defective exploding waffle irons. As explained above, W, X,
Y, and Z can prevail only if each can prove all the elements of their
claims: for example, that Acme breached a duty of care to purchasers
by negligently manufacturing the waffle iron, and that this breach
proximately caused injury in a specified amount. Acme would have an
opportunity to challenge plaintiffs proof by evidence, argument, and
cross-examination. Assuming that W, X, Y, and Z survived these
challenges, Acme would also have an opportunity to raise affirmative
defenses.
Assume that at each trial, each plaintiff testifies about how he
or she was injured, and Acme's counsel vigorously cross-examines
them. Acme also conducts discovery into the circumstances of each
claim and incorporates what it learns into its defenses.
The trials result in the following outcomes. W wins because
her testimony persuasively shows that she followed the waffle iron's
instructions, acted with great care, suffered extensive damages that
could have been caused only by a manufacturing defect, and Acme's
lawyers could not find any persuasive defenses. X loses because crossexamination reveals that he ignored Acme's explicit instructions to
plug the iron into a grounded outlet, and only when the iron was dry.
X instead plugged the iron into a jury-rigged outlet overloaded with
extension cords after having washed the iron's circuitry with a damp
cloth. The jury concludes that the cause of his injuries was his own
negligence and that there was no evidence that any manufacturing
defect affected the particular iron that he purchased. Y loses because
discovery of repair invoices for his kitchen reveals that all of the
claimed damage was caused by a cooking mishap that pre-dated his
purchase of the iron. Z loses because Acme is able to show that a
series of pre-suit letters between Z and Acme in which Z requested
and Acme paid limited compensation constituted an accord and
satisfaction and waiver of all legal claims. In sum: W proves all
elements and survives all defenses, X and Y fail to prove their claims,
and Z loses on an affirmative defense.
Now assume the exact same facts, but that W, X, Y, and Z all
have the same lawyer and elect to bring their claims in a single action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 or 42(a) or similar state
joinder and consolidation rules. The results of their individual claims
should clearly be the same (assuming equivalent lawyering, judges,
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and juries): W should still win, and X, Y, and Z should still lose.
Nothing inherent in the joinder of the four individual consumers' cases
should affect the cases' merit. Assuming that the judge and jury
properly do their jobs, X, Y, and Z cannot ride Ws coattails to victory.
Now assume that instead of a joined action under Rule 20 or a
consolidated action under Rule 42(a), W files a class action under Rule
23 for damages on behalf of all Acme waffle iron purchasers claiming
to have suffered property damage caused by defective waffle irons
during the relevant time period. X, Y, and Z (and hundreds of others)
meet the class definition. Instead of appearing in court (as in the
prior examples) X, Y, and Z are anonymous class members who
attempt to have their claims proven by W - the named plaintiff who
acts as their representative. Assuming that W tells her compelling
story and prevails on her individual claim, X, Y, and Z should not be
entitled to judgment in their favor as well.
W is merely a
representative for X, Y, and Z. Her existence cannot change the
strength of their personal claims, nor can Ws invulnerability to
Acme's defenses immunize X, Y, and Z. If Acme is able to make a
showing that the outcome of X, Y, and Z's cases might differ from Ws
based on the unique circumstances of their individual claims, then
some mechanism must exist to allow Acme to present that information
to the finder of fact before entry of judgment in X, Y, and Z's favor. If
such a mechanism does not exist, then it would be inappropriate to
allow X, Y, and Z to ride on W's coattails despite their own claims' lack
of merit.
Similarly, if one assumes that X is the named class
representative instead of W, it would be inappropriate to extinguish
Ws meritorious claim based on X's failure of proof.
The waffle iron hypothetical thus confirms the abstract
principle discussed above: class certification should not entitle a class
member to a judgment to which that person would not be entitled if
required to litigate on her own rather than as part of a class.
Certification might as a practical matter improve a class member's
chances of prevailing by giving her access to a better lawyer who
presents better arguments and has the resources to locate better
evidence than the class member would have found if required to
litigate on her own, but certification should not alter the merits of her
claim.
There is a difference between allowing the resources that
certification brings to polish a diamond hidden in the rough and
allowing the pressure that certification brings to create a diamond
from coal. For example, if certification provides Z with access to a
skilled lawyer who can defeat Acme's accord and satisfaction claim,
then certification has served a useful purpose by helping to neutralize
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the defendant's often overpowering resource advantage. 86
But if
certification creates a situation where the court simply ignores Acme's
otherwise dispositive accord and satisfaction defense and allows Z to
prevail, then certification has achieved an impermissible purpose by
manufacturing a whole (the class) whose claims exceed the sum of its
87
parts (individual class members).
The fidelity principle remains an important constraint on
certification even when the parties are willing to settle in lieu of trial.
A negotiated settlement is nominally a voluntary agreement that
waives recourse to procedural alternatives.
Settlements thus in
theory should not raise any concerns about fidelity to substantive law
because the contractual law that the parties negotiate displaces
whatever principles of law might have governed if the parties had
instead elected to risk a trial. However, if a settlement occurs solely
because one or more parties fears the outcome of a trial that would be
conducted in violation of the fidelity principle, the contractual law that
the settlement creates might not be voluntary in any meaningful
sense, and the negotiated contractual law would be no more legitimate
than the ad hoc law whose threatened application motivated the
The prospect of settlement in the shadow of a
settlement. 8
certification order that would violate the fidelity principle thus adds
an extra complication to class action doctrine, requiring courts to
develop a theory of consent to operate in tandem with the fidelity
principle so that courts can decide when fidelity-related obstacles to
trial also bar certification aimed at encouraging a settlement.
Developing such a theory of consent would be beyond the scope of this
Article, and would require addressing several emerging fields where
the consent norms underlying contract law overlap and potentially

86. Cf. Benjamin Kaplan, A PrefatoryNote, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 500 (1969)
("[I]nsofar as class actions will enhance the forensic opportunities of hitherto powerless groups,
they will tend to probe the terrae incognitae of substantive law.").
87. Some commentators perceive a certified class as a legal "entity" whose interests are
distinct from the interests of its individual members. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 1, at 919.
This may be a helpful way to conceptualize classes when confronting issues related to defining
the "parties" to a class action for purposes of assessing the adequacy of representation and the
binding effect of judgments. However, for the reasons explained in the main text, the claims of
the class "entity" do not have special merit merely because a class raises them. The merit of
class claims is a function of the merit of individual claims, although that merit might be easier to
discern or to prove when individuals aggregate their resources. Of course, one could rewrite
substantive law to create rights and remedies tailored specifically for "entity" litigants rather
than individual litigants, see id. at 941-42, but that is a change that should arise from politically
legitimate sources external to the class action rather than as a result of ad hoc procedural
convenience, see supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
88. Cf. supra Part II.C. (discussing the distortions in settlement value that occur when
parties attempt to resolve class actions encompassing individual claims of varying merit).
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conflict with the due process norms underlying civil adjudication.8 9
For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that aggregate
settlements of dissimilar claims do not avoid the fidelity constraint on
certification so much as shift its emphasis from the legitimacy of the
substantive law that would apply at trial to the legitimacy of the
contractual law that would be created by negotiation in the shadow of
trial.90
The discussion in this Section thus suggests a second
preliminary conclusion to help shape the drafting of certification
criteria in cases involving claims with some degree of similarity and
some degree of dissimilarity where the parties have no ex ante
agreement to settle. A class should not be certified unless either: (1)
proof of the named plaintiffs individual claim would also prove the
claims of the absent class members based on the similarity between
the representative and absentees, such that there is no need to inquire
separately into the merit of each individual class member's claims; or
(2) there is an appropriate litigation or negotiation mechanism for
resolving individual questions unique to particular class members at
some point between resolution of common questions and entry of
judgment. Either way, the procedural device of certification should
not circumvent resolution of individual issues that would be salient
under applicable substantive law if each class member's claim were
tried separately. Potentially outcome-determinative issues unique to
individual class members' claims thus either preclude certification or
must be accommodated in a manner consistent with applicable

89. For a discussion of "privatization of public processes" through contractual opt-outs to
otherwise binding state-created procedures and its implications for analysis of civil adjudication,
see Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 623 (2005). See also
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The ForthcomingNear-Total Demise of the Modern Class
Action, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (discussing the enforceability of contractual waivers of
amenability to aggregative litigation). Cf.Marcus, supra note 29, at 881 ("Rule 23 may provide
the glue that allows the parties to arrange tort reform by consent," but only if the consent is
"meaningful."); Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 158 ("The power to alter rights in a
manner that individuals may not avoid generally rests with democratic institutions, not class
counsel and courts by way of a judgment approving a class settlement.").
90. An entirely different problem arises when all parties affirmatively want to settle a
dispute, and seek class certification as a vehicle for giving their agreement maximum effect. In
these circumstances, the settlement is truly voluntary (assuming that the agents representing
the class are in fact implementing class members' preferences), and the parties do not care how a
trial would be conducted because the point of certification is merely to ratify a negotiated
agreement (indeed, in some cases the agreement may pre-date the court's involvement in the
case). Fidelity theory has no role in these circumstances, although there may be other reasons to
question the propriety of certifying a "settlement class." See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Taking
Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement
Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687 (2004).
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substantive laws (or norms governing the scope of permissible consent
in settlements) before entry of judgment.9 1
C. The FeasibilityPrinciple:Attempts to Adjudicate Class Actions
Should Occur Within Resource and Management Constraints
Class actions often inspire in lawyers the same boundless
enthusiasm and confidence that candy stores inspire in children. A
child in a candy store has remarkable confidence in his ability to
consume an inordinate quantity of enticing deserts, and an
unflappable desire to empirically test any limitations on his eating
capacity that an adult might have the temerity to suggest. Lawyers
and judges are often similarly smitten with the alluring potential of
class actions to compensate victims and deter wrongdoers, and tend to
overestimate their ability to cope with the burdens that class actions
impose. Certification criteria must recognize this certify-now, askquestions-later impulse that class actions inspire by grounding
certification decisions in a realistic assessment of how a case can be
litigated.
The burdens of class litigation are particularly acute when
cases involve both common and individualized questions of fact and
law and the court respects the finality and fidelity principles. A court
with infinite time and resources may have the theoretical ability to
resolve common questions in a consolidated proceeding, and then to

91. An interesting question for future scholarship and empirical study concerns the extent
to which the individual issues that defendants identify as obstacles to certification are as a
practical matter relevant to the outcome of disputes. A clever defendant can almost always
identify a theoretically relevant factual or legal variation among claims that could be resolved
only through burdensome individualized procedures, but these variations are not always
significant. For example, a defendant might insist on its right to cross-examine every class
member in a fraud case in order to determine if the class member had some specialized
knowledge that defeated his claim to have been misled, but it is difficult to predict whether such
a protracted inquiry would reveal any material information. The defendant will claim that it
cannot know what class members will say unless it interrogates them, and the plaintiff will
oppose such examinations absent proof that they will be productive. Courts must somehow
decide how likely the individual issue is to affect the case before concluding whether the issue is
relevant to the certification decision. A ruling on the defendant's right to pursue individual
defenses by cross-examining class members has the potential either to deny plaintiffs the
opportunity to obtain the benefits of class litigation based on speculation about a dubious
defense, or to deny the defendant the opportunity to raise what might be a meritorious defense
simply because doing so would be inconvenient. There is presently no data or scholarship to help
courts make that judgment call. Plaintiffs' advocates speculate that defendants routinely rely on
"hypothetical" defenses, while defense advocates insist that most ostensibly "common" class
claims actually rest on individualized inquiries, but it is unclear which side has the stronger
argument. The truth is probably somewhere in between advocates' extreme positions. Empirical
study devoted specifically to this question could therefore help to improve decisionmaking on a
recurring question in class actions.
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review the individual circumstances of each class member's claim to
resolve disputes about any remaining elements and defenses. 92 But if
review of individual questions requires a mini-trial on thousands or
millions of claims, doing so may be practically impossible; the case
would outlive its participants. 93
Thus, regardless of whether
certifying a class action would in some sense be desirable, there
94
cannot be a class action if the resources and time are not available.
Desire should not obscure reality. 95
A corollary to the point that courts have finite resources that in
practice limit their ability to adjudicate class actions featuring
substantial dissimilarity among claimants is that courts need to have
a realistic sense of what they can accomplish before they certify
classes.
Decertification is always an available remedy for an
improvident certification, but there are substantial costs to relying on
that remedy rather than making the certification decision correctly in
the first instance.
Certification creates immediate settlement
pressures and induces substantial investment in the case by the
parties and the court. Certification also creates momentum that
courts may be unwilling to halt. Thus, while courts have discretion to
92. The practical ability of a court to resolve a complex dispute is often a function of the
level of generality at which lawmakers define the applicable liability rule and the extent to
which lawmakers resolve policy questions at the rulemaking stage rather than delegating these
questions to courts for case-by-case consideration. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Process
Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 916 (1982). The feasibility principle is thus not
merely procedural in nature because it helps to illuminate shortcomings in the drafting of
substantive rules that inhibit the effective integration of substantive rights with procedural
remedies.
93. See, e.g., Galloway v. Am. Brands, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 580, 585-86 (E.D.N.C. 1978)
(estimating that adjudicating putative class members' individualized damage claims would
"consume well-over 100 years"). In reality, century-long litigation is unlikely because the parties
presumably would settle to avoid the expense of trial. However, distortions that dissimilarity
would create in the anticipated trial process would affect the value of any settlements. See supra
Part I.C.
94. Whether judicial resources are "available" is partly a function of a court's discretion
because judges must decide how much of their time to allocate to each case on their docket.
Courts applying the feasibility principle in circumstances where adjudicating a class action could
be possible if sufficient resources were diverted from other cases will therefore face difficult
questions about how to weigh the competing demands of multiple claimants for scarce judicial
time.
95. The frustration that arises when the desire to certify a class confronts the reality that
certification is impossible may motivate policymakers to tailor substantive law more closely to
the resources that are available for enforcing it. For example, common law legal rules requiring
proof of causation in toxic tort cases or reliance in fraud cases create management burdens that
often preclude certification of class actions asserting tort or fraud claims, and thus limit the
effectiveness of private law deterrents to corporate misconduct. Some commentators have
therefore proposed altering common law causes of action to eliminate these elements. See supra
note 3. Whether these proposals are desirable is a question of substantive tort policy, not a
question of procedural class action policy.
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second-guess themselves by decertifying classes, they seldom have an
opportunity to do so and are in practice reluctant to do SO. 9 6 Wellreasoned plans for managing class actions are therefore necessary
before certification rather than after so that the powerful and
potentially irreparable consequences of certification are not unleashed
absent some confidence that the case can in fact be tried as a class
action 97 or fairly settled consistent with the fidelity principle. Courts
have ample flexibility to be imaginative when confronting
management problems raised by individual questions of fact and law,
but must recognize the fine line between healthy creativity and blind
overconfidence.
An implication of this observation is that certification criteria
should require courts to assess at the time of a certification decision
whether class adjudication would be feasible in light of dissimilar
questions of fact and law. The concept of "feasibility" is intentionally
vague to give courts flexibility in approaching the task of managing
complex claims. Factors for determining whether a management plan
is feasible could include: (1) the time necessary to implement the plan;
(2) the ability of the parties to adduce the evidence necessary to
resolve disputed questions; (3) the extent to which the plan relies on
questionable predictions or assumptions about how various stages of
the litigation are likely to proceed; (4) the cost of resolving claims
relative to available resources; (5) the consistency of the plan with
applicable constraints on procedure, such as constitutional or
statutory requirements for a jury trial; and (6) the likelihood that
certification would facilitate a voluntary settlement (as opposed to a
settlement negotiated in fear of a trial conducted in violation of the
principles discussed in this Part) that would obviate an extensive use
of judicial resources. These factors should be sufficiently flexible to
ensure that courts are not forced to adjudicate class actions according
to a cookie-cutter ideal of complex litigation procedures, sufficiently
attuned to the settlement pressures that certification can create to
ensure that the parties are free either to settle or not to settle
depending on their desire to buy peace, and sufficiently firm to ensure

96. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1301 & nn. 188-89 (2002) ("When a trial judge believes that
settlement is likely with certification, she has little incentive to decertify the class. Accordingly,
defendants have little incentive to file motions to decertify, with the result that there should be
few such motions and a high settlement rate - predictions consistent with the available data.")
(citing Willging et al., supranote 10, at 175 tbl. 32)).
97. Cf. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.11 (1995) (discouraging "conditional"
certification orders used to "defer" final certification decisions because of their "[u]ndesirable"
practical consequences).

2005]

REGULATING CLASS ACTIONS

1049

that courts have a realistic plan for extricating themselves from a
9
class action before they leap into it. 8
D. Synthesis of the Three Principles
The finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles discussed above
suggest several criteria that can be used to test existing rules
governing class certification and to formulate new rules.
The
principles are particularly helpful in guiding courts confronting
proposed class actions where the answers to disputed questions may
not be the same for each class member. Combining the need for a
judgment (principle 1), with the need to ensure that each beneficiary
of that judgment is entitled to it (principle 2), and with the need for a
management plan for resolving individual issues within resource
constraints (principle 3) helps to frame the potential significance of
similar and dissimilar questions that the parties will ask the court to
resolve. The three principles suggest that when a plaintiff asks a
court to certify her as a representative of absent class members
seeking damages, the court may do so only if it has a feasible plan for
resolving factual and legal disputes regarding each element and
defense applicable to each class member's claim and for eventually
entering judgment for or against each class member. There must
either be an opportunity for the parties to litigate individual claims or
defenses, or a reason to believe that such an opportunity is not
necessary to reach a judgment that accurately values class members'
claims. The existence of individualized issues of fact and law unique
to the circumstances of particular class members thus does not
necessarily preclude certification if the court has a plan for coping with
individual factual and legal inquiries.
In practice, however,
certification will not be possible when there is no manageable way of
reaching a final judgment that resolves all factual and legal disputes
relevant to each class member's entitlement to relief under applicable
substantive law, and when one or more parties is unwilling to settle
voluntarily.

98. Conventional wisdom has until recently posited that the Supreme Court's decision in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), limits the power of judges to incorporate
practical considerations such as feasibility into their certification analysis for fear of prematurely
assessing the merits of class members' claims. However, recent scholarship and the modern
trend of judicial decisions establish that courts may consider how a claim would be tried before
deciding whether to certify it, even if such nominally procedural analysis requires addressing
some of the substantive aspects of contested claims and defenses. For a general discussion of
pre-certification "merits" analysis, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action
Certification,33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51 (2004).
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As we will see in the next Part, the predominance test at the
heart of Rule 23(b)(3) does not link the certification inquiry to either
the finality or fidelity principles, and is only loosely connected to the
feasibility principle. Despite the large stakes riding on certification
decisions, the rule on which courts currently base such decisions does
not formally account for any of the factors that this Part demonstrates
are essential to properly deploying the class action device.
IV. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN CLASS CERTIFICATION PRINCIPLES AND
EXISTING CLASS CERTIFICATION RULES AND DOCTRINE

This Part assesses how well existing certification criteria
conform to the principles discussed in Part III. The unfortunate
answer is that a wide gap separates principle and practice on the
critical issue of how courts should assess similarity and dissimilarity
among claims when deciding whether to certify proposed damages
classes. The predominance test at the heart of Rule 23(b)(3) strives to
balance the competing pull of similar and dissimilar elements within
proposed class actions, but is inherently incapable of assisting courts
in making principled certification decisions.
Section A explores the historical origins and role of the
predominance rule, revealing that it was created from thin air in 1966
with virtually no explanation or guidance to courts.
Section B
analyzes the practical and conceptual defects of the predominance
rule, explaining that it is inscrutably vague, not grounded in any
principled or practical assessment of whether dissimilarity among
claims creates a significant obstacle to certification, and premised on a
balancing test that does not serve any useful purpose. Section C then
reviews the typicality and manageability components of Rule 23 and
concludes that they are not capable of supplementing the
predominance test in addressing whether dissimilarity among class
members' claims should preclude certification. Section D examines
doctrine that courts have created to help apply the predominance test
to recurring fact patterns, concluding that this doctrine shares the
conceptual flaws of the predominance test that spawned it and
provides an additional reason for replacing the concept of
predominance with a more practical and principled alternative.
A. The Origins and Role of the Predominance Test
The predominance test was the culmination of a gradual
evolution in class action rules from the broad and unstructured
generalities of early equity practice toward more formal constraints on
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judicial discretion. 99 The architects of the 1966 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure had an intuition that evaluating the significance of similar
and dissimilar aspects of proposed class claims would be important
and crafted the predominance test to codify that intuition. Yet the
drafters never explained the meaning of their innovative new
predominance standard, leaving courts and commentators to drift
between competing visions of how goals of fairness and efficiency
affected the significance of similarity and dissimilarity among claims
and defenses.
Early federal rules governing class actions did not contain any
criteria for evaluating the effect of dissimilar individualized issues on
a court's decision about whether to permit a representative to litigate
claims on behalf of an absent class. The first federal class action rule
- Equity Rule 48, adopted in 1842 - focused on numerosity and the

impracticability of joinder rather than similarity or dissimilarity
among class members' substantive claims. 100 Rule 48 did not even
mention commonality as a relevant factor, although the Supreme
Court in 1853 read a commonality requirement into the rule. 10 1 In
1912, the Supreme Court renumbered Rule 48 as Rule 38 and rewrote
it to include an explicit commonality requirement, although there was
still no corresponding limitation on class litigation linked to the
existence of individualized questions. 102 Equity Rule 38 survived until
1938, when law and equity procedures merged into the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The new rules addressed class actions in
Rule 23, which permitted certification of three categories of classes.
99. For a discussion of the origins of nineteenth-century equity practice regarding group
and representative litigation, see STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO
THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 213-20 (1987); Hazard, supra note 54, at 1858-1923; Robert G. Bone,
Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative
Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 262-87 (1990).
100. Rule 48 stated:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be brought before it, the Court in its
discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit,
having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interest of the plaintiffs
and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But, in such cases, the decree shall
be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
42 U.S. (1 How.) lv, lvi (1842).
101. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302 (1853) (class suit must pursue "an
object common" to all class members).
102. Rule 38 stated that: "When the question is one of common or general interest to many
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole." Order Promulgating Rules of Practice for
the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 629, 659 (1912). The procedural codes of
most states roughly tracked the language of Rule 38. See William Wirt Blume, The "Common
Questions"Principlein the Code Provisionfor Representative Suits, 30 MICH. L. REV. 878, 878 n.4
(1932) (reviewing code language and precedent from law and equity courts).
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Only the so-called "spurious" 103 category of class actions explicitly
required "a common question of law or fact," but it did not require any
formal consideration of individualized questions.
The emphasis of early class action rules on commonality among
claims without any corresponding focus on individuality was likely an
artifact of the partial evolution of class actions from joinder principles
and equity practice. The central inquiry in joinder cases usually
involves identifying a single common issue, status, or right uniting
otherwise distinct claims or claimants. The possibility that claims
might be too distinct to litigate in a joined proceeding is a subsidiary
question related to whether practical concerns warrant severance. In
contrast, equity practice offered judges substantial flexibility in
bifurcating resolution of common and individual questions to an
extent not present in common law damages cases requiring trial by
jury. 10 4 Early class action formulations apparently adapted joinder's
fixation on commonality without developing a counterpart to the
doctrine of severance, and extended equity's flexible treatment of
concurrent common and individual questions into a modern context in
which law and equity had merged and bifurcation was substantially
more difficult. Class action rules thus evolved to focus on common
issues that united class claims without formal consideration of
individualized issues that divided class claims.
Emphasis on commonality at the expense of individuality
persisted until the substantial redrafting of Rule 23 in 1966.105 The
1966 revisions invented the concept of "predominance" to capture the
importance of individual issues to a court's decision about whether to
certify a class action seeking damages. The amended Rule 23(b)(3)
permitted courts to certify a class only upon a finding that "questions
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
103. The 1938 version of Rule 23 created three categories of class actions - "true," "hybrid,"
and "spurious" - based on the nature of the asserted substantive right. See James Wm.Moore,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:Some Problems Raised By The PreliminaryDraft, 25 GEO. L.J.
551, 571-76 (1937) (proposing and explaining the new class action rule). Commonality was not
an explicit element of either the true or hybrid class action, although as a practical matter such
actions were possible only when class members shared a substantial common interest. See id.
For a summary of the practical and theoretical problems that plagued litigation under the 1938
version of Rule 23, see Joseph J. Simeone, ProceduralProblems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REV.
905 (1962).
104. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties,45 HARV. L. REV. 1297,
1300-02 (1932) (contrasting the power of law and equity courts in complex litigation).
105. The 1946 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure added a note to Rule 23
discussing the effect of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), on shareholder derivative
litigation, but did not amend the text of the rule or address questions about similarity and
dissimilarity among class members' claims. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 24-29 (1946).
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any questions affecting only individual members." 10 6 The federal class
action rule thus for the first time explicitly recognized that courts
must consider both common and individual questions when deciding
whether class certification is procedurally appropriate for particular
substantive claims.
The 1966 amendments did not define "predominate." The
drafters' official notes and unofficial working papers likewise neither
explain what the predominance concept was intended to mean nor
identify its origin. 107 The notes suggest that courts should not certify
classes when10 individual questions of fact or law are "material" or
"significant,"' 8 but do not offer any criteria for assessing materiality
or significance or for comparing the materiality and significance of
individual questions with the materiality and significance of common
questions.
Contemporaneous
commentary
about the 1966
amendments also does not illuminate the meaning of predominance
despite the innovative nature of the concept and its central position in
the new Rule 23(b)(3). 10 9
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
107. The predominance test was developed without explanation at some point between
November 1960 and March 1963. Compare Reporter's Memorandum on Proposed Amendments
(Sub-Memorandum V at 4) (1960) (noting need to replace the 1938 version of Rule 23 but not
proposing specific language), with Reporter's Memorandum on Proposed Amendments at EE-2
(Preliminary Draft, Mar. 15, 1963) (including the predominance test amongst proposed reforms
to Rule 23). The explanatory memorandum accompanying the March 1963 draft did not explain
the predominance test, which apparently was not considered controversial and may have
appeared in earlier drafts (of which there is no record in the Advisory Committee's publicly
available files). See Memorandum from Benjamin Kaplan & Albert Sacks to Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules at 3-4 (Mar. 18, 1963). A contentious meeting of the advisory committee in late
1963 briefly alluded to the predominance test as being important, but did not explain what it
was intended to mean and focused almost exclusively on other aspects of the proposed
amendments to Rule 23. See Transcript of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules meeting on class
actions (Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1963). The notes to the 1964 preliminary draft of Rule 23 also omit any
explanation of the origin or meaning of the predominance concept. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1964), reprinted in 34 F.R.D. 325, 387-95. Although this is pure speculation, the
origin of the predominance concept may trace to an influential article by Zechariah Chafee, who
proposed that one critical consideration for determining whether equity courts should resolve
multiple related suits in a single forum was the "relative magnitude of the common questions
and the independent questions." Chafee, supra note 104, at 1327. Chafee offered only minimal
guidance about how to conduct this balancing inquiry, see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 282-83 (1950), although he did suggest caution in extending the
availability of representative suits beyond historical precedents featuring a high degree of
commonality among claims, see id. at 215, 224.
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1966).
109. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 390 (devoting one sentence to the predominance test
in the course of a twenty-five page discussion of the new Rule 23: "a class action loses
attractiveness as the individual questions are seen to have such scope or variety as to overload
the action"); Kaplan, supra note 86, at 498 (describing the predominance inquiry as establishing
the "tough" task of "sensing" "important themes" that run "pervasively through the entire
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Although the drafters did not define "predominate," they did
provide four factors to help courts apply the predominance test. Yet
these factors did nothing to clarify the relationship between common
and individualized questions in class litigation. The first sentence of
Rule 23(b)(3) creates two tests: predominance ("questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class [must] predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members") and superiority ("a class
action [must be] superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy"). 10 The second sentence
then lists four "matters pertinent" to "these findings," with "these
findings" presumably referring to both the predominance and
superiority inquiries identified in the prior sentence.11 1
The four listed factors in substance address only the question
of superiority and have little relevance to assessing predominance.
The first factor is "the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions."1 1 2 This
factor clearly bears on whether a class action is "superior" to
alternatives, but does not provide practical guidance for assessing the
relative predominance of common and individual questions of fact and
law. The factor's emphasis on plaintiffs' "interests" seems to link the
question of predominance to whether a knowledgeable plaintiff would
prefer class adjudication to available alternatives, yet a plaintiff might
prefer litigating alone merely because he values autonomy without
disputing that a case involves substantial common questions, or he
might favor free-riding as an absent class member without disputing
that the case involves substantial individualized questions.
A
plaintiffs "interests" in controlling litigation therefore do not seem to
have any bearing on whether common or individualized questions
"predominate." The second factor is "the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
litigation"); Charles Donelan, Prerequisitesto a Class Action Under New Rule 23, 10 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 527, 533 (1969) (noting that the predominance inquiry is "more difficult" than the
commonality inquiry but not elaborating on how to conduct it); Sherman L. Cohn, The New
FederalRules of Civil Procedure,54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1216 (1966) (describing the (b)(3) category as
"pragmatic" but not defining the predominance inquiry); Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary
Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 43 (1967) (noting that (b)(3) actions will
involve both common and individual questions but not explaining how the predominance test
should balance them); Charles W. Joiner, The New Civil Rules: A Substantial Improvement, 40
F.R.D. 359, 367 (1966) (describing "great and important" important innovations in Rule 23
without discussing predominance).
110. FED R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
111. Id.; see also Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997) (linking the four
factors to both predominance and superiority); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164
(1974) (same).
112. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
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members of the class." 113 This factor instructs a court to incorporate
empirical information about the conduct of related suits into its
assessment of predominance (which the court presumably would have
done anyway without being told), but fails to explain how. The factor
seems to focus on the question of superiority by linking the
availability of a class action to an assessment of the adequacy of
alternative remedies, and does not add any insight into how a court
should decide when a common question "predominates" over an
The third factor is "the desirability or
individual question. 11 4
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
This factor is obviously relevant to the
particular forum." 5
superiority inquiry, but is circular when read in context of the
predominance inquiry. Concentrating predominant common questions
in a single forum is presumably desirable, while concentrating
predominant individualized questions in a single forum is presumably
undesirable, but that observation does not explain how a court is
supposed to know which questions predominate in which
circumstances. Finally, the fourth factor is "the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action. 11 6 This factor
potentially offers limited assistance in applying the predominance
test, and I therefore discuss it in Section C below. Thus, with the
possible exception of the manageability factor, the four "matters
pertinent" in Rule 23(b)(3) do not add any content to the otherwise
undefined concept of predominance.
The rest of Rule 23 likewise fails to clarify or supplement the
predominance inquiry. Aside from the predominance test, the only
certification criteria that directly bears on the evaluation of
individualized questions is the requirement in Rule 23(a)(3) that "the
claims or defenses of the representative parties [be] typical of the
claims or defenses of the class." The typicality inquiry, coupled with
the Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability factor, supplements the
predominance inquiry but, as shown below in Section C, does not
mitigate any of the deficiencies in the predominance concept. The
113. FED R. CiV. P. 23(b)(3)(B).
114. This factor has added importance when the related suits are pending in state court
because the Anti-Injunction Act limits the ability of federal courts to enjoin state proceedings, see
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2005), and thus a federal court could conclude under Rule 23(b)(3)(B) that the
pendency of related state court actions may pose coordination problems that would diminish the
utility of a federal class action.
115. FED R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(C).
116. FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164
(1974) ("Commonly referred to as 'manageability,' this consideration encompasses the whole
range of practical problems that may render the class action format inappropriate for a
particular suit.").
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typicality and manageability tests provide some clues about how
individual issues should influence the (b)(3) certification calculus, but
the determination of whether individual issues are significant rests
primarily on whether a court believes that they "predominate" over
common issues. The predominance test is for this reason the most
hotly litigated of the (b)(3) certification factors and the one on which
117
certification usually hinges.
The 1966 version of Rule 23(b) remains operative today and for
the foreseeable future.
There are no pending legislative or
administrative proposals to modify the Rule's criteria for certifying
class actions. Substantial amendments to Rule 23 became effective on
December 1, 2003, but none of the amendments addressed the 23(a) or
23(b) certification factors. Congress likewise recently adopted various
class action reforms, but has focused on the scope of diversity
jurisdiction and the fairness of settlements rather than on questions of
similarity and dissimilarity among class members' claims. 118 Rule
23(b)(3) is therefore likely to remain frozen in its 1966 state unless
commentators begin to question it and propose alternatives.
The conceptual problems in federal Rule 23 also undermine
state class action rules. Predominance is a certification factor in fortyfive of the forty-eight states with rules or statutes permitting class
actions; 119 forty states essentially copy the predominance test from
Rule 23,120 and in five others the state rule is a close variant of the
117. See supra note 10.
118. See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, §§ 3-4, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
119. Mississippi and Virginia do not have rules or statutes authorizing class actions.
California, Nebraska, and South Carolina permit class actions but do not require or suggest that
courts consider predominance. See CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 382 (2005) ("[W]hen the question is
one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it
is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of all."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (2004) (same); S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 23 (multifactor certification
test). But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(b)(2) (West 2005) (requiring predominance in consumer
class actions under CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780).
120. Thirty-nine states have rules or statutes requiring courts to consider predominance, and
one state has added a predominance requirement through case law. See ALA. R. CIV. PRO.
23(b)(3); ALASKA R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); ARIZ. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); ARK. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b); COLO.
R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 9-8; DEL. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); FLA. R. CIV. PRO.
1.220(b)(3); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-23(b)(3) (2003); HAW. R. CIv. PRO. 23(b)(3); IDAHO R. CIV. PRO.
23(b)(3); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-801(2) (2005); IND. R. TRIAL PRO. 23(b)(3); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-223(b)(3) (2005); KY. R. CIV. PRO. 23.02(c); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 591(B)(3) (West
2005); ME. R. CiV. PRO. 23(b)(3); MD. R. CIV. PRO. 2-231(b)(3); MASS. R. CV. P. 23(b); MICH. CT. R.
3.501(A)(1)(B); MINN. R. CIV. PRO. 23.02(c); MO. R. CIV. PRO. 52.08(b)(3); MONT. R. CIV. PRO.
23(b)(3); NEV. R. Civ. PRO. 23(b)(3); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 27-A(a)(2); N.J. R. Ct. 4:32-1(b)(3); N.M.
R. CIV. PRO. 1-023(C)(3); N.Y. CPLR § 901(a)(2) (McKinney 2005); OHIO R. CIV. PRO. 23(B)(3);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2023(B)(3) (West 2005); R.I. SUP. CT. R. Civ. PRO. 23(b)(3); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 15.6-23(b)(3) (Michie 2003); TENN. R. CIv. PRO. 23.02(3); TEX. R. CIv. PRO. 42(b)(4); UTAH
R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); VT. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); WASH. SUP. CT. CiV. R. 23(b)(3); WEST VA. R. Civ.
PRO. 23(b)(3); WY. R. CIV. PRO. 23(b)(3); Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 354 S.E.2d 459, 464
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federal rule. 121 The "typicality" and "manageability" factors discussed
below have similarly seeped from Rule 23 into state law: typicality is a
factor in forty-one states, 122 and manageability is a factor in thirty123
eight states.
The lack of attention to predominance and related concepts
amidst the sound and fury of the debate over class action reform which one commentator has analogized to a "holy war"'124 - is
startling. One would have thought that the steadily increasing
discussion of class actions since the last major rules amendment in
1966 would have included constant attention to and reevaluation of
the basic principles that justify converting ordinary claims into class
actions, and in particular to the method for assessing dissimilarity
among class members' claims. Yet that scrutiny has not occurred. To
the contrary, the advisory committee that reviews proposed
amendments to the federal class action rule recently reached the
seemingly inconsistent conclusions that: (1) the authors of the 1966
class action amendments "had little conception" of how the rule would
operate in practice and recognized that it would "require reexamination after a period of experience," but (2) "questions
surrounding certification standards were not ripe for rulemaking"
thirty-five years later. 25 The amendments to Rule 23 that took effect
(N.C. 1987) ("[A] 'class' exists under [North Carolina] Rule 23 when the named and unnamed
members each have an interest in either the same issue of law or of fact, and that issue
predominates over issues affecting only individual class members.").
121. Predominance is a discretionary rather than required certification factor in five states.
See IOWA CT. R. 1.263(e); N.D. R. CrV. PRO. 23(c)(1)(E); OR. R. CrV. P. 32(B)(3); PA. R. CIV. PRO.
1708(a)(1); Derzon v. Appleton Papers, Inc., No. 96-CV-3678, 1998 WL 1031504, at *3 (Wisc. Cir.
Ct. July 7, 1998) (noting that the "predominance" test "finds an echo" in and "reflects a similar
purpose" as state class action statute).
122. Of the forty-five states cited above in notes 120 and 121 that have adopted a
predominance rule, Illinois, Iowa, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Wisconsin have not
adopted a typicality requirement. In contrast, South Carolina requires typicality but not
predominance. See S.C. R. CIV. PRO. 23(a)(3).
123. At least thirty-eight of the forty-five states that have adopted a predominance rule have
also adapted a manageability rule; the exceptions are Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. See supra note 120. Kansas
has adopted a manageability test by implication rather than explicitly. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-223(b)(3)(C) (noting that court should consider "procedural measures which may be needed" in
litigating the class action).
124. Miller, supra note 70, at 664.
125. REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 24-25 (rev. July 31, 2001),

reprinted in 201 F.R.D. 586, 588-89. In fairness to the committee, amendments to rules as
controversial as Rule 23 are extremely difficult to adopt. The minutes of advisory committee
meetings during the 1990s reflect intermittent concern about predominance and related
concepts, but there was no consensus on how to proceed and apparently the discussion did not
lead to any concrete proposals. See Civil Rules Advisory Committee Minutes (Feb. 16-17, 1995)
(observing that "[Rule] b(3) has no workable definition of predominance"); Civil Rules Advisory
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in December 2003 track this conclusion by focusing on postcertification management rather on than on pre-certification concepts
such as predominance. 126 The predominance concept thus remains far
more undertheorized and overlooked then its importance would
suggest.
B. Defects in the Predominance Concept
The predominance inquiry in Rule 23(b)(3) commits courts to
answering a meaningless question, and then offers them no guidance
for doing so. At the outset, the test is needlessly vague because it fails
to communicate why the relationship between common and individual
questions is conceptually and practically important, and fails to
identify principles that might guide courts in assessing the
relationship. Aside from being vague, the predominance test is also
incoherent because the balancing process it envisions seeks to
compare two incomparable values. The answer to the question of
whether common or individual issues predominate in a particular case
is meaningless because the practical implications of individual issues
can defeat certification regardless of how individual issues relate in
the abstract to common issues, and regardless of the efficiencies that
might arise from resolving common issues in a single proceeding.
Learning how an individual question relates to a common question on
some indeterminate balancing scale does not reveal any useful
information about the significance of the individual question and
cannot assist in determining whether a court should certify a proposed
class.
An initial problem with the concept of predominance is that it
is has no generally accepted meaning, leading to substantial confusion
and inconsistency in judicial efforts to apply it. A consequence of the
drafters' decision not to define "predominate" in the text or notes to
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 is that commentators were left to
divine the concept's meaning and purpose without any substantial
guideposts. The effect of the lack of guidance is evident in the leading
civil procedure and class action treatises, which offer differing
conceptions of how courts should assess common and individual issues
when deciding whether to certify a class. 12 7 The lack of any consensus
Committee Minutes (Mar. 20-21, 1997) (briefly discussing whether Rule 23(b)(3) should be
amended to include a "common proof' or "common evidence" requirement); Civil Rules Advisory
Committee Minutes (May 1-2, 1997) (same).
126. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (new provisions governing review of settlements); FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(h) (new provision governing fee awards in class actions).
127. See, e.g., 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 4:21,

4:25 (4th ed. 2004) (stating that the predominance and superiority factors "blend" and describing

2005]

REGULATING CLASS ACTIONS

1059

among commentators spills over to judicial opinions attempting to
apply the predominance test. Despite the critical importance of
predominance analysis in deciding whether to certify (b)(3) classes,
courts apply the test in a myriad of vague and distinct formulations,
1 28
finding predominance when common issues of liability are "central,"
"significant," 129 or "overriding," 130 or when there is a "common nucleus
of operative fact,"'13' or when "resolution of one issue or a small group
of them," even if not "conclusive," will "so advance the litigation that
they may be fairly said to predominate,"1 32 or when common liability
questions are the "dominant core"1 3 3 or "most important"'134 aspect of a
case, or when common questions will require "most of the efforts of the
litigants and the court"1 35 or will "outweigh"'136 individual questions, or
when proving common questions would require "the same quantum of
37
evidence" even if the size of the class were expanded or contracted,
or when issues subject to "generalized proof' are "more substantial"
than issues subject to individualized proof.' 38 Alternatively, courts
sidestep the definitional problem by ignoring it and jumping directly
into predominance
analysis without articulating a guiding
standard. 13 9 The Manual for Complex Litigation likewise fails to fill
the definitional void left by Rule 23 and does not demystify the
predominance test. Indeed, the Manual's thirty-seven-page discussion
of class actions does not discuss the predominance standard at all, and
instead fosters confusion by suggesting that class definitions can
at length the standards that courts should not use in assessing predominance without
identifying a standard that should be used); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE
23.44 (3d. ed.) (noting that the predominance inquiry is "pragmatic" rather than
"precise"); 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1778 (3d ed.
2005) (reviewing several distinct judicial approaches to predominance without endorsing any
particular test).
128. See, e.g., Radmanovich v. Combined Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 424, 435 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
129. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986).
130. See, e.g., In re Workers' Comp., 130 F.R.D. 99, 109 (D. Minn. 1990).
131. See, e.g., Clark v. Bonded Adjustment Co., 204 F.R.D. 662, 666 (E.D. Wash. 2002)
(citation omitted).
132. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986).
133. See, e.g., In re Energy Sys. Equip. Leasing Securities Litig., 642 F. Supp. 718, 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1986).
134. See, e.g., Chiang v. Veneman, 213 F.R.D. 256, 263 (D.V.I. 2003).
135. See, e.g., Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 434 (Tex. 2000) (citations
omitted).
136. See, e.g., In re West Virginia Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 71 (W. Va. 2003).
137. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004).
138. See, e.g., Moore v. Painewebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1252 (2d Cir. 2002).
139. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996) (criticizing the
district court's "incomplete and inadequate predominance inquiry" without identifying a
framework to guide appellate review).
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encompass "diverse interests" without explaining how courts should
140
assess the permissible scope of diversity.
The Supreme Court could have helped ease confusion by
clarifying the meaning of the predominance rule (which the Court
itself promulgated), 141
but instead
amplified
interpretative
uncertainty by blurring the distinct elements of Rule 23 into a single
vague test while simultaneously condemning the subjectivity in
certification analysis that the Court's own doctrine creates. The
Court's opinion in Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor 42 exemplifies the
problem.
The Court held in Amchem that the Rule 23(a)(2)
commonality test blurs into the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality test, 143 that
the typicality test blurs into the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy test, 44 and
that the adequacy test blurs into the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
test. 45 These observations led the Court to collapse the commonality,
typicality, adequacy, and predominance inquiries into a search for
"unity"146 and "cohesion"'147 within the proposed class. Yet the Court
did not develop any standards that might help judges to evaluate the
relative significance of unity and disunity (or similarity and
dissimilarity) among claims and defenses. The Court achieved this
reduction of Rule 23 into a "unity and cohesion" test while
simultaneously repudiating the tendency of district courts to reduce
certification analysis to a "gestalt" and "chancellor's foot" assessment
of fairness. 48 Yet the Court's own focus on "unity" embodies precisely
the sort of impressionistic analysis that the Court purports to have
140. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supranote 97, § 30.15.

141. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2005), delegates to the Supreme Court
responsibility for promulgating rules of civil procedure subject to a potential congressional veto.
The Supreme Court in turn delegates responsibility for proposing rules to the Judicial
Conference of the United States Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, which further
delegates responsibility to an Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.
142. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
143. Id. at 626 n.20 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982):
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve
as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be
fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Those requirements therefore also
tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 621 (noting relationship of Rule 23(b) to the question of whether "absent members
can fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives"); id. at 623 ("The Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation.").
146. Id. at 621 (The "dominant concern" of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) is "whether a proposed class
has sufficient unity.").
147. Id. at 623.
148. Id. at 621.
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rejected. The Court then added that the predominance inquiry is
"demanding," 149 but did not articulate any criteria - such as the
criteria in Part III above - that judges could use in implementing the
"demanding" quest for "unity." The Court in Amchem thus had the
proper intuition - that dissimilarity is important - but reacted to that
intuition with insufficient focus and clarity. Indeed, the Amchem
opinion is a step backward in the nearly forty-year effort of judges and
commentators to understand the meaning of predominance because it
layers an additional set of inscrutable concepts - unity and cohesion on to an already inscrutable rule.
The Court's few other class action decisions are no more helpful
than Amchem on the question of predominance. In fact, a striking
aspect of the Court's burgeoning class action jurisprudence is that the
Court assiduously avoids reviewing certification criteria - except as
these criteria relate to conflicts of interest among class members,
which is an issue that seems to preoccupy the Court 150 focusing
instead on other areas of class action doctrine such as standing and
mootness, 151 diversity jurisdiction, 152 tolling of statutes of
149. Id. at 624; see also Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 306-07 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the predominance test provides "ample assurances" that claims are not
"unrelated").
150. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852-59 (1999) (reversing approval of class
action settlement of asbestos claims ostensibly because the trial court failed to properly apply
certification standards governing suits against limited funds, but also because of perceived
conflicts of interest among class counsel, class members with present damages, and class
members likely to accrue damages in the future); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
626 (1997) ("In significant respects, the interests of those within the single class are not
aligned."); E. Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977) (holding that
"the named plaintiffs' failure to protect the interests of class members by moving for
certification" and demand for a remedy in "conflict" with the preferences of class members
rendered them inadequate class representatives); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 n.13 (1975)
(finding that the class representative was adequate but noting that "[t]here are frequently cases
in which it appears that the particular class a party seeks to represent does not have sufficient
homogeneity of interests to warrant certification"); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940)
("[S]election of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not
necessarily or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not
afford that protection to absent parties which due process requires."); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57
U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853) ("In all cases where . . a few are permitted to sue and defend on
behalf of the many, by representation, care must be taken that persons are brought on the record
fairly representing the interest or right involved, so that it may be fully and honestly tried."); see
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 399 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting "the centrality of the procedural due process protection of
adequate representation in class action lawsuits").
151. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 261-68 (2003) (rejecting standing and adequacy
challenges to named plaintiff in class action opposing affirmative action in undergraduate
admissions); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (reaffirming Gerstein,
infra); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980) ("an action brought
on behalf of a class does not become moot upon expiration of the named plaintiffs substantive
claim, even though class certification has been denied;" mootness instead depends on how
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limitations, 153 personal jurisdiction and choice of law, 154 the preclusive
effect of class action judgments, 155 the formality of certification
certification issues are resolved on appeal); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 340
(1980) ("[E]ntry of judgment in favor of named plaintiffs over their objections did not moot their
private case or controversy" or prevent them from appealing the denial of class certification);
Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 134-35 (1977) (holding that when a change in substantive law
moots the claims of the class representative and a substantial number of class members, courts
should defer ruling on the merits of remaining claims within the "fragmented" class pending
reconsideration of whether the class meets the Rule 23(a) certification criteria); Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) ("That a suit may be a class action, however,
adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class 'must
allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by
other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to
represent"' (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975))); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 755 (1976) ("Given a properly certified class action ... mootness turns on whether,
in the specific circumstances of the given case at the time it is before this Court, an adversary
relationship" exists to ensure a sharp presentation of issues); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
110-11 & n.ll (1975) (holding that certification of a class action after the representatives' claims
have become moot does not render the class claims moot when the nature of the claim is
inherently transitory); Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399-403 (holding that resolution of the named
plaintiffs' claim after certification of a class does not moot the claims of class members);
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974) ('To have standing to
sue as a class representative it is essential that a plaintiff must be a part of that class, that is, he
must possess the same interest and suffer the same injury shared by all members of the class he
represents"); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) ("[I]f none of the named plaintiffs
purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the
defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class."); Hall v.
Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48-49 (1969) (holding that a plaintiff cannot revive claims that were moot
when filed by denominating the suit as a class action on behalf of members with live claims).
152. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301 ("Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy
the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case.");
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1969) (holding that the claims of individual class
members cannot be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement).
The Court is currently reconsidering the questions deciding in Zahn in Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., Docket 04-70.
153. See Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 661-62 (1983) (holding that federal law requires at a
minimum that the filing of a class action suspends the limitations period on absent class
members' claims, but that state law can supplement federal tolling by permitting renewal of the
limitations period after denial of certification); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345,
350 (1983) ("The filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations 'as to all asserted members
of the class,' not just as to interveners.") (internal citation omitted); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) ("[T]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable
statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had
the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.").
154. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) ("[A] forum state may
exercise jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class-action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff
may not possess the minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal
jurisdiction over a defendant," if it provides "minimal procedural due process protection"); id. at
821 ("[W]hile a State may... assume jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs whose principal
contacts are with other States, it may not use this assumption of jurisdiction as an added weight
in the scale when considering the permissible constitutional limits on choice of substantive law..
. "1),

155. See MatsushitaElec. Indus. Co., 516 U.S. at 380-86 (holding that state court class action
settlement releasing claims exclusively within the jurisdiction of federal courts precludes class
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analysis, 156 the form and cost of notice, 15 7 the appealability of orders
relating to certification and resolution of class claims, 158 and
miscellaneous questions with no connection to predominance. 159 One
would have expected that the thousands of class actions litigated in
members from relitigating the federal claims in federal court); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,
761-69 (1989) (holding that consent decree resolving class action claims does not preclude nonmembers of the class from challenging classwide remedies); Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467
U.S. 867, 876-81 (1984) (holding that a judgment rejecting class action claims alleging that a
defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination does not preclude
individual class members from pursuing discrimination claims unique to their individual
circumstances); Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) ("If the federal
courts are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, the decree
when rendered must bind all of the class properly represented.").
156. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (certification requires a "specific
presentation" and "rigorous analysis" of Rule 23 factors); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976) (holding that fact that all parties "treated" the case as a class action
does not make the case a class action absent certification under Rule 23); Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308, 312 n.1 (1976) ("Without such certification and identification of the class [under
Rule 23], the action is not properly a class action" even if informally "treated" as such); Bd. of
Sch. Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1975) (finding that class was not properly certified
where district court failed to follow procedures in Rule 23(c)).
157. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350, 356 (1978) ("[W]here a
defendant can perform one of the tasks necessary to send notice, such as identification, more
efficiently than the representative plaintiff, the district court has discretion to order him to
perform the task" but "ordinarily there is no warrant for shifting the cost of the representative
plaintiffs performance of these tasks to the defendant."); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 177-79 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs must bear the cost of sending individual notice to
identifiable class members).
158. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (holding that absent class members who
object in the district court to the fairness of a settlement may appeal from an order approving the
settlement without first intervening as a named party); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445
U.S. 326, 336 (1980) ("[T]he denial of class certification [is] an example of a procedural ruling,
collateral to the merits of a litigation, that is appealable after the entry of final judgment.");
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469-77 (1978) (holding that certification orders are
not appealable under the collateral order or "death knell" doctrines); Oppenheimer Fund, 437
U.S. at 347 n.8 (an "order allocating the expense of identification [of class members for purposes
of notice is] appealable under the collateral-order doctrine"); United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
432 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1977) (holding that when the district court denies class certification, an
absent member may wait until after entry of judgment on the named plaintiffs' individual claims
before filing a motion to intervene for the purpose of appealing the district court's denial of class
certification).
159. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453-54 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(analyzing applicability of contractual arbitration clause to class action claims); Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 104 (1981) ("We recognize the possibility of abuses in class-action
litigation, and agree with petitioners that such abuses may implicate communications with
potential class members. But the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a
communications ban that interferes with the formation of a class or the prosecution of a class
action in accordance with the Rules.") (footnote omitted); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 726
(1986) ("Rule 23(e) wisely requires court approval of the terms of any settlement of a class action,
but the power to approve or reject a settlement negotiated by the parties before trial does not
authorize the court to require the parties to accept a settlement to which they have not agreed");
Boeing Co. v. Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 480-82 (1980) (permitting class counsel to claim attorney
fees from the common damages fund created for class members).
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federal court would have generated at least a few grants of certiorari
to guide lower courts in applying the predominance test, but such
review has not occurred, 160 and "predominate" continues to lack an
authoritative judicial gloss.
Aside from being vague, the predominance test is not grounded
in any principle that could guide courts in applying it to the facts of
particular cases.
Even if "predominate" had a precise and
authoritatively determined meaning, courts would still need to know
why common issues and individual issues are important in order to
161
know in any particular case which predominates over the others.
For example, if the animating principle of predominance is a need to
promote efficient resolution of disputes, then courts might be
relatively more willing to tolerate individual variations among claims
as the price of achieving rough justice in complex cases. Alternatively,
if the predominance concept is intended to provide the defendant with
a fair opportunity to defend itself, then courts would be relatively less
impressed with the volume of common questions and more interested
in the practical effect of individual issues on accurate adjudication of
class claims and defenses.
However, rather than link the
predominance inquiry to a broader purpose, Rule 23(b)(3) does not
specify any purpose. The Advisory Committee notes to the Rule try to
fill this vacuum by linking the predominance inquiry to both fairness
and efficiency, but fail to explain how judges should reconcile these
often conflicting goals.162
Predominance analysis was thus
predestined to stumble aimlessly between competing ends without
doing justice to either.
The predominance inquiry is further flawed because it is not
linked to any practical assessment of how individual questions of fact
or law would affect a class action trial. As explained in Part III, issues
of law or fact unique to individual class members are significant
because they may pose obstacles to entering a classwide judgment
160. See, e.g., Roper, 445 U.S. at 329 n.2, 331 (denying petition for writ of certiorarion
question of whether certification was consistent with Rule 23's predominance test, granting writ
on question of whether the representative plaintiffs' claims were moot, and remanding to the
district court after finding that claims were live without addressing the merits of the court of
appeals' predominance analysis); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., Docket 04-70
(granting certiorari on question related to scope of diversity jurisdiction in class actions, but
denying certiorarion a question related to application of Rule 23's predominance test).
161. Cf. Robert A. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the Federal Class Action, 14 REV.
LITIG. 79, 97 (1994) (noting the need for procedural rules to contain "general norms" for guiding
judicial discretion).
162. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1966) ("Subdivision (b)(3)
encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and
expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.").
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(finality), to adjudicating claims and defenses under the appropriate
substantive law (fidelity), and to developing a realistic plan for
managing litigation within resource constrains (feasibility). Aside
from the unhelpful "matters pertinent" discussed above (and below in
Section C), the predominance test does not explicitly recognize the
foregoing concerns - or any concerns - that might justify denying
certification when individualized issues are salient. As a result, the
strong policy arguments in favor of class actions when a case raises
important common questions often overshadow relatively amorphous
concerns about individualized inquiries and lead courts to certify
classes without any realistic sense of how to cope with the
dissimilarities among class claims. The problem is then magnified
because no other aspect of Rule 23 picks up where predominance
leaves off by explaining how to handle individual issues within the
context of a certified class action. 16 3 The predominance test read in
conjunction with the rest of Rule 23 thus has the twin effects of
encouraging courts to discount the significance of individual issues
before certification and then to ignore individual issues after
certification.
The predominance concept would remain fatally flawed even if
all of the foregoing defects could be repaired because the concept's
premise is incoherent. If the meaning of predominance were clarified
with an authoritative interpretation grounded in principle and linked
to practical guidance, the test would still require courts to balance the
inherently unbalanceable. Commentators and courts do not attach
much inherent meaning to the word "predominate" in Rule 23(b)(3),
but generally agree that the word connotes a comparative assessment
and thus requires judges to balance the significance of common and

163. Rule 23(c)(4)(B) ostensibly addresses the problem of dissimilarity among class members
by permitting the court to divide a class into subclasses. However, relying on subclasses is an
ineffective alternative to replacing the predominance test. First, Rule 23 does not offer any
criteria for assessing the permissible degree of dissimilarity within a subclass, and thus Rule
23(c)(4)(B) replicates the defect in Rule 23(b)(3). Second, subclassing accommodates variances
among homogenous groups of class members, but does not explain how to handle issues that
require review of individual class members' circumstances. For example, subclasses would be
useful in a product-liability class action if the only contested issue were whether versions of the
product produced in different years shared the same defect, In that case, the court could
establish a subclass for purchasers of each year's version, substituting several homogenous
subclasses for the otherwise heterogeneous original class. In contrast, if the only contested issue
were damages, and if proof of the existence or amount of damages depended on evidence unique
to each class member, then subclasses would not fill the void left by the failure of the
predominance test to account for significant dissimilarity among claims and defenses. Finally,
presenting the facts of multiple distinct subclasses to a single jury may mitigate, but would not
eliminate, the cherry-picking and claim fusion problems that arise from jurors' cognitive inability
to parse individualized issues in complex litigation. See generally sources cited supra note 21.
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individual questions when deciding whether to certify a class. 164
Balancing common and individual questions is a pointless exercise
that confuses the reasons that class actions are attractive in general
with the reasons that class actions are viable in particular cases.
Class actions are attractive mechanisms for resolving disputes
because the existence of a common question uniting otherwise
disparate claims can create an economy of scale that overcomes
collective action problems, mitigates the defendant's resource
advantages, and permits efficient resolution of the issues common to
class members. But as explained in Part III, class actions are viable
only when the individual issues that accompany common issues are
also amenable to resolution within the class action framework. The
existence of common questions is thus a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for certifying a class, while the existence of individualized
issues beyond some threshold is a sufficient reason to deny
certification.
Certification standards should therefore focus on
determining whether individual issues exceed a threshold level of
significance - and on defining what that threshold might be - rather
than on comparing common and individual questions in a gestalt
balancing process.
The predominance test thus systematically
understates the importance of individual questions by trying to
balance them against common questions instead of evaluating them
independently.
In addition to understating the importance of individual
questions, the predominance test also overstates the importance of
common questions. The predominance test in theory permits courts to
deny certification in cases where individual issues can be resolved
within the parameters discussed in Part III, but nevertheless
"predominate" over comparatively less significant common questions.
Yet other provisions of Rule 23 address this situation more directly
than the predominance test, and if those provisions would permit
certification there is no apparent reason why a predominance analysis
would add any useful information to the certification calculus. For
example, suppose that a court concludes that a proposed class action
would allow "numerous" class members represented by an "adequate"
and "typical" plaintiff to litigate a "common" question of fact in a
164. See, e.g., 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.44 (3d. ed. 1999)
(predominance inquiry "focuses on the number and significance of common questions, as
compared to individual issues"); Hines, supra note 58, at 760 (stating that the predominance
inquiry requires a determination of whether "class members' claims are more dissimilar than
alike"). But see Romberg, supra note 58, at 287-88 (suggesting that the predominance inquiry
does not involve an assessment of whether common issues "outweigh" individual issues and
instead requires courts to determine as a "threshold" matter whether adjudicating the proposed
common questions would produce a "meaningful benefit").
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manner that is "superior" to available alternatives. Further suppose
that the court identifies significant questions of law and fact unique to
individual class members' claims, but develops a feasible and
substantively acceptable method to cope with these individual
questions within the context of a class action. In such a case there
would be no reason to care whether common questions "predominate."
Whatever issues in some abstract sense "predominate," the class
action would still be potentially useful and would be consistent with
the principles discussed in Part III. The predominance test is thus
pointless in cases where individual issues are insufficient to defeat
certification of their own force and common issues are sufficient to
satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2) commonality test and the Rule 23(b)(3)
superiority test. 165 In contrast, the predominance test is moot when
common questions are insufficient to render class actions "superior" to
alternatives.
Either way, in circumstances where individualized
issues do not impose sufficient obstacles to render certification
impracticable, the predominance test does not accomplish anything
useful that the commonality and superiority tests do not already
166
accomplish more directly.
The predominance test thus fails to achieve its apparently
intended purpose. The drafters of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23
recognized that claims brought as putative (b)(3) class actions would
often entail both common and individualized elements, and that courts
would need a mechanism to determine when claims were sufficiently
similar or too dissimilar to warrant certification for class treatment.
The mechanism that the drafters developed was the predominance
test, but that test is too vague, too unprincipled, too impractical, and
too linked to a pointless balancing inquiry to provide any meaningful
guidance to courts. As we see in Section C, no other provision in Rule
23 can pick up the slack left by the conceptual implosion of the
predominance test.

165. One could argue that common questions by definition predominate when individual
questions are manageable and class adjudication is superior, but that would confirm that the
predominance test does not add anything to Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority and manageability tests.
166. Predominance could arguably be a factor in determining superiority, but is best excised
from the class action vernacular for the reasons noted in the text: it is vague, unprincipled, and
impractical. (The superiority test is also vague, unprincipled, and impractical, but that is an
issue for another article, and in any event would not justify introducing additional imprecision
by linking superiority to predominance.)
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C. The Failureof Additional Rule 23 CertificationCriteriato Cure
Defects in the Predominance Standard
The predominance test is the only element of Rule 23's
certification criteria that explicitly refers to the significance of
individual issues. The typicality 167 and manageability 168 inquiries
indirectly address dissimilarity among class members' claims, but
neither is an effective substitute or supplement for predominance.
1. Typicality
1 69
Typicality is a concept that sounds sensible but means little.
The typicality inquiry apparently codifies the unobjectionable
sentiment that the representative of a class supposedly pursuing a
common claim should not himself pursue an atypical claim,
apparently because the 1966 drafters felt that such atypicality would
drive a wedge between the goals and interests of the agent and his
principals. 170 Yet Rule 23's requirement that class representatives be
"adequate" more effectively captures this desire to link the interests of
class representatives and class members by grounding the linkage in
relatively well-developed principles of due process rather than in
comparatively undefined notions of what is "typical." If a class
representative will adequately represent class members consistent
with due process, then it is difficult to see why somebody concerned
with agency costs should care that the representative is atypical,
especially given the consensus among commentators that a class
representative is merely a figurehead in class litigation and thus not
worth substantial judicial scrutiny.171
Likewise, if the class
167. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
169. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CML PROCEDURE § 16.2 (2d. ed. 1993) ("It is not
entirely clear what the rulemakers intended to achieve with this requirement."); Issacharoff,
supra note 1, at 354 (noting "amorphous" nature of the rule).
170. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 387 n.120 ("[The typicality requirement] emphasizes that
the representatives ought to be squarely aligned in interest with the represented group."). The
Supreme Court has thoroughly muddled the meaning of the typicality test to the point where it
no longer appears to have any unique content. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157
n.13 (1982):
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve
as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiffs claim
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be
fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Those requirements therefore also
tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement ....
171. See, e.g., Coffee, Accountability, supra note 1, at 406 ("Commentators have generally
agreed that the representative in a class action is more a figurehead than an actual
decisionmaker.").

2005]

REGULATING CLASS ACTIONS

1069

representative is so inadequate that allowing him to act as an agent
for absent class members would violate due process, then his
"typicalness" would not be a consolation.
The typicality requirement at best promotes in a limited
fashion the class action's goal of efficiency by ensuring that litigation
focuses directly on the core common issues in a case without the
distraction of atypical satellite issues. Analysis of typicality can thus
be understood as an effort to control the potential sprawl of class
actions by limiting the range of issues for the court to address. From
this perspective, already complicated class litigation should not be
needlessly broadened to include claims by class members that the
named representative does not raise, or claims by the named
representative that the class does not raise. 172 This practical aspect of
the typicality test may also serve as a prudential adjunct to the
general principle of Article III standing that "a plaintiff who has been
subject to injurious conduct of one kind" does not "possess by virtue of
that injury the necessary stake in litigating conduct of another kind,
although similar, to which he has not been subject."'173 Nowhere in
this vision of typicality, however, is there any suggestion that
monitoring the relationship between the claims of the representative
and the claims of the class is an effective means of determining
whether class claims are sufficiently similar to justify certification. To
the contrary, the typicality inquiry is ill-suited to assess dissimilarity
among class members' claims and thus cannot fix the deficiencies of
the predominance test.
The flaw in the typicality test when considered in light of
defects in the predominance test is that the typicality inquiry
compares class representatives to absent class members without
comparing absent class members to each other. Typicality analysis
therefore tolerates substantial variation among class members'
circumstances and cannot fill the void that a more effective version of
the predominance test would occupy. Moreover, the typicality and
predominance factors in practice speak past each other. The remedy
when a class representative is atypical is often to find a new class
representative, but not to change the class definition. The initial
atypical representative thus remains a member of the class. One
would expect that the atypical claimant's continued membership in
the class would raise a red flag about predominance; after all, if
individual questions of law or fact unique to the proposed class
representative are so salient as to render claims encompassed by the
172. Cf.Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) ("The typicality requirement is said
to limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiffs claims.").
173. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982).
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class definition atypical, then perhaps these individual questions
likewise "predominate" and render class claims too dissimilar for class
action treatment. 174 Yet courts and commentators have not drawn
this seemingly clear connection between the typicality and
predominance inquiries because the connection appears nowhere in
the text of Rule 23, which does not link the inquiry into a
representative's typicality with the broader question of dissimilarity
among the claims of absent class members. The Rule 23(a) typicality
factor thus cannot overcome the defects in the Rule 23(b)
predominance factor.
2. Manageability
The manageability inquiry in Rule 23(b)(3)(D) holds some
promise for helping to grapple with questions of similarity and
dissimilarity, but ultimately is not sufficient in its present form.
Individual questions of fact or law unique to particular class members
pose obstacles to the efficient management of a class action, and thus
assessment of the manageability of a class action could be an
opportune time to consider the significance of dissimilarity. However,
two problems undermine the appeal of using 23(b)(3)(D)
manageability analysis to patch holes in the predominance inquiry.
First, amongst the mischief that individual questions of law or fact
create when embedded in class actions are attempts at "management"
that violate substantive law or due process, such as attempts to
presume individual facts out of existence or efforts to defer individual
issues to post-judgment claims proceedings without allowing a
complete presentation of defenses. 175 Using the manageability inquiry
to control the extent of dissimilarity among class claims is thus
analogous to asking the fox to guard the henhouse. Absent some
principled guidance for determining whether a management device is
substantively acceptable - which Rule 23 currently does not provide analysis of manageability is as likely to create problems as it is to
prevent them. Second, the manageability inquiry is tied to the
superiority inquiry as well as the predominance inquiry.
The
comparative nature of the superiority inquiry replicates the balancing
approach of the predominance test and thus tends to share the defects
of the predominance test in evaluating the independent significance of
174. The fact that a proposed class representative is atypical should be particularly troubling
to courts because lawyers who finance and initiate class action litigation usually hand-pick the
representative. If lawyers are unable to find a representative whose circumstances typify those
on whose behalf the lawyers want to litigate, a court should be concerned about whether there is
a properly defined class encompassing sufficiently similar claims.
175. See supra notes 24 and 28.
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individual questions of law or fact. The superiority inquiry also
presupposes that a class action is one of several "available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." 176 Analysis of
superiority thus presumes that a class could be certified and asks
whether it should be as a matter of judicial discretion. The questions
about dissimilarity that I address in this Article relate to the
antecedent question of whether a class action is even "available" in
particular circumstances, and thus the superiority rule and its
attendant manageability inquiry are not a relevant source of guidance.
Accordingly, a modified form of manageability inquiry (as I propose in
Part V) might help solve or prevent problems related to dissimilarity
among claims in proposed class actions, but the present incarnation of
the manageability test as a vague adjunct to both the predominance
and superiority factors in Rule 23(b)(3)(D) cannot overcome the defects
of the predominance test.
D. DoctrinalConsequences of JudicialReliance on Predominance
The analysis in this Part has so far sought to identify intrinsic
defects in the predominance rule related to its inscrutability and to
the incoherence of the balancing inquiry at its conceptual core. This
Section seeks to confirm the prior theoretical analysis by reviewing
practical applications of the predominance test to determine if the
test's conceptual flaws have infused the doctrine that courts have
developed to ensure procedural consistency when handling recurring
fact patterns in Rule 23(b)(3) litigation.
Not surprisingly,
predominance doctrine reflects - and in fact amplifies - the conceptual
flaws in the underlying rule that the doctrine seeks to implement. In
particular, doctrine addressing three critical and recurring issues
highlight the need to integrate more principled and practical
guidelines into the Rule 23(b)(3) certification inquiry. These three
issues involve the implications for certification of individualized
evidence of damages, individualized defenses to liability, and conflicts
among applicable state laws.

176. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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1. Doctrine De-emphasizing Individualized Damages
The analysis in Part III establishes that questions related to
proving and calculating individual class members' damages could
raise significant obstacles to the principled resolution of class claims.
If the applicable substantive law (the fidelity principle) links a class
member's entitlement to judgment (the finality principle) to proof of
loss in a reasonably precise amount, then practical resource
constraints (the feasibility principle) may preclude the court from
adjudicating contested damages claims as a class action, especially as
the size of the class - and thus the number of damages calculations grows into the thousands or millions. The problem would be even
more acute if there is a contested question of comparative fault, in
which case the amount of individual damages would be a function of
individual liability, which would complicate or preclude efforts to
streamline class litigation by litigating liability issues as if they were
common to the entire class. 177 The existence of individualized
evidence relevant to proving and calculating damages is thus a factor
that courts should consider before deciding whether to certify a class.
The doctrine that courts have developed to assess the propriety
of certifying common questions despite the need for individualized
damages calculations highlights the flaws at the heart of the
predominance balancing concept.
The general rule in most
jurisdictions is that individualized damages do not defeat certification
if questions of liability otherwise predominate. 178 This doctrine is
177. See Nagareda, Preexistence, supra note 1, at 239-41 (noting that analysis of damages in
class actions governed by comparative fault principles requires revisiting evidence from the
liability phase of litigation).
178. See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) ("It is primarily
when there are significant individualized questions going to liability that the need for
individualized assessments of damages is enough to preclude 23(b)(3) certification"); Smilow v.
Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Where, as here, common
questions predominate regarding liability, then courts generally find the predominance
requirement to be satisfied even if individual damages issues remain"); In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing numerous cases);
State ex rel. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 106 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(holding that "[t]he need for inquiry as to individual damages does not preclude a finding of
predominance," finding the liability question to be "common," and not addressing the practical
significance of individualized damages questions); In re Bell Atl. Corp. Sec. Litig., 1995 WL
733381, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 11, 1995) ("To determine whether common questions predominate,
the court's inquiry is directed primarily towards the issue of liability; individual questions of
damages will not preclude class certification."). Courts will sometimes deny certification when
damages questions are highly individualized even if liability issues present common questions.
See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 306 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that although
"[e]ven wide disparity among class members as to the amount of damages suffered does not
necessarily mean that class certification is inappropriate," on the facts of the particular case a
need for "individualized damages inquiries" predominated over common liability questions).
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usually stated as a self-evident truth, yet the doctrine suffers from
what should be an obvious flaw: it circularly assumes its own
conclusion. The question being asked is, in effect, "do individualized
damages questions predominate" and the answer being given is, in
effect, "not when liability questions predominate." Lost in the shuffle
is any attention to how the court should determine which set of
questions in fact predominates - the finding that liability questions
predominate over damages questions is assumed rather than proven
on the facts of particular cases. This circularity is at first glance
surprising, but is alluring within the stilted context of the
predominance balancing calculus. As discussed above, the conceptual
flaw in the predominance rule is that it invites a gestalt balancing of
common and individual questions without independent consideration
of how individual questions may in practice undermine the principled
resolution of class members' claims. Doctrine attempting to assess the
significance of individualized damages calculations manifests this flaw
in the predominance balancing test because the doctrine reflects a
normative conclusion that, on balance, common liability questions are
relatively more significant - along some unspecified metric - than
individual damages questions. 179 This general conclusion about the
propriety of certification would be impossible to reach if the
certification inquiry required independent assessment of how
dissimilarity among damages calculations would influence resolution
of class members' claims, but becomes conceivable if the
"predominance" of common liability questions is considered in the
abstract and without recourse to the guiding principles discussed in
Part III.
The underemphasis on individualized damages calculations in
current doctrine does not mean that individualized damages should
For example, certification
always be fatal to certification.
notwithstanding the need to determine individual damages may be
justified when proof of individual damages is either: (1) a mechanical
process easily accomplished through the defendant's business records
(as in many cases challenging false billings) or through other
accessible records (as in most securities fraud cases); 8 0 or (2) not
179. An example of this phenomenon is In re American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Dealer
Relations Litigation, in which the court lumped together individualized issues of "causation,
injury-in-fact, and extent of damages" and found that common issues of liability predominated
because of their relative "complexity." 979 F. Supp. 365, 366 n.1 & 367 (D. Md. 1997). The court
apparently did not consider whether individual damages questions, even if relatively "more
mundane" than common liability questions, id. at 367, were nevertheless sufficiently complex to
defeat certification.
180. Although securities fraud suits are often cited as the paradigm case for class
certification, recent analysis demonstrates that the paradigm is less solid than commonly
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necessary before entry of judgment because the applicable substantive
law permits assessment of lump-sum damages followed by a claims
proceeding to allocate the award (as in some equity cases where
disgorgement is a proper remedy for unjust enrichment). However,
proof of individual damages before the trier of fact is not always
mechanical or avoidable in complex multiparty litigation - there may
be clever means of doing it efficiently, but one cannot simply assume
that such means are available or desirable. Doctrine applying the
predominance balancing test to focus on common liability questions
without independent consideration of individual damages questions
thus fails to respect the finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles
discussed in Part III.
2.

Doctrine Under-Weighting Individualized Defenses

The analytic flaw that infects doctrine about the propriety of
certifying dissimilar damages claims is also evident in doctrine about
the significance of individualized defenses. Courts routinely state that
the possibility that a defendant will have unique defenses to
18
individual claims is generally not a basis for denying certification. '
This doctrine leaves room for exceptions when the breadth and
complexity of individualized defenses pose a clear practical obstacle to
aggregate adjudication,1 8 2 but nevertheless tends to permit
certification notwithstanding the presence of dissimilar defenses that
raise problems under the finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles.
The intense focus on commonality at the certification stage
arises from the balancing test inherent in the concept of
believed. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Defeating Class Certificationin Securities FraudActions, 22
REV. LITIG. 405 (2003).
181. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc., v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 296 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000)
(rejecting a more stringent emphasis on variation among defenses as inconsistent with "the
essence of the predominance inquiry"); Lender's Title Co. v. Chandler, No. 04-41, 2004 WL
1354265 (Ark. June 17, 2004) ("[Ihe mere fact that individual issues and defenses may be raised
regarding the recovery of individual members cannot defeat class certification where there are
common questions concerning the defendant's alleged wrongdoing that must be resolved for all
class members."); Haywood v. Superior Bank FSB, 614 N.E.2d 461, 464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
("[T]he existence of individual issues, individual defenses of individual damages, multiple
theories of recovery, or even the inability of some class members to obtain relief because of a
particular individual factor will not, standing alone, defeat a class certification if the common
questions of fact or law are otherwise predominant.").
182. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 404, 414 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (finding
that "individualized, fact-intensive" questions about statute of limitations defenses predominated
over common liability questions). Cf. Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 147 n.25 (3d Cir.
1998) (affirming decertification of class and noting that "[w]e acknowledge that the existence of
affirmative defenses as to some class members may not by itself enough warrant the denial of
certification ....
But we note that the defenses are only one of many matters raising individual
issues in this case.") (internal citations omitted).
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predominance, reflecting a value judgment that the most important
question in a class action is the defendant's general liability to the
class, and that this question is so important that it outweighs - i.e.,
predominates over - collateral questions unique to individual class
members.
The doctrine likewise reflects a belief that the
predominance inquiry is inextricably linked to the procedural goal of
efficiency, to the point where courts are reluctant to allow the prospect
of individualized inquiries to derail consolidated review of more
immediately pressing common questions.
The notion that individualized defenses are categorically less
significant than common questions of liability is dubious even if one
assumes that predominance is a coherent certification standard, but is
fatally flawed when one rethinks the viability of the predominance
test in light of the principles discussed in Part III. First, with the
exception of affirmative defenses (such as laches and waiver), most
"defenses" are merely the mirror image of arguments necessary to
prove liability. For example, the defense in a fraud case that the
defendant did not induce the plaintiff to take any action is the
equivalent of arguing that the plaintiff has not carried her burden of
proving reliance. Likewise, the defense in a product liability case that
a particular item was safe and precipitated an injury only due to
misuse is the equivalent of saying that the plaintiff has not carried
her burden of proving causation. The doctrinal assumption that
"liability" and "defenses" are somehow distinct is therefore suspect,
particularly when the defendant proposes to disprove allegations of a
common classwide course of conduct with individual counterexamples
- in other words, by attempting to disprove aggregate liability by
stating defenses to individual claims.
Second, doctrine allowing certification notwithstanding salient
individualized defenses violates all three principles discussed in Part
III. The doctrine permits a certification decision without substantial
consideration of how defenses might affect the court's ability to reach
a judgment (finality), without any assessment of how defenses affect
the plaintiffs' ability to prove liability consistent with the substantive
law underlying the claim (fidelity), and without any concrete plan for
managing the case after resolution of common liability questions
(feasibility). The doctrine flourishes only because the predominance
concept hinges on a balancing test, which in turn permits courts to
define the relative importance of common questions and individualized
defenses without considering that the practical difficulty of litigating
individualized defenses might preclude certification regardless of
whether resolving common questions would otherwise be desirable.
Judicial underemphasis of defenses is thus a manifestation of the

1076

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:4:995

predominance test's failure to assess the significance of dissimilarity
among claims independently from the fairness and efficiency
considerations that generally favor aggregate resolution of common
questions. The practical consequence of this conceptual failure is that
courts routinely run the risk either that a certified action will grind to
a halt before judgment when defenses raise insurmountable
management obstacles, which would render the entire litigation a
waste of time and money;18 3 that unwieldy defenses confronted late in
litigation will instigate questionable ad hoc lawmaking to
accommodate them;1 8 4 or that the dissimilarities among defenses will
distort settlement outcomes.1 8 5 Accordingly, the doctrinal treatment
of individualized defenses under the predominance balancing analysis
is less rigorous than the finality, fidelity, and feasibility principles
would recommend.
3. Doctrine Postponing Conflict of Laws Analysis
The phenomenon of allowing a balancing test to discount
otherwise serious individualized questions is also evident in doctrine
holding that courts need not consider potential conflicts of law during
the predominance inquiry. Many class actions involve plaintiffs from
multiple states challenging conduct that occurred in their home states
or that originated in an array of intermediary states. If the laws of
states with significant contacts to the dispute materially differ, then
the court must conduct a conflict of law analysis to select the
consistent with
applicable law for each contested issue,
Substantial
constitutional 18 6 and common law 8 7 constraints.
183. A striking example of a class action collapsing under the weight of deferred
individualized issues occurred in the twenty-five-year saga of litigation arising from the 1971
prison riots in Attica, New York. The district court held a trial on common liability questions,
only to realize after several years of fruitless management efforts that the remaining
individualized defense and damage questions raised intractable management problems that
ultimately led the Second Circuit to hold, "[w]ith the benefit of hindsight," that certification had
not produced any "benefit" to the class. Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 269-71 (2d Cir. 1999).
Foresight is presumably preferable to hindsight in structuring complex and time-consuming
litigation, which further supports the need for a class action rule that focuses substantial
attention on dissimilarity before certification.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
185. In practice, most certified class actions settle, rendering the question of defenses moot.
However settlement does not solve the distortion problem - it merely displaces it to a new
context. See infra Part II.C. (analyzing how dissimilarity distorts the valuation of claims for
settlement).
186. The Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses, and possibly the Dormant
Commerce Clause, preclude states from applying forum law to the claims of class members with
whom the forum has no relevant connection. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. at art. IV, § 1;
id. at art. I, § 8. For example, if a New York resident files a nationwide class action against a
Delaware company in New York state court for fraudulent representations issued from the
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management problems arise when the outcome of the choice of the law
calculus requires applying the varying laws of multiple states to class
members' claims.
For example, each substantive motion would
require as many as fifty distinct rulings, the court would need to
instruct the jury about the law in each of as many as fifty states, and
the court would need to advise the jury about the limited admissibility
of evidence that is relevant to claims in some states but not others.
Even if the laws of the fifty states cluster into only a few distinct
formulations on each issue, the practical burden of identifying,
analyzing, and ruling on each cluster for each claim would be
18 8
daunting.
Courts in many jurisdictions prefer to avoid conflicts analysis
by holding that certification is permissible when there is an important
common question of disputed fact, regardless of whether the
implications of that fact would vary under the applicable laws of

company's Delaware headquarters, New York law might apply to the claims of class members
from New York, but cannot apply to the claims of class members from, say, Alaska. Plaintiffs
might argue that Delaware law should apply to the claims of all class members regardless of
domicile because the tortious contract arose in Delaware, but the viability of that argument
would depend on the content of the applicable choice of law rule; some choice of law rules would
favor applying the laws of each of the fifty states where injury occurred, and some might favor
applying the law of the one state where injury-causing conduct originated. Cf. Friedrich K.
Juenger, Mass Disastersand the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 110-21 (summarizing
the myriad methodologies for resolving conflict of laws in complex litigation with multistate
contacts). For analysis of the applicable constitutional questions, see BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 572-73 (1996) (state lacks power "to punish [a defendant] for conduct that was lawful where
it occurred and that had no impact on [the state] or its residents"); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S.
324, 336-37 (1989) (states cannot "control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State" and
regulate "commercial activity occurring wholly outside" their borders); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (state 'may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its borders
having no relation to anything done or to be done within them."' (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930))); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 582-83 (1986) (rejecting state's attempt to "project its legislation" into other states);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit Clauses forbid a state from applying its law to a transaction absent "significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the
occurrence or transaction"); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 399 (1924) (stating that
a Texas statute cannot govern a Tennessee insurance policy); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head,
234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) ("[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of [a State] to operate
beyond the jurisdiction of that State... without throwing down the constitutional barriers by
which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authority and upon the
preservation of which the Government under the Constitution depends."); Bonaparte v. Tax
Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) ("No State can legislate except with reference to its own
jurisdiction.").
187. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).

188. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[B]ecause we
must apply an individualized choice of law analysis ...the proliferation of disparate factual and
legal issues is compounded exponentially"), afl'd, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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different states.18 9 Although there is a contrary trend emerging in
federal appellate courts, 190 numerous state courts (who may soon no
longer face this question) 191 and federal district courts cling to the
notion that choice of law is not relevant to the certification inquiry
when there is a "predominant" common question of fact.192
The failure of courts to conduct a rigorous conflict of laws
analysis before certifying a class violates the finality, fidelity, and
feasibility principles. A court cannot know whether it has the capacity
to try claims (feasibility) consistent with substantive law (fidelity) if it
does not know which substantive laws apply and the extent of any
variations that the trier of fact would need to consider in rendering a
judgment (finality). Certification under such conditions of uncertainty
amounts to a blind guess about whether a class action would be viable.
189. See, e.g., Singer v. AT&T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 691 (S.D. Fla. 1998) ("It is wellestablished that consideration of choice of law issues at the class certification stage is generally
premature. Many courts find that it is inappropriate to decide choice of law issues incident to a
motion for class certification."); In re Kirschner Med. Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F.R.D. 74, 84 (D. Md.
1991) ("[Mlany courts have found it inappropriate to decide choice of law issues incident to a
motion for class certification."); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 135 F.R.D. 39, 41 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
("Along with other district courts in this circuit, this court declines to decide choice of law issues
on a class certification motion .. ");Peterson v. Dougherty Dawkins, Inc., 583 N.W.2d 626, 630
(N.D. 1998) ("[Clourts often decline to decide choice of law issues when determining whether to
certify a class action."); Lobo Exploration Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 991 P.2d 1048, 1051-52 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1999) (affirming certification order that "declined to decide choice of law issues incident
to a motion for class certification"). But see Dragon v. Vanguard Indus., 89 P.3d 908, 916-18
(Kan. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs bear the burden of submitting a conflict of laws analysis
sufficient to justify certification).
190. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Because
[plaintiff] seeks certification of a nationwide class for which the law of forty-eight states
potentially applies, she bears the burden of demonstrating 'a suitable and realistic plan for trial
of the class claims"' as "[uinderstanding which law will apply before making a predominance
determination is important when there are variations in applicable state law."); In re LifeUSA
Holding, 242 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2001) (faulting district court that "failed to consider how
individualized choice of law analysis of the forty-eight different jurisdictions would impact on
Rule 23's predominance requirement"); In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996)
(faulting district court that "failed to consider how the law of negligence differs from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction" before certifying nationwide state law class, and holding that the plaintiffs bore
the "burden" on this issue); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996) (district
courts have a "duty" to "consider variations in state law when a class action involves multiple
jurisdictions" and the "requirement that a court know which law will apply before making a
predominance determination is especially important when there may be differences in state
law"); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (declining to accept, "on
faith," plaintiffs' "assertion" that state laws are uniform and instead making a "considered"
judgment about choice of law questions based on "extensive analysis of state law variances"
before certifying class).
191. A new federal statute allowing removal to federal court of class actions involving
plaintiffs from multiple states will probably limit the opportunity of state courts to rule on
complex choice of law questions in class actions. See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 1092, § 4, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
192. See supra note 189.
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A certification standard that focused more directly on the finality,
fidelity, and feasibility principles therefore would not permit a court to
certify a class without first carefully considering which states' laws
applied, how those laws conflicted, and whether the conflicts would
render class adjudication impracticable.
Doctrine permitting courts to defer consideration of damages,
defenses, and choice of law until after the decision to certify a class
thus helps to underscore the flaws in the predominance test. The
predominance inquiry is not grounded in any determination about
how individualized questions affect a court's ability to litigate claims
to a final judgment pursuant to a feasible plan and consistent with
substantive law, and thus many courts have developed doctrine that is
likewise not grounded in such determinations. The result is that
certification decisions overlook factors - such as the need to litigate
individualized defenses or damages and to resolve or account for
conflicts of law - that a certification standard should consider before
determining whether a class action is a procedurally appropriate
The misplaced
mechanism for resolving a particular dispute.
among
claims at the
on
similarity
doctrine
emphasis of predominance
expense of attention to dissimilarity is thus another reason to rethink
the viability of the underlying predominance concept.
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V. PROPOSED REVISION TO RULE(23)(B)(3) AND IMPLICATIONS

The conceptual and practical flaws in the predominance test
raise the question of what should replace it.193 This Part proposes a
new "resolvability" test that would focus on whether a class action is
an appropriate means of resolving disputed claims that involve both
common and individualized elements. The proposal incorporates the
principles discussed in Part III in an effort to avoid the practical
problems discussed in Parts II and IV. After presenting my proposal
for replacing the predominance test, I discuss some of its practical and
normative implications and suggest how these implications might
inspire further scholarship about the dynamic overlap between
substantive regulation of mass risks and procedural reform of group
litigation.
A. The "Resolvability"Test
The principles discussed in Part III provide a foundation for
formulating a replacement to the predominance test. Instead of
focusing on the gestalt relationship between common and individual
questions, a new certification standard can more directly implement
broader principles that address the need for: (1) final judgments
establishing the rights and responsibilities of the parties, (2) fidelity to
substantive law, and (3) feasible plans for managing class actions
within resource constraints. A new rule should be sufficiently broad
to encompass the diverse array of potential class actions, sufficiently
narrow to guide the development of additional layers of doctrine
geared toward specific recurring problems, and sufficiently flexible to
permit classwide settlements in appropriate circumstances.
My proposal would eliminate the predominance concept by
rewriting the first clause of Rule 23(b)(3), which currently states that
193. The predominance concept is so vague that in theory there is no need to replace it;
courts and commentators could simply interpret it to more closely track the finality, fidelity, and
feasibility principles discussed in Part III. A common question would thus "predominate" over
an individual question only if the court has a feasible plan for entering a judgment on both
common and individual questions consistent with applicable substantive law. However, trying to
fix the predominance concept rather than abandoning it would be a second-best solution. The
test would still be vague and susceptible to drifting from any newly-imposed gloss, and would
still rest on an inapposite notion of balancing inherent in the meaning of the word
"predominate." Reinterpretation (or a more principled refinement of existing interpretations) of
the predominance test would at best be an interim solution pending revision of the Rule, but is
not a substitute for writing a more coherent certification standard to manage the increasingly
high-stakes process of group litigation. Notably, the 1966 drafters of Rule 23 (who wrote the
predominance test, as well as most of the rest of the current rule) did not intend for their work to
be permanently etched in stone, and recognized that further refinements might be necessary
with the benefit of accumulated experience. See supra text accompanying note 125.
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certification is permissible when the court finds that "questions of law
or fact common to members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members." 194 The amended Rule
23(b)(3) (and similar state rules) would permit certification when the
court finds that:
The court has a feasible plan to answer all disputed questions of law and fact that must
be resolved before entering judgment for or against class 1 9members
under the law
5
governing each class member's claim and applicable defenses.

Given the inexorable desire of lawyers to create shorthand
monikers for certification concepts - such as "typicality" and
"adequacy" - the new test could be called "resolvability."
The new resolvability test would combine with the existing
Rule 23(b)(3) superiority and 23(a)(2) commonality tests to require a
four-step analysis of how similarity and dissimilarity among putative
class members' claims should affect certification. First, the court
would have to determine if there is a question of law or fact common to
all class members that if answered would materially facilitate entry of
judgment for or against the class. Second, assuming that such a
common question exists, the court would have to determine if any
questions of law or fact unique to individual class members could
affect the propriety of entering judgment for or against them. Third,
assuming that material individualized questions exist, the court would
have to determine if it could feasibly resolve the individual questions
consistent with applicable substantive law governing claims and
defenses before entering judgment. Finally, assuming that there is a
feasible way to resolve individualized issues, the court would have to
decide if doing so within a class action would be superior to using
available alternative remedies. Class actions seeking damages under
Rule 23(b)(3) would thus be permissible only if they were a superior
method of feasibly adjudicating both the similar and dissimilar
aspects of class members' claims to judgment under the substantive
196
law governing claims and defenses.
194. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The proposal would require action either by the Supreme Court
under the Rules Enabling Act process, see supra note 141, or by Congress, and then parallel
action by state courts or legislatures.
195. The rest of the current rule would then continue as a new sentence: "The court must
also find that a class action is superior .... "
196. The resolvability test is unlikely to create problems related to the timing of certification
decisions that are not already present under the predominance test. If a case is sufficiently
complicated that an early resolvability decision is not possible - see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A)
(requiring courts to address certification "at an early practicable time") - then it is difficult to
imagine how a meaningful predominance analysis could be possible under the same
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Settlements of otherwise uncertifiable classes would still be
possible even under the new certification rubric, but careful scrutiny
of the negotiation process and the terms of the agreement would be
necessary to determine if the settlement is consistent with the
principles underlying the resolvability test. As explained in Part II.C,
negotiated resolutions of class actions featuring excessive dissimilarity
among claims incorporate the potential prejudicial effects of trial into
the terms of settlements, and thus courts considering certification
motions cannot assume that a future settlement will cure the defects
of an improvident certification decision. This observation, coupled
with the analysis in Part III, suggests that class action settlements
generally fall into one of three categories, each raising different levels
of concern: (1) when a class action can be certified for trial consistent
with the resolvability test, it can be fairly settled (assuming that class
members are represented adequately); (2) when a class action cannot
be certified for trial consistent with the resolvability test, but both
parties would prefer a group settlement to individualized litigation,
then a settlement might be permissible even though the resolvability
test is not satisfied, depending on myriad considerations addressed in
the literature on "settlement classes";1 97 but (3) when a class action
cannot be certified for trial consistent with the resolvability test, and a
party would prefer the absence of a class action to a negotiated
classwide agreement, then any settlement negotiated by that party in
the shadow of a certification order raises questions - beyond the scope
of this Article - about due process, voluntariness, and the normative
The
role that consent should play in dispute resolution.198
resolvability test thus does not conclusively answer the question of
when courts should encourage or approve settlements, but does
provide a new framework for considering the question and for
rethinking Rule 23's requirement that class action settlements be
"fair, reasonable, and adequate."'199
The revised version of Rule 23(b)(3) would track the principles
discussed in Part III and avoid the problems with the predominance
circumstances. Indeed, the resolvability test is an improvement over the predominance test
because its greater specificity will help to guide courts in deciding what information they need to
know and in structuring pre-trial proceedings to permit acquisition of that knowledge in
preparation for the certification decision. Although courts at the beginning of a case - before
substantial discovery - cannot always know exactly which factual and legal questions will be
salient at the end of a case, limited discovery coupled with the parties' analysis of what each
hopes to prove and disprove should be sufficient in most cases to permit courts to make
reasonably informed certification decisions.
197. See supra note 90.
198. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C).
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test discussed in Part IV.
Instead of relegating analysis of
dissimilarity to the vague and conceptually hollow predominance
balancing test, a revised rule would ground certification analysis
directly in broader principles that should animate the class action
device. Rather than silently hoping that courts apply class action
rules consistently with broader principles, the new rule would require
courts to do so by incorporating these principles directly into the text
of the rule. The principles regarding final judgments, fidelity to
substantive law, and feasible management within resource constraints
discussed in Part III would no longer be mere aspirations of class
action jurisprudence, and instead would factor directly into day-to-day
decisionmaking.
The dubious doctrines that predominance has
spawned - such as the notions that consideration of defenses,
damages, and choice of law are irrelevant at the certification stage would fade away because they are facially inconsistent with the
20 0
concept of resolvability.
The proposed resolvability test would also mitigate the
problems of cherry-picking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking
discussed in Part II. All three problems arise when courts permit
certification to obscure the differences among dissimilar aspects of
claims and defenses, such that the trier of fact perceives commonality
in circumstances where there is really individuality.
A revised
certification standard that spotlights dissimilarity will make
individualized issues much less prevalent in certified class actions and
much more prominent in the cases in which they remain. Adherence
to the fidelity principle should reduce instances of ad hoc lawmaking,
and adherence to the finality and feasibility principles should ensure
that procedural mechanisms exist to highlight the dissimilar aspects
of class members' claims so that claim fusion and cherry-picking
20 1
become harder to attempt and easier to detect.
200. Plaintiffs might attempt to evade revisions to Rule 23(b)(3) by trying to squeeze (b)(3)
classes into the (b)(1) or (b)(2) molds, but doctrine exists to prevent such circumvention of the
(b)(3) requirements. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834-48 (1999) (reviewing
limits on (b)(1) class actions); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410-18 (5th Cir.
1998) (reviewing limits on (b)(2) class actions).
201. The resolvability test's focus on dissimilarity may also have the added benefit of
creating incentives for plaintiffs' lawyers to structure class definitions in a manner that
minimizes the likelihood that class members with strong claims will subsidize members with
weaker claims. Plaintiffs' lawyers currently have an incentive to define proposed classes as
broadly as possible to encompass the maximum number of fee-generating damages recipients. If
we assume that lawyers initially focus on claims with the highest value, we can surmise that as
the class definition grows broader, the new entrants will have claims with progressively less
merit and value, in effect diluting the value of the initial members' claims. Amending Rule
23(b)(3) creates an opportunity to reverse incentives regarding the breadth of class definitions. A
rational plaintiffs' lawyer must balance the marginal potential gain from expanding the class
definition against the catastrophic loss that would ensue if a court concludes that the class
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Eliminating the predominance test would not eliminate
subjectivity from certification decisions, but would help to redirect
subjective analysis along more relevant lines and facilitate
Both the
development of doctrine to guide decisionmaking.
predominance and resolvability tests entail subjective elements, but
the predominance test is so conceptually hollow that it has not
generated coherent doctrine to help structure judicial discretion. In
contrast, the subjective inquiries arising from the proposed
resolvability test are linked to practical and theoretical guideposts
that should permit courts to develop a helpful body of precedent to
guide certification analysis. The primary areas of subjectivity under
the proposed rule involve: (1) determining what is and is not "feasible"
for a court to accomplish in a class action; (2) identifying creative and
yet acceptable mechanisms to "resolve" claims in a class proceeding;
and (3) deciding when a defense is sufficiently likely to be "applicable,"
or when a question is sufficiently "disputed," to raise a potential
obstacle to certification. These questions will recur in numerous
contexts but will raise similar practical problems that should over
time generate a body of precedent to provide relatively concrete
20 2
guidance to courts struggling with certification decisions.
definition is too broad and therefore refuses to certify any class or sua sponte defines a much
narrower class. The lawyer will assess the risk of expanding the class definition in light of how
the court is likely to react, which in turn is a function of the procedural standard governing
judicial review of class definitions. Thus, if the resolvability standard would be less receptive
than the predominance standard to broadly defined classes that encompass substantial
dissimilarity, then lawyers will likely try to frame their proposed classes more narrowly (unless
they are risk-takers, in which case they might still frame classes broadly with the hope of being
able to submit a narrower class definition if the court rejects the broad definition). Assuming
that a narrow class has a higher proportion of members with meritorious claims, then the
resolvability test would help to ensure that marginal claimants with comparatively low-value
claims do not dilute the distribution of an aggregate award. Plaintiffs with low-value claims
could of course still file their own separate class actions, but the settlement value of their claims
would presumably be relatively low.
202. For example, plaintiffs and defendants will often dispute whether the myriad individual
defenses that the defendant insists must be litigated are likely to meaningfully alter the outcome
of any particular class member's claim or are simply hypothetical musings designed to throw a
wrench into the certification machinery. See supra note 91. As this dispute recurs, courts will
develop standards for parsing credible defenses that should be adjudicated from dubious
defenses thrust into the case solely for tactical purposes. The ensuing doctrine would not be
unduly novel, as many federal courts already engage in similar pre-certification analysis of
substantive issues that are likely to arise in the course of class litigation. See Gen. Tel. Co. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) ("[S]ometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind
the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question."); E. Texas Motor Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 406 n.12 (1977) ("Where no class has been certified, however,
and the class claims remain to be tried, the decision whether the named plaintiffs should
represent a class is appropriately made on the full record, including the facts developed at the
trial of plaintiffs' individual claims."). Similar kinds of questions about tactical pleading also
arise in diversity cases when courts must determine if a non-diverse party is properly part of a
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Jettisoning the concept of predominance in favor of a more
nuanced focus on the ability of class litigation to resolve both common
and individualized aspects of claims and defenses should therefore
better align the principle and practice of class litigation. A new
procedural rule will not end the debate over the desirability of class
actions as remedies for group injuries, but could help reorient that
debate by eliminating the distracting practical and conceptual
problems that the predominance inquiry creates.

B. Avenues for FurtherScholarship
The resolvability test - and in particular its emphasis on
fidelity to substantive law - is likely to reduce the frequency of class
actions absent countervailing changes to the substantive rules that
class actions enforce. The primary reason that some cases will not be
amenable to certification is that traditional tort law and many
statutory causes of action incorporate a compensation model of
entitlements that hinges on proof of individualized questions of fact
and law, such that plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in their favor
only if they can prove elements of a claim that are tied to each
person's unique circumstances. 203 Defendants presumably will latch
on to individualized issues involved in proving entitlement to
judgment as a basis for defeating certification. Thus, while the
predominance test tolerates comparatively heavy emphasis on
common elements of class members' claims, the resolvability test
would attach heightened significance to individualized aspects of
claims and defenses that materially affect the propriety of entering
judgment for or against individual claimants, which would tend to
justify fewer proposed class actions.
The practical consequences of the resolvability test raise three
interrelated questions for future scholarship that highlight the
indeterminate boundaries between substantive and procedural
considerations in group litigation. The first question posits a need to
develop procedures responsive to substantive objectives, the second
question posits that achieving substantive objectives may require
tailoring liability and damages rules to available procedures, and the
third question posits that the criteria for measuring the quality of a
case or has been "fraudulently joined" solely to defeat federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Marshall v.
Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232-33 (4th Cir. 1993).
203. Compare note 3 supra (discussing common law and statutory causation and reliance
elements that hinder certification), with note 24 supra (discussing how federal statutes
regulating securities permit inferences of causation and reliance that facilitate certification).
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procedure requires a value judgment linked to the aspirations of the
substantive laws that the procedure must implement. All three
questions address the regulatory vacuum that decreased availability
of the class action would create while illuminating the dynamic
interplay of substantive and procedural considerations in the
regulation of mass risks.
First, if class actions will be less available to compensate
victims of legal wrongs, procedural architects must develop alternative
compensation mechanisms to overcome the collective action problems
that often make civil litigation impracticable in cases involving large
numbers of somewhat similar and somewhat dissimilar injuries.
Class actions are not the only means of aggregating claims, and thus
any procedural reform that makes class actions more difficult to
sustain without removing claimants' underlying preference to
aggregate requires investigating alternatives to class litigation. 20 4
Second, courts and legislators should consider the extent to which
substantive remedies favoring compensation over deterrence are
worth their cost in procedural flexibility. By stressing the practical
consequences of dissimilarity among otherwise common class claims,
this Article highlights how substantive laws that fixate on individual
entitlements to damages rather than the scope of the defendant's
wrongful behavior complicate and potentially preclude aggregative
litigation. 20 5 If the price of focusing on individual entitlements is that
those entitlements become more difficult to vindicate in class actions,
then it is worth thinking about whether the focus of statutory and
common law rights should transform to facilitate group litigation and
the deterrent pressures that such litigation creates. 206

204. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement:
An InstitutionalAccount of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1573 (2004) (noting that
even without class actions, tort claims have "persistently resolved themselves into what are
essentially bureaucratized, aggregate settlement structures"); Howard M. Erichson, Mississippi
Class Actions and the Inevitability of Aggregate Litigation, Miss. C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005)
("[A] prohibition on class actions channels mass disputes into other modes of formal and informal
aggregate dispute resolution."). Even when individualized claim processing is preferable to
aggregation, some procedures are relatively more amenable to high volumes of claims than
others. For example, Congress has created compensation systems that depend on administrative
rather than judicial adjudication, such as programs linked to black lung disease, see 30 U.S.C. §§
901 et seq, the side effects of vaccines, see 42 U.S.C. § 300aa et seq., and the September 11
terrorist attacks, see Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001).
205. See supra note 3 (citing examples of substantive reforms that facilitate aggregate
litigation).
206. Assessments of procedural innovations are inextricably intertwined with preferences
regarding the laws that procedures enforce. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the
"Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 299-300 (1973) ("Whether we characterize any
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Finally, a corollary to the preceding point about the relative
importance of compensation and deterrence is that this Article's
emphasis on dissimilarity among claims highlights an open question
about the distributive implications and relative desirability of overA
and under-deterrence, and over- and under-compensation.
consequence of aggregating dissimilar claims is that the trial and
settlement distortions discussed in Part II may cause defendants to
pay higher or lower damages than the applicable substantive law
requires. Likewise, the allocation of damage awards among class
members may be imperfect, such that some will receive more than
they deserve under the applicable substantive law, and some will
receive less. Aggregation of dissimilar claims can thus over- or underdeter, and both over- and under-compensate. Yet not aggregating
claims creates analogous harms. The collective action problems that
arise absent aggregation may prevent victims of a wrong from
obtaining a remedy, 20 7 and even when adjudication is feasible
plaintiffs will have varying chances of success depending on their
ability to bear the burdens of litigating alone, the quality of their
counsel, and the idiosyncrasies of the judge and jury. Alternatively,
individual nuisance suits on weak claims might extract larger
settlements than would be possible if the defendant could lower its
transaction costs by fighting all related claims in the same proceeding.
Thus, the absence of aggregation creates the potential for over- or
under-deterrence and both over- and under-compensation. Among the
normative questions that arise from this analysis are whether overdeterrence is preferable to under-deterrence, whether overcompensation is preferable to under-compensation, and whether either
preference depends on if the procedural cause of the over-/underproblem is a rule fostering access to adjudication or a rule foreclosing
it. The answers to these questions will influence the design of
substantive regulations and procedural rules by helping to prioritize
the relative importance of access to adjudication, accurate resolution
of aggregate claims, and accurate resolution of individual claims.
Highlighting the procedural consequences of aggregating dissimilar
claims thus helps to illuminate a broader set of problems affecting
deterrence and remediation of large-scale injuries.
Refining certification criteria to grapple more directly with
dissimilarity among claims would thus have both substantive and
procedural consequences, necessitating further creative efforts at
substantive and procedural innovation. There is a connection between
revised [class action] practice as an 'abuse' or a 'reform' depends largely on our evaluation of
policies underlying the type of litigation likely to be affected.").
207. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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when class actions are available, what class actions can accomplish,
and how much compensation and deterrence substantive laws can
achieve. Adjusting one link in the chain requires rethinking the
others
In sum, it is time to excise "predominance" from the vernacular
of class action discourse and replace it with a more practical
"resolvability" approach that recognizes the problems of cherrypicking, claim fusion, and ad hoc lawmaking
principles of finality, fidelity, and feasibility.
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Philanthropy has a dirty little secret-that a gift to public
charity restricted to a specific purpose is often used in ways not
intended by the donor. In most states, the attorney general is the
agent for enforcement of such gifts (an arrangement that recognizes
the public's role as the ultimate beneficiary of any public charity).
But attorney general offices are beset with difficulties that make it
impossible to monitor how each charity administers restricted gifts.
Donors-whose restricted gifts play a vital role in the charitable
sector as a source not only of funding but also mission-are
increasingly aware that their restrictionsare ignored. Frustratedby
lax enforcement, donors are pursuing standing to enforce their
restrictions.
In Smithers v. St. Luke's/Roosevelt Hospital, the donor's
widow succeeded in obtaining standing, even after the Attorney
General had entered into a settlement agreement with the hospital.
Donors with their restrictedgifts (often representingpersonal beliefs
and social agenda) keep the charitable sector vital and ensure its
diversity. Nevertheless, such restrictionsexist in perpetuity and can
result in an effective privatizationof a charity's mission, especially if
the charity is not free to interpret a restrictionin response to change.
Even though such restrictionsare legally binding on the charity, the
Attorney General in the exercise of her prosecutorialdiscretion can
effectively allow certain restrictions to lapse, preserving thereby the
autonomy of the charity. Thus, Smithers has enormous implications
for the autonomy of charitable organizations and their capacity to
respond independently to change.
Public charity occupies a large part of what is termed "civil
society." As a background to evaluate the trade-offs inherent in
Smithers, Professor Goodwin examines the conclusions of recent
studies documenting the problem of participation in all areas of

American life (including, for example, Robert Putnam's "Bowling
Alone") to argue that, given the fragile state of civil society, a
liberalization of the standing rules is an important incentive to
continued participationby donors-anda boon to the vitality of civil
society. She also proposes, again for the sake of civil society, certain
changes in the doctrines governing fiduciary duty to allow the
charity more autonomy in interpretingrestrictions.

